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Abstract
Formation control of autonomous connected vehicles is one of the typical
problems addressed in the general context of networked control systems.
By leveraging this paradigm, a platoon composed by multiple connected
and automated vehicles is represented as one-dimensional network of
dynamical agents, in which each agent only uses its neighboring informa-
tion to locally control its motion, while it aims to achieve certain global
coordination with all other agents. Within this theoretical framework,
control algorithms are traditionally designed based on an implicit assump-
tion of unlimited bandwidth and perfect communication environments.
However, in practice, wireless communication networks, enabling the
cooperative driving applications, introduce unavoidable communication
impairments such as transmission delay and packet losses that strongly
affect the performances of cooperative driving. Moreover, in addition
to this problem, wireless communication networks can suffer different
security threats. The challenge in the control field is hence to design coop-
erative control algorithms that are robust to communication impairments
and resilient to cyber attacks. The work aim is to tackle and solve these
challenges by proposing different properly designed control strategies.
They are validated both in analytical, numerical and experimental ways.
Obtained results confirm the effectiveness of the strategies in coping with
communication impairments and security vulnerabilities.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Contributions
Connected autonomous vehicles have recently attracted extensive re-
search interest due to its potential to benefit the road traffic significantly,
e.g. enhancing road safety, improving traffic capacity and smoothness,
and reducing fuel consumption [191, 57, 122, 126, 130]. The fundamental
aim is to cooperatively drive the road by operating vehicles platoon that
maintain an optimal inter-vehicular spacing policy, tracking at the same
time desired speed and acceleration profiles. In this driving paradigm
all connected vehicles embed wireless communication hardware in order
to share information with neighbors and to receive the reference signal
coming from the leading vehicle. To support Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS) applications, both the Wi-Fi networks, based on IEEE
802.11p communication standard protocol [6], and the mobile network
4G/5G [35] are exploited. On the basis of information received from
vehicles within the platoon, the on-board control algorithm is responsible
of the safe tracking of the desired velocity and acceleration profile, i.e.
vehicles have to track the leader motion, while respecting at the same
time a pre-determined inter-vehicles spacing policy [8, 14].
Formation control of autonomous connected vehicles is one of the typical
problems addressed in the general context of networked control systems
(e.g. see [162, 59, 170, 174, 167, 111, 151, 60, 92] and references therein).
By leveraging this paradigm, a platoon composed by multiple connected
 20 1 Introduction
and automated vehicles is represented as one-dimensional network of
dynamical agents, in which each agent only uses its neighboring informa-
tion to locally control its motion, while it aims to achieve certain global
coordination with all other agents[155].
Within this theoretical framework, control algorithms are tradition-
ally designed based on an implicit assumption of unlimited bandwidth
and perfect communication environments [68]. However, in practice,
communication resources are limited and not perfect. Indeed, wireless
communications, enabling the cooperative driving applications, introduce
unavoidable communication impairments such as transmission delay and
packet losses that strongly affect the performances of cooperative driving
[30, 218]. Communication time-delay and other networked-induced phe-
nomena are hence crucial in cooperative driving application since they
may lead the vehicular network to instability. Therefore, for the practical
implementation of distributed strategies, they have to be taken into
account from the beginning of the control design phase and the challenge
in the control field is hence to design cooperative control algorithms that
are resilient and robust to communication impairments.
This problem has been tackled in the current literature under the restric-
tive assumption that the communication delay is unique (or homogeneous,
uniform, identical as indifferently referred in the technical literature) and
often constant (see e.g. [135, 139, 86, 90, 182, 91, 123]).
However, when treating with communication networks, each communica-
tion link, that connects a pair of vehicles, is affected by a different variable
time-delay that depends from actual conditions, or possible impairments,
of the communication channel. It follows that the hypothesis commonly
made in the technical literature of a unique and constant network delay
may result unrealistic and that delays, affecting the outdated information
that are used to compute the control input, have to be considered as
a multiple time-varying functions depending from the specific commu-
nication link under investigation [153]. Indeed, time-delay itself might
obey its own dynamics, which possibly depend on the communication
distance, total computation load and computation capability.
Moreover, in addition to this problem, wireless communication networks
can suffer different security threats. In collaborative driving applications,
the sudden appearance of a malicious attack can mainly compromise: i)
the correctness of data traffic flow on the vehicular network by sending
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malicious messages that alter the platoon formation and its coordinated
motion; ii) the safety of platooning application by altering vehicular
network communication capability. In view of the fact that cyber attacks
can lead to dangerous implications for the security of autonomous driving
systems, it is fundamental to consider their effects on the behavior of
the interconnected vehicles, and to try to limit them from the control
design stage. Past studies on wireless communication networks security
vulnerabilities focus their attention on an accurate classification of mali-
cious attacks and the solutions to mitigate them at communication level
[4]. However, while security in sensing and communication has been
extensively investigated in the technical literature, security in control
has been recently indicated as a key ingredient that has to be added
for enhancing the protection level of the normal operation of a physical
process [75, 124].
From control viewpoint, recent literature on the security of the networked
cyber-physical systems is usually devoted to designing state estimators for
the better understanding of system dynamical behaviors and the attack
detection (see survey [50] and references therein). The exploitation of the
cooperation property of the networked control systems paradigm, or more
precisely the exploitation of all information exchanged among the agents
within the networked control system, could be also a promising solution
so to counteract security vulnerabilities [151]. However, many issues
are still open, as for example the need of designing distributed control
protocols able to cope simultaneously with network induced phenomena
- such as the unavoidable delays that affect in practice the information
shared via a wireless channel - and different kinds of possible cyberattacks
[50].
Hence, from the literature overview on cooperative driving control strate-
gies, and more in general on the networked control systems, the following
main challenges arise:
1. Designing distributed cooperative control algorithms that are re-
silient and robust to multiple time-varying communication delays
and packet losses.
2. Designing resilient secure distributed control algorithms able to
counteract different security vulnerabilities when considering the
wireless communication network non-ideal.
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The aim of this thesis is to tackle and solve both the challenges by propos-
ing different properly designed control strategies. Specifically, for dealing
with the challenge 1 a novel adaptive distributed cooperative approach
is proposed so to achieve the cooperative driving despite the presence of
communication delays, assumed to be heterogeneous (multiple) and time-
varying. The proposed control strategy updates its action on the basis
of state errors among the vehicle itself and the delayed state information
received from neighboring vehicles through the wireless communication
network. On-board controllers, that automatically compensates the out-
dated information caused by network delays, compute a not-identical
control input since different adaptive gains are associated to each commu-
nication link. The adaptive approach has been chosen since it provides
robustness with respect to unmodeled dynamics and uncertain parame-
ters [193, 154], so to better counteract the effects of all disturbances that
always characterize real vague environments. To disclose this aspect a
detailed robustness analysis w.r.t. external disturbances is also provided.
The stability of the adaptive strategy is analytically proven by exploiting
the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method and the stability criterion is expressed
as a Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) whose solution also provides the
estimate of the delay margin that guarantees stability. The effectiveness
of the proposed strategy is shown by using PLEXE[169, 170, 167], a state
of the art inter-vehicular communications and mobility simulator that
includes basic building blocks for platooning.
Again for addressing the challenge 1, we also propose a nonlinear finite
controller for the specific cooperative driving applications of autonomous
vehicles approaching the traffic junction. The crossing problem is recast
as the control of a virtual longitudinal platoon that opportunely arranges
the vehicles that may be in different lanes of the junction and may
have different directional intentions. Specifically, this recast has been
proposed in the seminal work [188] and recently exploited in [132], where
a just simulation study shows the performance of a classical longitudinal
(virtual platooning) controller based on a linear CACC strategy which is
essentially an inter-vehicle distance control algorithm that ensures the
string stability, i.e. ensures that once at steady-state, the inter-vehicular
distances are kept constant. However, for safety reasons, a fundamental
problem is to guarantee, besides the robustness to communication impair-
ments, from the very beginning of control design, that the desired virtual
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formation is effectively reached before vehicles enter the Conflicting Area
(CA), i.e. the intersection core area where collisions could occur. To face
this issue, a completely distributed nonlinear finite-time control strategy
for cooperative vehicles negotiating an intersection is proposed. Colli-
sions are, hence, prevented due to the achievement of the desired virtual
formation in a finite time T before the first vehicle accesses the CA.
Moreover, the control protocol guarantees desired inter-vehicle distances
among virtual platoon members such that real vehicles access the CA
in a mutually exclusive fashion, while the simultaneous achievement of
a common platoon velocity ensures that the desired formation will be
preserved once reached. The stability analysis is an on-going work and
its effectiveness is validated in numerical and experimental way.
For dealing with the challenge 2 we propose a novel distributed collab-
orative strategy that guarantees the platoon formation in adversarial
environment and that allows to promptly react to security vulnerabilities
such as messages manipulation attacks and communication capability
attacks. The proposed distributed control approach also leverages a
real-time voting technique to achieve the complete mitigation of some of
the most critical effects due to malicious attacks. This does not imply
that we aim to substitute other solutions for security, such as the crypto-
graphic ones [121] that work at the information level to avoid that the
content of the information can be somehow altered. Our aim is to provide
further countermeasures to detect, mitigate and, if possible, counteract
cyber threats that may alter driving decision at control level so to help
increasing the overall security of the ensemble of the connected vehicles.
The stability of the proposed secure control strategy is demonstrated by
exploiting the Lyapunov-Krasovskii theory and an extensive simulation
analysis discloses the effectiveness, the robustness and resiliency of the
proposed approach and its capabilities in reacting to the malicious attack
effects.
Some of the proposed cooperative driving control strategies have been
also experimentally validated during on the road tests that have been
carried out at the AstaZero test track near Gothenburg (Sweden) and
have involved three vehicles properly equipped for autonomous driving
and connected via wireless communication network. Specifically the ex-
perimental tests refer to the cooperative crossing problem of autonomous
vehicles approaching a traffic junction and sharing information via 5G
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mobile communication network. Experimental results indicate that the
proposed approach is effective in guaranteeing the safe crossing in real
on-the-road scenarios. Note that, with no loss of generality, the presented
experimental setup can be easily used also for testing all the control
strategies proposed in this thesis.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The thesis is structured as follows.
• In Chapter 2 some useful concepts and definitions are summarized
for the sake of clarity.
• In Chapter 3, after presenting the cooperative driving systems, we
describe how to model them as networked control systems. More-
over, we highlight the open control problems both in cooperative
driving application field and in the general context of networked
control systems.
• In Chapter 4 we solve the cooperative driving problem by propos-
ing a novel distributed adaptive synchronization-based control
strategy able to effectively operate on information, exchanged via
vehicular networks, despite the presence of unavoidable commu-
nication impairments, such as multiple time-varying delays (that
affect communication links) and packet losses. Herein, we analyti-
cally demonstrate the convergence of the control approach via a
Lyapunov-Krasovskii approach. The effectiveness of the proposed
strategy is shown via an extensive numerical simulations in PLEXE.
Note that the content of this chapter has been presented in [155].
• In Chapter 5 we study the robustness property of the adaptive
control protocol proposed in Chapter 4 in counteracting both mul-
tiple time-varying communication delays and external disturbances.
The robust stability is proven via the Lyapunov-Krasovskii the-
ory. Delay-dependent LMIs conditions are analytically derived for
ensuring both robust synchronization to the leader dynamics and
disturbances attenuation. An exemplar simulation result discloses
the effectiveness of the approach. Note that the content of this
chapter has been presented in [48].
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• In Chapter 6 we focus on some relevant types of malicious threats
that affect the platoon safety, i.e. application layer attacks (Spoof-
ing and Message Falsification) and network layer attacks (Denial
of Service and Burst Transmission), and we propose a novel collab-
orative consensus-based control strategy for enhancing the protec-
tion level of autonomous platoons and hence counteracting them.
The control protocol stability is analytically demonstrated via
the Lyapunov-Krasovkii approach and numerically validated via
PLEXE simulator. Note that the content of this chapter has been
presented in [152].
• In Chapter 7 we focus on cooperative driving control of autonomous
vehicles approaching a traffic junction. The cooperative crossing
application is addressed by recasting the intersection geometry
as a virtual platoon and solved by leveraging a distributed finite-
time controller that exploits outdated information, shared via
the brand new 5G communication network, to proper compute
its action. The stability of the closed-loop is an on-going work
and hence not reported in this thesis. Numerical simulations
disclose the effectiveness of the control approach in guaranteeing
the cooperative crossing of autonomous vehicles at traffic junction
without collisions.
• In Chapter 8 an overview of the experimental setup, composed of
three prototype vehicles and used to validate some of the proposed
cooperative driving control strategy, is presented; details on both
the hardware and software solutions are provided. Specifically,
the experimental tests refer to the cooperative crossing problem
presented in Chapter 7. The experimental results achieved during
the on the road tests at AstaZero confirm the effectiveness of
the strategy in guaranteeing the safe crossing in real on-the-road
scenarios.
• In Chapter 9 conclusions are drawn.
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CHAPTER 2
Mathematical preliminaries
and Background
2.1 Cooperative Control of networked dynami-
cal systems
Networked dynamical systems consist of groups (i.e. ensemble) of
dynamical systems exchanging their information and interacting with
each other through wireless/wired communication networks, in order
to agree, for example, upon a certain quantity of interest. Many real
systems in nature and human society can be modeled as networked
dynamical systems thus in the last two decades cooperative systems
have received a compelling attention in different research fields such
as physics sciences, mathematics, economic science and engineering
[183]. Many researchers, inspired by natural occurrence of flocking
and formation forming, have focused their work on synchronization,
consensus and coordination of networked dynamical systems [86, 118], i.e.
in controlling the whole network in order to produce a common behavior
by applying distributed algorithms and to guarantee a smart group
behavior. Examples in engineering deal with the coordinated motion of
autonomous vehicles [163, 170, 169, 167, 151, 60], the phase or frequency
synchronization in power grids [166, 51], and the synchronization of
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Figure 2.1: Example of networked dynamical systems in engi-
neering.
wireless sensor networks [181, 210] (see Fig. 2.1).
2.1.1 Networked Dynamical systems Modeling
Basically, to model the networked dynamical systems we have to define:
1. A model of each dynamical system within the network, called agent
or node;
2. The interaction protocol between agents;
3. The structure of the communication which indicates how and if
an agent obtains information about other agents depending on the
active communication links.
Each agent can be thought of as a generic non-linear control system of
the form:
x˙i(t) = fi(xi(t)) + gi(xi(t))ui(t), (2.1)
with xi(t) ∈ Rn and ui(t) ∈ Rm.
The interaction between agents can be modeled by choosing an appro-
priate coupling law. For example, the coupling between nodes can be
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modeled as:
ui(t) = σ
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
αi,jh(xi(t), xj(t)), (2.2)
where σ is the coupling gain, αi,j model the presence/absence of coupling
between agents in the network and h(xi(t), xj(t)) refers to the particular
protocol used.
The communication structure is modeled by a graph where every agent
is a node and every communication link connecting a pair of agents
is an edge. Hence a network of N dynamical agents is modeled as an
N -order graph G = (V, E) where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of
edges [189]. There are different ways to characterize mathematically a
network [69]. One of these representation is given by adjacency matrix.
The adjacency matrix A is a matrix whose elements are 1 if and only if
exists an edge from vertex i to vertex j. Consider an undirected network
G = (V, E) with N vertices, and let’s label the vertices with integer labels
(1, ..., N). If we denote an edge between vertices i and j by (i, j) then
the complete network can be specified by the matrix A ∈ RN×N , whose
elements are so defined:
αi,j =
{
1 if : (i, j) ∈ E
0 otherwise
. (2.3)
In some situations, however, it is useful to represent edges as having
a strength, weight, or value to them, usually a real number. Thus in
the Internet, for example, edges might have weights representing the
amount of data flowing along them or their bandwidth. In this case we
speak about weighted networks and the adjacency matrix will not have
only elements equal to 1 or 0. Furthermore we can speak about delayed
networks if the communication between agent i.e. each link of the network,
is affected by a time-delay even though the agent is characterized by an
own non delayed dynamics. To characterize analytically this situation, it
is possible to define for each edge (i, j) ∈ E a function τi,j(t) that model
the communication delay among the agent i nd the agent j. Indeed
the assumption that there exist a communication time-delay between
agent is a very realistic assumption for many real system as the World
Wide Web. In reality the communication is not instantaneous, but the
exchanged information is affected by a time-delay although sometimes
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negligible. For every node vi ∈ V , we can define the set of neighbours Ni
as the subset of V defined as follow:
Ni = {j ∈ V : αi,j 6= 0} . (2.4)
The degree of a vertex in a graph is the number of edges connected to
it. We will denote the degree of vertex i by ∆i. In general ∆i is so
calculated:
∆i =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
αi,j . (2.5)
Furthermore we can define the diagonal matrix ∆ ∈ RN×N whose
diagonal element are the vertex degrees:
∆ =

∆1 0 ... 0
0 ∆2 ... 0
... ... ... ...
0 0 ... ∆n
 . (2.6)
Thanks to the degree matrix ∆ and to the adjacency matrix A, we can
define an another important matrix, called Laplacian matrix L ∈ RN×N .
L = ∆−A (2.7)
For construction, the Laplacian matrix has zero row-sum, hence, at least
one eigenvalue will be zero.
2.1.1.1 Digraph Propriety
A directed network or directed graph, also called a digraph for short, is
a network in which each edge has a direction, pointing from one vertex
to another. Such edges are themselves called directed edges, and can be
represented by lines with arrows on them. Example of directed network
is the World Wide Web, in which hyper-links run in one direction from
one web page to another. Conversely a graph is defined undirected if
each edge has not a direction. A digraph is strongly connected if there
is a path from every node to every other node. A strong component of
a digraph is an induced subgraph that is maximal, which is subject to
being strongly connected. A directed tree is a digraph in which every
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node has exactly one parent node with the exception of one node, which
is called the root, which has no parent and has a directed path to every
other node. We say that j is reachable from node i if there exists a path
from node i to node j. A node is said to be globally reachable if it is
reachable from any other node in the graph. In the case of undirected
graph the Laplacian matrix is a symmetric matrix with zero row-sum
and real spectrum. For a digraph the Laplacian matrix is so defined:
L = [li,j ] =
 li,i =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
αi,j
li,j = −αi,j i 6= j
(2.8)
2.1.2 Consensus and Synchronization in networked dy-
namical systems
In networks of agents (or dynamical systems), consensus means to reach
an agreement regarding a certain quantity of interest that depends on the
state of all agents. A consensus algorithm (or protocol) is an interaction
rule that specifies the information exchange between an agent and all
of its neighbours on the network [143]. Every agent exploit the same
algorithm and take decision thanks to the local available information
and those that receive from the other agents.
Consider a network of agents interested in reaching a consensus via
local communication with their neighbours on a graph G = (V, E) that
represent the agent connection. By reaching a consensus, we mean
asymptotically converging to a constant agreement value, i.e.:
lim
t−→∞xi(t) = x¯ ∀i ∈ V (2.9)
being x¯ the collective decision of the group.
Most early papers on networked dynamical systems address consensus
problem without considering the presence of a leader node, so all nodes
are commanded to converge toward a not prescribed common evolution.
Synchronization, in the sense of cooperative tracking, has been then
studied by adding a leader that imposes the desired behavior to a group
of agents to achieve the command trajectory (e.g., see [205], [119] and
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references therein). According to [112], we say that the networked
dynamical systems achieve synchronization if
lim
t→∞ ‖xi(t)− x0(t)‖ = 0, i = 1, . . . N, (2.10)
where xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xin)
T ∈ Rn are the state variables of node i and
x0 = (x01, x02, . . . , x0n)
T ∈ Rn are the reference state variables of the
leader node. The hyperplane:
S =
{[
x>1 (t), x
>
2 (t), ..., x
>
N (t)
]> ∈ RN×N : xi(t) = xj(t) = x0(t)}
for i, j = 1, 2, ..., N is said to be the synchronization manifold of the
networked dynamical systems.
2.2 Stability of Continuos-Time Systems
In what follow some useful results about stability of linear system are
recalled. We begin by considering the familiar linear state equation:
x˙(t) = Ax(t). (2.11)
For this class of systems, the following result hold:
Theorem 1. (Lyapunov stability for linear systems) Consider a linear
system in the form of (2.11) and let A ∈ RN×N . The following statements
are equivalent:
• all the eigenvalues of A have negative real part;
• for all matrices Q = Q> > 0 there exists an unique solution
P = P> > 0 to the following (Lyapunov) equation:
AP> + PA = −Q (2.12)
Consider now, a time varying linear system in the form:
x˙(t) = A(t)x(t), (2.13)
for A ∈ RN×N and t ∈ R. Without loss of generality, assume that
Eq. (2.13) has equilibrium x = 0. To establish asymptotic stability
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of this equilibrium, a standard approach is to seek standard quadratic
Lyapunov function associated with Eq. (2.13). A typical choice is the
classical quadratic function V (x(t)) = x(t)>Px(t). Evaluating the time
derivative V˙ (t) along the system trajectory we have:
V˙ (x(t)) = x(t)>
[
A(t)>P + PA(t)
]
x(t), (2.14)
and thus it is sufficient to seek a matrix P ∈ S+n which satisfies the
continuous-time algebraic Lyapunov equation:
A(t)>P + PA(t) = −M(t), (2.15)
where M(t) ∈ S+n is given. Here, S+n denotes the set of real, n × n
positive definite symmetric matrices.
Theorem 2. [42] The unique solution of Eq. (2.15) is given by:
P =
∫ ∞
t0
φ>A(s, t0)M(t)φA(s, t0)ds, (2.16)
where φA(t, t0) is the transition matrix for the system Eq. (2.13). More-
over, P ∈ S+n whenever M(t) ∈ S+n
On the other hand, suppose we seek a Lyapunov function of the form
V (x(t)) = x(t)>P (t)x(t), the emphasis being that P is time varying.
Then
V˙ (x(t)) = x(t)>
[
A(t)>P (t) + P (t)A(t) + P˙ (t)
]
x(t), (2.17)
and so we seek a P (t) ∈ S+n which satisfies the continuous-time differential
Lyapunov equation
A(t)>P (t) + P (t)A(t) + P˙ (t) = −M(t), (2.18)
where M(t) ∈ S+n is specified.
Theorem 3. [42] The unique solution of Eq. (2.18), subject to the
initial condition P (t0) = P0 is given by:
P (t) = φ−>A (t, t0)P (t0)φ
−1
A (t, t0)−
∫ ∞
t0
φ>A(s, t0)M(t)φA(s, t0)ds (2.19)
where φA(t, t0) is the transition matrix for the system Eq. (2.13). More-
over, P ∈ S+n whenever M(t) ∈ S+n
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2.3 Time-Delay Systems Theory
Time delay systems are systems in which a significant time delay exists
between the applications of input to the system and their resulting effect.
Such systems arise from an inherent time delay in the components of
the system or from a deliberate introduction of time delay into the
system for control purposes. Such time delay systems can be represented
by delay differential equations, which belong to the class of functional
differential equations [203]. The analysis of time-delay systems is a well-
developed field gathering a lot of different techniques. These methods
can be categorized to either belong to frequency-domain or time-domain
techniques. Frequency-domain approaches are mostly devoted to linear
time-invariant systems, yet under some circumstances, it is possible to
adapt them to address the case of varying delays using, for instance, model
transformations. Time-domain approaches can, however, be applied to
any type of systems: linear or non-linear, with constant or time-varying
delays, etc. [28]. Most of the existing results for stability of systems with
time-varying delays, based on time-domain approaches, are developed
based on the following two Lyapunov-type approaches [100]:
• The Lyapunov-Razumikhin method that looks for functions which
normally allow one to prove stability of systems with bounded
but freely fast time-varying delays. See for example papers [29]
and [117].
• The Lyapunov-Krasovskii method that looks for functionals which
only allow one to prove stability of time-delay systems where the
delay parameters are bounded both in length and time variation
( [64, 80, 108, 133, 105]). In [64], a discussion about the conser-
vatism among the different methods is given.
The main difference among the two approach relies int the fact that
Razumikhin gives more conservative bound on the maximum allowable
delay preserving stability than the Lyapunov-Krasovskii approach, as
showed in [74].
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2.3.1 Krasovskii theorem
In what follows we provide some definitions and results on the stability
of delayed systems, according to Lyapunov-Krasovskii theory.
Definition 1. (Uniform norm) Let φ(s) ∈ C([a, b],Rn) be the set of
continuous functions mapping the interval [a, b] to Rn, then the uniform
norm of φ is defined as
‖φ‖C = max
a≤s≤b
‖φ(s)‖. (2.20)
In this definition, the vector norm ‖ · ‖ represents the 2−norm ‖ · ‖2.
We use functional differential equations to describe time-delay systems.
The general form of a retarded functional differential equation (RFDE)
(or functional differential equation of retarded type) is:
x˙(t) = f(t, xt), t ≥ t0
x(t0 + s) = φ(s), s ∈ [−h, 0] (2.21)
where h > 0 is the delay and φ ∈ C([−h, 0],Rn) is the functional of initial
conditions. The state of the system xt ∈ C([−h, 0],Rn) is defined as
xt(θ) = x(t + θ). Moreover, xt(t0, φ) denotes the state-value at time t
with initial condition xt0 = φ.
For the class of systems in (2.21) it holds the following theorem:
Theorem 4. (Lyapunov-Krasovskii Stability Theorem) [72] Suppose that
f : R≥t0 ×C([−h, 0],Rn)→ Rn given in (2.21) maps R≥t0× (bounded sets
of C([−h, 0],Rn)) into a bounded sets of Rn, and that u, v, w : R≥0 → R≥0
are continuous non-decreasing functions, where additionally u(s) and v(s)
are positive for s > 0, and u(0) = v(0) = 0. Assume further that there
exists a continuous differentiable functional V : R× C([−h, 0],Rn)→ R
such that
u(‖φ(0)‖) ≤ V (t, φ) ≤ v(‖φ‖C) (2.22)
and
V˙ (t, φ) ≤ −w(‖φ(0)‖), (2.23)
then the trivial solution of (2.21) is uniformly stable. If w(s) > 0 for
s > 0, then it is uniformly asymptotically stable. In addition, if
lim
s→∞u(s) = +∞,
then it is globally uniformly asymptotically stable.
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It is important to note that there exists two types of stability results,
and can be be distinguished based on whether they depend on the delay
value. In some cases it is possible to asses stability of delayed system for
a range of delay values or even obtain stability results for family of delays.
This leads us to the concepts of delay-independent and delay-dependent
stability.
Definition 2. (Delay-Independent Stability) [28] A time-delay system is
stable independently of the delay or delay-independent stable if stability
does not depend on the delay value, that is, if the system is stable for
any delay value in [0,∞].
The above definition immediately extends to systems with multiple delays
and time-varying delays. This concept of stability is quite strong since
delays must have no impact on stability. This imposes, in return, strong
constraints on the structure of the system. It is therefore expected that
time-delay systems are, most likely, not delay-independent stable.
Definition 3. (Delay-Dependent Stability) [28] A time-delay system is
delay-dependent stable if there exists a (bounded) interval I ∈ R for which
the system is stable for any delay in I, and unstable otherwise.
Unlike delay-independent stability, delay-dependent stability is a concept
of stability that is actually sensitive to change in the delay values. This
is certainly the most realistic notion of stability since delays are, most of
the time, influential on the stability of real world systems.
2.3.2 Model transformation - Leibniz-Newton formula
Model transformation is a very common procedure introduced quite early
in the analysis of time-delay systems, but not restricted to. The rationale
behind model transformations is to turn a time-delay system into another
system, referred to as a comparison system or comparison model, which
may or may not be a time-delay system [28]. Analysis tools are then
applied on the comparison system in order to draw conclusions on the sta-
bility of the original time-delay system. Model transformations lie at the
core of many efficient analysis techniques such as Lyapunov-Razumikhin
and Lyapunov-Krasovskii approaches. The goal of model transformations
is to simplify the analysis of time-delay systems. The compensation for
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this is that the comparison system may exhibit additional dynamics
leading to a possible loss of equivalence, in terms of stability, between
the original and the comparison system. Additional dynamics consist
of supplementary zeros in the characteristic equation of the comparison
model. When at least one of these additional zeros is unstable, the
comparison model is unstable and the stability of the original system
cannot be inferred from the comparison model [72]. Many different model
transformation procedures have been proposed in the literature, however,
in this thesis work we will exploit the Leibniz-Newton formula [28].
Definition 4. (Newton-Leibniz transformation) [28] The Newton-Leibniz
model transformation is based on the following identity:
x(t− h) = x(t)−
∫ t
t−h
x˙(s)ds (2.24)
2.4 Integral inequalities
In this section, some integral inequalities, exploited during the disserta-
tion, have been retrieved.
First of all we recall the Hadamard inequality, valid for convex functions
only:
Lemma 1. (Hadamard Inequality) [53] Let f : I ⊆ R → R be a convex
mapping defined on the interval I of real numbers, then the following
inequality holds:
1
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x)dx ≤ f(a) + f(b)
2
, (2.25)
being a, b ∈ I with a < b.
The following integral inequality is known as the Jensen Inequality, which
plays an important role in the stability problem of time-delay systems:
Lemma 2. (Jensen Inequality) [72] For any constant matrix Θ = Θ> >
0 ∈ RN×N , scalar h : h(t) > 0, and vector function x(.) : [−h, 0] −→ Rn
such that the following integral is defined, then
h
∫ t
t−h
η>(s)Θη(s)ds >
∫ t
t−h
η>(s)dsΘ
∫ t
t−h
η(s)ds. (2.26)
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Moreover we recall the following useful integral inequality:
Lemma 3. [89] For any generic positive definite matrix Ξ it holds
2a>c ≤ a>Ξa+ c>Ξ−1c. (2.27)
CHAPTER 3
Cooperative Driving of
Autonomous Connected
Vehicles as Networked
Control Systems
3.1 Cooperative Driving Systems
Owing to the ever-increasing traffic demand, modern societies with well-
planned road management systems, and sufficient infrastructures for
transportation, still face the problem of traffic congestion. This results in
loss of travel time, and huge societal and economic costs and an increas-
ing environmental impact [17]. To give new answers to the increasing
mobility demand and other open issues, several solutions have been
adopted. Some of these rely on the enhancement or on the construction
of new infrastructures (like roads, highways, port, airport and so on),
some others rely on the enhancement of the vehicular safety systems
(like air-bags or safety belt). However, it is clear that building new
infrastructures require several expensive actions with the drawback of an
increased environmental impact [61]. For this reasons, solutions allowing
a more efficient use of the existing infrastructure are aimed. Intelligent
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Transportation Systems (ITS) is a fairly new concept which gives a
new vision of mobility that, thanks to the integration of Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) with traditional transport in-
frastructures, allows users to get more from transportation systems, in
greater safety and with less environmental impact improving the overall
efficiency. The idea of ITS, in road transports, rely on the possibility to
connect among them vehicles with other vehicles or with central or de
localized infrastructure, helping to find new solutions to problems like
collision avoidance, fleet management, driver assistance etc. As depicted
in Fig. 3.1, the goal thus became vehicles and infrastructure cooperate
to perceive potentially dangerous situations in an extended space and
time horizon [147]. Communication and cooperation between vehicles
Figure 3.1: ITS scenario: Vehicles communicate information
each other.
offer the opportunity to develop many different applications [31]:
• safety applications: which aim to mitigate vehicular collisions such
as rear ending;
• mobility applications : which look at increasing traffic flow through
information sharing about road conditions;
• comfort applications: such as cooperative adaptive cruise control,
which aim at reducing the driver work load.
Among the the different ITS solution, we focus on Cooperative Driving
Systems.
Cooperative driving systems exploit the wireless communication as an
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additional sensor both to perceive the presence of neighboring vehicles
and to communicate (e.g. in broadcast) their own presence and in vehicle
data. The idea of vehicles cooperating via wireless communication dates
back to the 1980s [140], when California PATH program was established
to study and develop vehicle-highway cooperation and communication
systems [8, 179]. The basic idea is to enable the communication and the
cooperation among neighboring vehicles to safely reduce their mutual
distance, hence increasing the road capacity, and suppress traffic shock-
waves, hence reducing fuel consumptions [106].
To allow communication among nearby vehicles or between vehicles
and nearby fixed roadside equipment, different architectural solution for
creating vehicular networks were proposed. Such architectures have to
guarantee two main communication paradigm:
• a pure wireless Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), allowing vehicular com-
munication with no infrastructure support;
• an hybrid Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) architecture that does not
rely on fixed infrastructure in a constant manner, but can exploit
it for improved performance and service access when it is available.
Actually the V2I architecture implicitly includes V2V communication.
The communication between vehicles or between vehicles and road in-
frastructure enable vehicles and infrastructure to form a cooperative
system where the users exchange information and cooperate to improve
quality of travel experience. In Cooperative Driving systems vehicles
are organized as a platoon, i.e. a set of vehicles that, in order to reach
a common objective, share information about their state information
(position, velocity, acceleration, consumption, emission etc.) or commu-
nicate with a road side infrastructure, through a wireless communication
network such as 4-5G or WLANs IEEE 802.11a/b/g/p [83] (see Fig. 3.2).
The core of such cooperative driving systems is a set of algorithms de-
ployed on the vehicles and controlling their motion based on the behavior
of the surrounding vehicles so to achieve an inter-vehicle separation
(smaller than the one guaranteed by human drivers, but safe) while
increasing road capacity and decreasing, at the same time, traffic con-
gestion [81, 113, 38] Another benefit, originated by cooperation, is that
the aerodynamic drag is reduced (especially for heavy-duty vehicles)
thereby increasing fuel economy and, consequently, reducing pollutants
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Figure 3.2: Cooperative driving systems.
emissions [136]. To achieve these objectives, the cooperative driving
systems are characterized by distributed, hierarchical control, where the
high level control structure takes decisions and compute set point for
lower level controller that acts on the throttle and brake systems. As
exemplary case we take the architecture shown in Fig. 3.3 [187], where
is possible to distinguish three layers: the vehicle control layer and the
vehicle management layer that are present on each vehicle, and the traffic
management layer, common to all the vehicles and shared by them, that
is on the infrastructure. The functions of the vehicle control layer are to
sense the conditions and states ahead of the vehicle and to activate the
lateral and longitudinal actuators. The layer outputs sensing data and
vehicle state variables to the vehicle management layer and receives com-
mands of the steering and vehicle speed from it. Each vehicle may have
its individual vehicle control layer. The vehicle management layer deter-
mines the movement of each vehicle under the cooperative driving with
the data from the vehicle control layer, those received from neighbouring
vehicles through the inter-vehicle communications, and from the traffic
control layer through the road-vehicle communications. The criteria of
the movement comes from the traffic control layer. The traffic control
layer has two parts: physical part, that includes the infrastructure-based
ITS equipment like sign boards, traffic signals, and the road-vehicle
communications, and a logical part that includes common sense, laws,
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Figure 3.3: The architecture for the cooperative driving of
automated vehicles.
rules, manners, and ethics in the human society. Within the two parts, a
criteria that must be common to neighbouring vehicles will be found and
sent to the vehicle management layer in each vehicle. The cooperative
control strategies, that drives the collective behavior of vehicles platoon,
are usually deployed on vehicle management layer and traffic control
layer of the architecture in Fig. 3.3. The control strategy precursors
of cooperative driving system, introduced by the automotive industry,
is the Adaptive Cruise Control ACC system. The ACC is considered
to be the successor of the conventional Cruise Control (CC). A vehicle
with CC is able to maintain a pre-selected speed if no vehicle is up-
front. The ACC is a radar-based system which is designed to enhance
driving comfort and convenience by relieving the driver of the need to
continually adjust his or her speed to match that of a preceding vehicle.
The system slows down the speed when it approaches a vehicle with a
lower speed and the system increases the speed to the level of speed
previous set when the vehicle upfront accelerates or disappears (e.g. by
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changing lanes) [190]. Recently, V2V communication have pushed the
ACC system into a more sophisticate system, called CACC. Each vehicle
within the cooperative driving system is equipped with on-board sensors
measuring position, velocity, acceleration. Such set of measurements
requires Inertial Measurements Units (IMU), Global Positioning Systems
(GPS) and radars, which are commonly available on road vehicles. Each
vehicle is also equipped with wireless V2V communication hardware
to share information with its neighbors and receive reference signals.
Thanks to the information of neighbors vehicles CACC controller will
be able to anticipate problems better, enabling it to be safer, smoother
and more reliable in response. In CACC, wireless communication is
used by the controller to regulate speed and distance between vehicles,
ensuring that any changes in speed by the driver in front of you are
immediately registered in the cooperative vehicle. However, most of the
CACC controller presented in literature does not cope communication
failure/impairments, network delay and security vulnerabilities. To over-
come these issues, flexible control system, reconfigurable on the basis of
the actual communication capabilities, have to be designed. In this sight,
cooperative driving can be represented as a networked control system
where the vehicles are controlled by handling their state information and
networked information received from neighboring vehicles through the
communication network [170, 167, 144] in which the time-delay and the
security vulnerabilities are explicitly modeled in order to give a more
realistic representation of the cooperative driving systems [151, 155, 152].
3.2 Modeling of Connected Autonomous Vehi-
cles
Formation control of autonomous connected vehicles is one of the
typical problems addressed in the context of networked multi-agent
systems (e.g. for the flight formation of autonomous aerial vehicles
[16]). It follows that a multi-agent system has been naturally pro-
posed as an alternative modeling approach to easily handle the coordi-
nation of ground vehicles (cars) and to manage platoon tasks (e.g. see
[162, 59, 170, 174, 167, 111, 151, 60, 92] and references therein).
By leveraging this networked control system paradigm, a platoon com-
posed by multiple connected and automated vehicles is represented as
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Figure 3.4: Schematic representation of autonomous connected
vehicles platoons from networked control systems perspective[197].
one-dimensional network of dynamical agents, in which each agent only
uses its neighboring information to locally control its motion, while it
aims to achieve certain global coordination with all other agents. This
framework is schematically represented in Fig. 3.4 as the composition
of the following main interrelated components: a) agent dynamics, that
model the longitudinal dynamics of each vehicle; b) communication topol-
ogy, which indicates how and if an agent obtains information about
other agents depending on the active communication links c) formation
geometry, which defines the desired spacing between adjacent vehicles in
a platoon; d) distributed collaborative control that is implemented at the
single-vehicle level and depends on both the state variables of the vehicle
itself (measured on board) and information received from neighboring
vehicles through the communication topology.
3.2.1 Agent Dynamics
The behaviour of each vehicle within the vehicular network is described
by its longitudinal dynamics. These latter are inherently nonlinear due to
some salient nonlinearities involved in the powertrain system, e.g., engine,
driveline, brake system, aerodynamics drag, tire friction, gravitational
force [158].
In order to facilitate the control strategy design, the following assumption
were used to obtain a concise model for cooperative driving control [116]:
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1. The longitudinal tire slip is negligible;
2. The vehicle body is rigid and symmetric;
3. The influence of pitch and yaw motions are negligible;
4. The driving and braking torques are controllable inputs.
Under the aforementioned assumption, the simplified resulting longitu-
dinal dynamics for each i-th vehicle, still nonlinear, are described as
follows[170] (∀i = 1, · · · , N , being N the number of vehicle within the
vehicular network):
p˙i(t) = vi(t)
ηF,i
rw,i
Fi(t) = miv˙i(t) + CA,iv
2
i (t) +migf
TiF˙i(t) + Fi(t) = Fdes,i(t),
(3.1)
where pi [m], vi [m/s] are the position and the speed of the i-th vehicle
that are measured with respect to a road reference frame; mi, CA,i, g, f ,
ηF,i, rw,i are the mass, the aerodynamics drag coefficient, the gravitational
acceleration, the rolling resistance coefficient, the mechanical efficiency
of driveline and the wheel radius for the i-th vehicle, respectively; Fi(t)
denotes the actual driving/brake force; Ti is is the characteristic time
constant of the drivetrain depending upon specific features of the vehicle;
Fdes,i(t) is the desired driving/brake force, i.e. the control input, that
has to be imposed to vehicle dynamic in order to reach a specific control
objective.
However, control performance are difficult to analytically analyze for
nonlinear models [116]. To this aim, linear models are more frequently
used to formulate tractable problems. The most commonly used models
for describing the i-th vehicle behavior are:
1. single integrator model;
2. second-order model;
3. third-order model.
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Single Integrator Model The single integrator model is the simplest
model for vehicle dynamics, where the vehicle speed is taken as the
control input ui(t) and the position pi(t) is the only state variable [216],
i.e.
p˙i(t) = ui(t). (3.2)
Second-Order Model One improvement w.r.t. to single integrator
model is to consider the vehicle dynamic as a point mass, described by
the following second-order dynamics[150]:
p˙i(t) = vi(t)
v˙i(t) =
1
mi
ui(t),
(3.3)
where pi [m], vi [m/s] are the position and the speed of the i-th vehicle;
mi is the mass of the vehicle i; ui(t) is the control input, i.e. the desired
acceleration that has to be imposed to the vehicle dynamic so to achieve
the desired control objective.
Note that, although commonly exploited, the assumption of directly
controlling the acceleration of the vehicle still does not capture some
features of the vehicle internal dynamics, e.g. the inertial delay in
powertrain dynamics, and might lead to instability in real-world driving
conditions [199].
Third-Order Model The third order model is introduced so to take
into account the powertrain dynamics of the vehicle. It is obtained by
converting the nonlinear model (3.1) into a linear one for controller design
via a feedback linearization technique [199]. Specifically, the control input
Fdes,i(t) is selected as [116]
Fdes,i(t) =
1
ηF,i
(CA,ivi(t)(2Tiv˙i(y) + vt) +migf +miui(t))rw,i, (3.4)
where ui(t) is the new input after linearization. Then, the following
linear model is obtained for vehicle longitudinal dynamics [131]:
Tia˙i(t) + ai(t) = ui(t), (3.5)
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where ai(t) denotes the acceleration of vehicle i.
Considering the state space representation of model (3.5), we obtain the
third order model for each vehicle as:
x˙i = Axi +Bui(t) (3.6)
where xi(t) = [ri(t) vi(t) ai(t)]
> ∈ R3 represent the i-th vehicle state
vector (i = 1, · · · , N) (being ri [m] and vi [m/s] and ai [m/s2] the
i-th vehicle position (in meters), velocity (in meters per second) and
acceleration (in meters per second2), measured with respect to road
reference frame); A ∈ R3×3 and B ∈ R3×1 have the following expression:
A =
 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 − 1Ti
 , B =
 00
1
Ti
 . (3.7)
Multiple vehicle are involved in cooperative driving application, and thus
an important feature for the agent dynamics is the homogeneity.
Definition 5. A platoon of connected autonomous vehicles is said to
be homogeneous if all vehicles share identical dynamics; otherwise it is
called heterogeneous.
3.2.2 Communication Topology
The communication topology in cooperative driving application indicates
the way each vehicle obtains the information of its neighboring vehicles.
More specifically, it describes the information used by local onboard
vehicles controller and thus strongly influences the collective behavior
of vehicles platoon. Early-stage cooperative driving applications were
mainly based on radars and sensor to acquire information about the
surrounding environment [96]. This imply that each vehicle could obtain,
at most, information coming from its preceding and follower vehicles. In
this case the following communication topologies arise:
• Predecessor-Follower (P-F). Each vehicle can exchange information
only with its preceding vehicle;
• Bidirectional (B-F). Each vehicle can exchange information with
its preceding and follower vehicles.
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More recently, the development of reliable wireless vehicular com-
munication, leveraging Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and/or Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) connectivity, has allowed the exchange of more
information among vehicles and/or between a vehicle and the road infras-
tructure. Therefore new communication topologies, depicted in Fig. 3.5,
are emerging in cooperative driving application such as [217]:
1. Leader-Predecessor-Follower (L-P-F). Each vehicle can communi-
cate with its preceding vehicle and the leading vehicle;
2. Bidirectional-Leader-Follower (B-L-F). Each vehicle can exchange
information with its preceding vehicle, its follower vehicle and the
leading vehicle;
3. All-to-All (Broadcast, BR). Each vehicle exchange information with
all the other vehicles in platoon.
The network communication structure can be modeled by a graph where
every vehicle is a node. Hence, a network of N vehicles is represented
as a directed graph (digraph) G = (V, E ,A) of order N characterized by
the set of nodes V = {1, . . . , N} and the set of edges E ⊆ V × V. The
topology of the graph is associated to an adjacency matrix with non
negative elements A = [αij ]N×N . In what follows, we assume αij = 1 in
the presence of a communication link from vehicle j to vehicle i, otherwise
αij = 0. Moreover, αii = 0 (i.e., self-edges (i, i) are not allowed unless
otherwise indicated). The presence of edge (i, j) ∈ E means that vehicle
i can obtain information from vehicle j, but not necessarily viceversa.
Note that, defining the degree matrix as D = diag{∆1,∆2, ...,∆N}, with
∆i =
∑
j∈V
αij , the Laplacian of the directed graph G can be defined as
L = D −A.
In the rest of the thesis we consider N vehicles together with a leader
agent, taken as an additional agent labeled with the index zero, i.e.,
node 0. We use, hence, an augmented directed graph GN+1 to model the
resulting network topology. We assume node 0 to be globally reachable
in GN+1. Thus there exists a path in GN+1 from every node i in G to
node 0 [88]. Note that, in the typical network topologies for cooperative
applications, shown in Fig. 3.5, the leader is always globally reachable
(see [115] and reference therein).
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Figure 3.5: Examplar platoon communication topologies: (a)
Predecessor-Following (P-F), (b): Leader-Predecessor-Following
(L-P-F); (c): Bidirectional-Leader-Predecessor (B-L-F); (d): All-
to-All (Broadcast, BR); (e): Platoon of N + 1 vehicles.
3.2.3 Formation Geometry
Formation geometry defines the desired spacing between adjacent vehicles
in cooperative driving application. In general, there are three main
policies of formation geometry employed in cooperative driving, namely:
1. Constant distance [150, 212]. The desired distance among two
adjacent vehicles is constant and independent of vehicle velocity,
which can achieve a very high traffic capacity.
2. Constant Time Headway policy [170, 167, 96]. The desired inter-
vehicle spacing varies with vehicle velocity, which is more likely
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in accordance with driver behaviors, but has limit on achievable
traffic capacity.
3. Nonlinear distance policy [98, 207, 60]. The desired inter-vehicle
distance is a nonlinear function of vehicle velocity, which has the
potential to balance the traffic flow stability and traffic capac-
ity compared with constant distance and constant time headway
policies (see [219] for details).
3.2.4 Distributed Controller
The distributed controllers are implemented at the single-vehicle level
and depends on both the state variables of the vehicle itself (measured on
board) and the information received from neighboring vehicles through
the communication topology so to achieve a certain global coordination.
The controller design strongly depends on the performances that the
designer would achieve in cooperative driving applications. The first
priority for cooperative driving application is to guarantee the internal
stability, i.e. the networked closed loop system need to be asymptotically
stable. In addition to the internal stability, other performances metrics
include:
• String stability [176]. A vehicles platoon is string stable if the
disturbances are attenuated when propagating downstream along
the string of vehicle.
• Stability margin [82]. The stability margin is the real part of least
stable eigenvalue that characterizes the speed of convergence to
the desired behavior.
• Coherence Behavior [15]. It is quantified as the H2 norm of the
closed-loop system, capturing the robustness of the vehicle platoon
w.r.t. exogenous disturbances.
The majority of distributed controller are linear for the easiness of
comprehensive theoretical analysis and the convenience of hardware im-
plementation [120]. However, there are two major drawbacks in linear
design methods, namely 1) it is not easy to explicitly handle string
stability, and 2) it is unable to deal with the nonlinearity and constraints.
Therefore, more recently, advanced control methods have been introduced
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into cooperative driving control for achieving better performances. For
example, sliding mode control (SMC) [199] and H∞ [156] controller for
dealing with string stability, or Model Predictive Control (MPC) ap-
proach which explicitly handle the vehicle nonlinearities and a actuator
constraints [107].
Traditionally, control algorithms are usually designed based on an implicit
assumption of unlimited computation resources, non-delayed sensing and
actuation, unlimited bandwidth and perfect communication environ-
ments, and control design mainly focuses on establishing the relationship
between control performance and computation complexity [68]. However,
computation and communication resources are limited and often shared
between multiple applications (such as subsystems, agents, nodes and
other processes). Thus, the development of real-time distributed control
algorithms in cooperative driving applications should be realized and
reevaluated by integrating communication, computation and control so as
to achieve the desired control performance through local, asynchronous,
distributed and cooperative actions. Therefore, another crucial perfor-
mances metric that has to be considered in cooperative driving control
strategy design, less addressed in the current literature, is the Resiliency
and the Robustness to the unavoidable communication impairments
introduced by wireless vehicular network. Moreover, vehicular networks
can suffer different security threats. In view of the fact that cyber attacks
can lead to dangerous implications for the security of autonomous driving
systems another challenge in cooperative driving systems is the designing
of distributed control protocols able to cope also with different kinds of
possible cyber attacks.
3.3 Communication issues of cooperative driv-
ing application
Wireless V2V communication enables cooperative driving to exchange
information among vehicles in addition to the local sensors (i.e. radar
and lidar) measurements which is highly potential to improve cooper-
ative driving performances. However, vehicular networks introduces
unavoidable communication impairments such as transmission delay and
packet losses [30, 218] that strongly affect the performances of coopera-
tive driving. Communication time-delay and other networked-induced
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phenomena are hence crucial in cooperative driving application since
they may lead the vehicular network to instability. Therefore, for the
practical implementation of distributed strategies, they have to be taken
into account from the beginning of the control design phase.
Traditional control systems deal with control issues in which the data
communication link between vehicles is considered to be perfect. As
a result, information exchanged among vehicles is completely and ex-
actly exploited by onboard distributed controller. This is in contrast to
networked control system paradigm since in practice, when deploying
distributed control strategies, agents share information through dedicated
wired or wireless communication networks. Indeed, due to technological
constraints, time-delays in data acquisition and transmission are unavoid-
able and their effects on the closed-loop network have to be investigated
and prevented, since they may strongly compromise the predicted system
stability, as well as the overall performance [153, 198].
The challenge in the control field is hence to design cooperative control
algorithms that are resilient and robust to communication impairments.
Communication time delay is defined as:
• Homogenous if the communication time delay is assumed to be
equal for each communication link of the network;
• Heterogeneous if the communication time delay is different for each
communication link of the network.
Moreover for each of this category, we can further assume that delays
can be modeled as:
• Constant function;
• Time-varying function.
The presence of communication delays implies that the distributed control
strategies have to be implemented via outdated information. It follows
that the networked control system has to cooperate in the presence
of time-delays that affect the control input and hence the closed-loop
network. This problem has been tackled in the current literature under
the restrictive assumption that the communication delay is unique (or
homogeneous, uniform, identical as indifferently referred in the technical
literature) and often constant (see e.g. [135, 139, 86, 90, 182, 91, 123]).
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However, when treating with communication networks, e.g., based on
the IEEE 802:11 protocol, each communication link, that connects a
pair of agents, is affected by a different variable time-delay that depends
from actual conditions, or possible impairments, of the communication
channel. It follows that the hypothesis commonly made in the technical
literature of a unique and constant network delay may result unrealistic
and that delays, affecting the outdated information that are used to com-
pute the control input, have to be considered as time-varying functions
depending from the specific communication link under investigation, i.e.
τij(t) (multiple, or equivalently heterogeneous, time-varying delays) [153].
Indeed, time-delay itself might obey its own dynamics, which possibly
depend on the communication distance, total computation load and
computation capability. The thesis contributes to extend the literature
on synchronization of cooperative networked systems by addressing the
problem of cooperative driving in the presence of multiple time-varying
communication delays.
3.4 Security issues of cooperative driving appli-
cation
The Vehicular ad hoc Networks and the de facto vehicular networking
standard IEEE 802.11p communication protocol are key tools for the
deployment of platooning applications, since the cooperation among vehi-
cles is based on a reliable communication structure. However, vehicular
networks can suffer different security threats. Indeed, in collaborative
driving applications, the sudden appearance of a malicious attack can
mainly compromise: i) the correctness of data traffic flow on the vehicular
network by sending malicious messages that alter the platoon formation
and its coordinated motion; ii) the safety of platooning application by
altering vehicular network communication capability. In view of the fact
that cyber attacks can lead to dangerous implications for the security of
autonomous driving systems, it is fundamental to consider their effects
on the behavior of the interconnected vehicles, and to try to limit them
from the control design stage. Special attention has been recently raised
with respect to control solutions for cyber-physical systems in vehicular
networks, where the complexity of transportation systems, and of high
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mobility vehicular systems, pushes to find tailor-made solutions depend-
ing from the specific application, such as platooning (e.g. see [75, 124]).
Past studies on VANETs security vulnerabilities focus their attention
on an accurate classification of malicious attacks and the solutions to
mitigate them at communication level [4]. However, while security in
sensing and communication has been extensively investigated in the
technical literature, security in control has been recently indicated as a
key ingredient that has to be added for enhancing the protection level of
the normal operation of a physical process.
From control viewpoint, recent literature on the security of the networked
cyber-physical systems is usually devoted to designing state estimators
for the better understanding of system dynamical behaviors and the
attack detection (see survey [50] and references therein). Alternative
approaches propose instead the exploitation of the cooperation property
of the multi-agent systems paradigm, or more precisely the exploitation of
all information exchanged among the agents within the networked control
system [151]. However, many issues are still open, as for example the
need of designing distributed control protocols for connected multi-agent
systems able to cope simultaneously with network induced phenomena -
such as the unavoidable delays that affect in practice the information
shared via a wireless channel - and different kinds of possible cyberattacks
[50]. Therefore, since security is a crucial point in cooperative driving
control system design, in this thesis we also propose a distributed collab-
orative control strategy which is able to both counteract communication
impairments, such as time-varying multiple delays, and to attenuate
malicious effects on platoon behavior.
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CHAPTER 4
Adaptive
synchronization-based
control protocol for
cooperative driving of
autonomous vehicles with
multiple communication
delays
The development of automated and coordinated driving systems is an
hot topic today for vehicles and it represents a challenging scenario that
heavily relies on distributed control in the presence of wireless communi-
cation network. To actuate platooning in a safe way it is necessary to
design controllers able to effectively operate on informations exchanged
via vehicular networks despite the presence of unavoidable communi-
cation impairments, such as multiple time-varying delays that affect
communication links. To this aim in this chapter we propose a novel dis-
tributed adaptive collaborative control strategy that exploits information
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of autonomous vehicles with multiple communication delays
coming from connected vehicles to achieve leader synchronization and
we analytically demonstrate its stability with a Lyapunov-Krasovskii ap-
proach. The effectiveness of the proposed strategy is shown via numerical
simulations in PLEXE, a state of the art inter-vehicle communication
and mobility simulator that includes basic building blocks for platooning.
4.1 Cooperative Driving as Synchronization
problem
Nowadays Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) lead to positive ef-
fects, in terms of pollution and safety. Connected autonomous vehicles
improve the traffic flow mitigation, and a fundamental aim is to coop-
eratively drive the road by operating vehicle’s platoon that maintain
an optimal inter-vehicular spacing policy, tracking at the same time
desired speed and acceleration profiles. The natural breakthrough is the
improvement of road capacity and traffic congestion mitigation [37, 36],
while preserving at the same time fuel economy and decrease of pollutants
emissions [191, 57, 122, 126, 130].
In this driving paradigm all connected vehicles embed wireless commu-
nication hardware in order to share information with neighbors and to
receive the reference signal coming from the leading vehicle. On the
basis of information received from vehicles within the platoon, the on-
board control algorithm is responsible of the safe tracking of the desired
velocity and acceleration profile, i.e. vehicles have to track the leader
motion while respecting at the same time a pre-determined inter-vehicles
spacing policy [8, 14]. The goal is to perform a reference tracking that
allows followers to pursue the leader in a safe way but guaranteeing at
the same time excellent transient dynamics. Transient performance are
fundamental during normal operation, when deceleration, or acceleration,
maneuvers must be safely executed (e.g. in the occurrence of sudden
traffic) avoiding that any vehicle in formation falls too far behind the
vehicle ahead [158, 9]. Tracking ability assume also a great importance
during join or emergency braking maneuvers, when all vehicles has to
safely brake reaching their required stand-still distance when they finally
stop [136, 125, 127].
Although a platoon is a group of lined vehicles, different communication
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topologies arise, depending from the on board communication facilities,
their features [212, 167], and how the information is used by the control
algorithm. Furthermore, since vehicles are moving within a non-ideal
wireless communication environment, information can be received by
each vehicle with a different (multiple, or heterogeneous) time-varying
delay, whose current value depends on the network conditions [30, 218].
Note that since communication impairments are unavoidable in practice,
the control input, that is computed on the base of the network infor-
mation, results to be affected by delay in realistic scenarios and packet
losses [164].
Typical control schemes for platoon follow a Cooperative Adaptive
Cruise Control (CACC) approach which adopts pre-fixed communica-
tion patterns during control design, such as, for example, predecessor-
follower [158, 220]. The aim is to provide robustness to the platoon that
is assumed to be already formed and traveling with a target velocity, so
that small perturbation on leading vehicle are de-amplified toward the
platoon tail. The analytical control synthesis is usually performed by
exploiting linear tools in the frequency domain under the assumption
that the inter-vehicle communication is ideal or affected by a unique
constant delay. A sensitivity analysis is sometimes added to investigate
the effect of delay variation. See [45], and references therein, for a recent
and wide review of the technical literature.
Formation control of autonomous connected vehicles is one of the typical
problems addressed in the context of networked control systems (e.g.
see [162, 59, 170, 174, 167, 111, 151, 60, 92] and references therein). By
leveraging this paradigm, a platoon composed by multiple connected
and automated vehicles is represented as one-dimensional network of
dynamical agents, in which each agent only uses its neighboring infor-
mation to locally control its motion, while it aims to achieve certain
global coordination with all other agents. Within this framework, the
consensus-based approaches have been recently proposed in [170, 97, 167]
to deal with both topology variety and heterogeneity in the time-varying
communication delays, but the theoretical analysis disregards leader
tracking maneuvers (when the leader dynamically changes its velocity
profile) and focus on the so called leader-law [9], where the platoon first
forms itself and then travels with a common constant velocity.
In particular in [97, 170] and [167] the problem of communication losses
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has been theoretically investigated by exploiting stability tools for delayed
networks, but neglecting acceleration profiles. An alternative approach,
based on a sliding mode control, has been also recently designed in [59]
in the presence of an actuation lag, but under the restrictive assumption
of perfect communication among agents.
More recently, consensus has been also exploited to achieve leader-
tracking by describing the drivetrain but in absence of communication
delays [211]. Moreover, the reference tracking problem has been also tack-
led in [174] by leveraging transient synchronization for linear multi-agent
systems again under the restrictive hypothesis of a perfect communi-
cation. Different control methodologies have been also proposed for
leader tracking such as, for example, MPC tools in [213] where the work
investigates the case of an ideal communication scenario modeled by
unidirectional topologies [213]. Other approaches, alternative to MPC or
consensus, solve instead leader tracking by exploiting fixed-gains control
strategies that are designed again under the restrictive hypotheses of a
given communication structure with a prefixed-topology and a constant
and unique (homogeneous) communication delay (see [200, 150, 76] and
references therein). Under these assumptions the stability analysis in
the presence of certain constant amount of time delay in the leader state
reception is carried out around the equilibrium solution in the Laplace
domain [200, 150] or exploiting a Lyapunov approach [76].
In this chapter, instead, we proposed an adaptive distributed cooperative
approach to solve the leader tracking problem, or better to synchronize
the platoon to generic leader velocity profiles in the presence of communi-
cation delays, assumed to be heterogeneous (multiple) and time-varying.
To perform the analytical investigation, the platoon is modeled as a
multi-agent system where each vehicle is a third order dynamical agent
sharing information through wireless communication links (each of them
affected by a different time-varying delay). Note that synchronization
among autonomous agents via local interactions is one of the benchmark
problems in the recent general literature on multi-agent systems control.
Here the problem is commonly tackled under the restrictive assumption
of an ideal (or perfect) communication among agents [119] or supposing
that the communication delay is unique (or homogeneous, uniform, iden-
tical as indifferently referred) (e.g., see [182, 123] and references therein)
and often constant [146].
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The proposed control strategy updates its action on the basis of state
errors among the vehicle itself and the delayed state information received
from neighboring vehicles through the wireless communication network.
On-board controllers, that automatically compensates the outdated infor-
mation caused by network delays, compute a not-identical control input
since different adaptive gains are associated to each communication link.
The adaptive approach provides robustness with respect to unmodeled
dynamics and uncertain parameters [193, 154], so to better counteract
the effects of all disturbances that always characterize real vague envi-
ronments.
The platoon synchronization under the action of the adaptive strategy
is analytically proved by exploiting the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method
and by assuming that the leading vehicle is globally reachable, i.e. there
exists at least a path (direct or not) that allows the information flow from
leader vehicle to followers. The stability criterion is expressed as an LMI
criterion that also provides the estimate of the delay margin that guar-
antees stability. High fidelity simulations with PLEXE [169, 170, 167]
are used here to test the control strategy. PLEXE permits a deep inves-
tigation of platooning systems by coupling vehicle dynamics (e.g. mass
of vehicles, engine and brakes limitations) with realistic wireless network
simulation for transmission delay and beaconing strategy. Note that the
communication features are intrinsically modeled within PLEXE through
a realistic communications device (IEEE 802.11p card) implementation.
In so doing, the control algorithm has been extensively analyzed in a
realistic artificial and safe environment (before being implemented in real
vehicles driving on real roads), taking into account the main possible dis-
crepancies between the theoretical control design and its deployment (e.g.
due to perturbed situations, variable conditions, information losses and
communication impairments). Results for different topologies confirm
the effectiveness of the approach also in case of lossy channels and under
the limits imposed by realistic vehicle’s dynamics. Moreover, a brief
comparison with an up-to-date consensus-based protocol [170] discloses
the good performance of the proposed adaptive approach in guaranteeing
the leader tracking.
Summarizing, the main contribution of this chapter is twofold:
1. To design and analytically prove the effectiveness of a novel dis-
tributed adaptive approach to solve the collaborative driving prob-
 62
4 Adaptive synchronization-based control protocol for cooperative driving
of autonomous vehicles with multiple communication delays
lem in the presence of communication impairments such as time-
varying delays.
2. To carry out a comprehensive performance evaluation analysis of
the proposed strategy in order to disclose its ability in ensuring
the synchronization behavior (for generic time-varying leader speed
profile and for different communication network topologies) and
its robustness to packet losses/hard delay (by implementing the
well-known Bernoulli and Gilbert-Elliot channel models).
4.2 Cooperative Leader Tracking
Here we consider a homogeneous platoon composed by N vehicles, orga-
nized as a string (with vehicles following one another along a straight
line), moving along a single lane and sharing their state information
(e.g., the absolute position, the velocity, and the acceleration) with all
other vehicles communicating through a V2V communication paradigm
[38]. The reference trajectory is imposed by the leading vehicle (the
first vehicle of platoon labelled as vehicle 0 and assumed to be globally
reachable). Our target is to synchronize the dynamics of all vehicles
of the platoon to the reference behavior imposed by leader. Note that
the formulation of problem, described as follows, is suitable for various
communication topologies, including all of those shown in Fig. 3.5. The
behavior of the generic i-th vehicle in the platoon is described by the
longitudinal third order dynamics in Eq. (3.6) [131], i.e.:
x˙i = Axi +Bui(t; τij(t)) (4.1)
where xi(t) = [ri(t) vi(t) ai(t)]
> ∈ R3 represent the i-th vehicle state
vector (i = 1, · · · , N) (being ri [m] and vi [m/s] and ai [m/s2] the
i-th agent position (in meters), velocity (in meters per second) and
acceleration (in meters per second2), measured with respect to road
reference frame); A ∈ R3×3 and B ∈ R3×1 have the following expression:
A =
 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 − 1T
 , B =
 00
1
T
 ; (4.2)
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being T > 0 [s] the characteristic time constant of the drivetrain de-
pending upon specific features; ui(t; τij(t)) the control input evaluated
from each agent by exploiting both local measurements and networks
information affected by time-varying delays depending on the specific
communication link, i.e. τij(t) (j = 0, · · · , N) i 6= j. The reference
leading dynamics are instead described as [87]:
x˙0(t) = Ax0(t) (4.3)
with x0(t) = [r0(t) v0(t) a0(t)]
> ∈ R3 and A ∈ R3×3.
The cooperative leader tracking problem, maintaining a desired inter-
vehicle spacing policy, can now be expressed as the following third-order
network synchronization problem:
limt→∞ ‖ri(t)− r0(t)− di0‖ = 0
limt→∞ ‖vi(t)− v0(t)‖ = 0
limt→∞ ‖ai(t)− a0(t)‖ = 0
∀i = 1, ..., N, (4.4)
being di0 the desired distance of vehicle i from the leading vehicle [212,
186].
To solve the problem we use the following distributed strategy that
leverages on an adaptive proportional controller that updates its action
based on the errors among the state information as:
ui = −
N∑
j=0
αijk
>
ij(t)
 ri(t− τij(t))− rj(t− τij(t))− dijvi(t− τij(t))− vj(t− τij(t))
ai(t− τij(t))− aj(t− τij(t))
 (4.5)
where αij models the network topology emerging from the presence/ab-
sence of a communication link between the i-th and j-th vehicle; dij
are the desired spacing errors between vehicles i and j (∀i = 1, · · · , N
and j = 0, · · · , N), defined according to the spacing policy [150, 212];
κij(t) ∈ R3×1 are the adaptive control gains vector. Since vehicles share
information through a wireless communication channel (V2V commu-
nication paradigm), it happens that information can be delivered with
time-delay. In particular a frame can be lost due to interferences, and
the receiver has to wait another beacon interval before receiving the
next update. The above considerations leads to the need of running the
controller based on outdated information and of using the time stamp
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inserted into messages to correctly correlate the information, and hence
to correctly compensate the error. Indeed τij(t) is detectable [32, 170].
The gains vector in (4.5) is given as:
kij(t) =
 ρij(t)βij(t)
γij(t)
 ; (4.6)
being i 6= j, and the gain vector components are updated according to
the following adaption law:
ρ˙ij(t) = ζij,1 (ri(t)− rj(t)− dij)2
β˙ij(t) = ζij,2 (vi(t)− vj(t))2
γ˙ij(t) = ζij,3 (ai(t)− aj(t))2
(4.7)
where ζij,k ∈ R+ (∀k = 1, 2, 3) are positive constants. Note that the
initial conditions are arbitrarily set to positive values, i.e. kij(0) > 0.
4.2.1 Closed-Loop Vehicular Network
To prove the cooperative synchronization of vehicles dynamics (4.1) to
the leader motion (4.3) under the action of the adaptive protocol in (4.5),
we define the error of the i-th and the j-th vehicle with respect to leader
as:
ei(t) =
 ri(t)− r0(t)− di0vi(t)− v0(t)
ai(t)− a0(t)
 =
 r˜iv˜i
a˜i
 (4.8)
ej(t) =
 rj(t)− r0(t)− dj0vj(t)− v0(t)
aj(t)− a0(t)
 =
 r˜jv˜j
a˜j
 . (4.9)
After some algebraic manipulations the control strategy ui in (4.5) can
be expressed in terms of the state errors as:
ui = −
N∑
j=0
αijk
>
ij(t) [ei(t− τij(t))− ej(t− τij(t))] . (4.10)
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Now the dynamics of the error system for the generic i-th vehicle under
the control action (4.10) can be written as:
˙˜ri(t) = v˜i(t)
˙˜vi(t) = a˜i(t)
˙˜ai(t) = − 1T a˜i(t)− 1T
N∑
j=0
αijk
>
ij(t) [ei(t− τij(t))− ej(t− τij(t))] .
(4.11)
System (4.11) can be recast in a more compact form as:
e˙i(t) = Aei(t)−Bαi0k>i0(t)ei(t− τi0(t))
−B
N∑
j=1
αijk
>
ij(t) [ei(t− τij(t))− ej(t− τij(t))]
(4.12)
where A and B are in (4.2).
Now, by defining
−Bαi0k>i0(t) = Ci0(t) ∈ R3×3, (4.13a)
−Bαijk>ij(t) = Ĉij(t) ∈ R3×3, (4.13b)
system (4.12) can be rewritten as (i = 1, . . . , N):
e˙i(t) = Aei(t) + Ci0(t)ei(t− τi0(t))+
N∑
j=1
Ĉij(t) [ei(t− τij(t))− ej(t− τij(t))] . (4.14)
Exploiting a more compact notation, delays τij(t) can be represented as
elements of the following delay set: σp(t) ∈ {τij(t) : i, j = 1, 2, ..., N, i 6=
j)} for p = 1, 2, ...,m with m ≤ N(N − 1). Analogously, delays τi0(t)
are elements of the set: τl(t) ∈ {τi0(t) : i = 1, 2, ..., N, } for l = 1, 2, ..., q
with q ≤ N . Note that m and q are equal to their maximum value if
the underlying network topology is a directed complete graph and all
time-delays are different.
By defining now the error state vector as x˜ (t) =[
e>1 (t) e>2 (t) · · · e>N (t)
]> ∈ R3N , according to the above defini-
tions, the multi-agent delayed closed-loop network can be written as:
˙˜x (t) = A0x˜ (t) +
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)x˜ (t− τl (t)) +
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)x˜ (t− σp (t)) (4.15)
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where
A0 =

A 03×3 · · · 03×3
03×3 A · · · ...
...
...
. . .
...
03×3 · · · · · · A
 ∈ R3N×3N ; (4.16)
Cl(t) =

C(1,1)(t) 03×3 · · · 03×3
03×3 C(2,2)(t) · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
...
03×3 · · · · · · C(N,N)(t)
 ∈ R3N×3N , (4.17)
with diagonal blocks such that (i = 1, . . . , N ; l = 1, . . . , q)
C3×3(i,i) (t) =
{
Ci0(t) i = l, τl(·) = τil(·),
03×3 i 6= l, τl(·) 6= τil(·),
(4.18)
being Ci0(t) as in (4.13a). Matrices Ĉp(t) ∈ R3N×3N (p = 1, · · · ,m) in
(4.15) are instead block matrices such that each block (referred for the
sake of clarity as Ĉp(r,q)(t) ∈ R3×3) is given as:
Ĉp(r,q)(t) =

Ĉij(t) with i 6= j if σp(·) = τij(·) , r = q = i
−Ĉij(t) with i 6= j if σp(·) = τij(·) , r = i, q = j
03×3 otherwise
(4.19)
being r, q = {1, 2, · · ·N} and Ĉij(t) as in in (4.13b).
Given the above definitions, it holds:
Lemma 4. Let matrices A0, Cl(t) and Ĉp(t) to be defined as in (4.16),
(4.17) and in (4.19), respectively. Assume that node 0 is globally reachable
in GN+1, then
F (t) = A0 +
q∑
l=1
Cl(t) +
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t) ∈ R3N×3N (4.20)
is a negative definite matrix ∀t ≥ 0.
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Proof. By construction F (t) is a strictly diagonally dominant block
matrix [58], whose generic block element F(i,i)(t) ∈ R3×3 on the main
diagonal is defined as:
F(i,i)(t) = A+ Ci0(t) +
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
Ĉij(t) (4.21)
with A, Ci0(t) and Ĉij(t) as in (4.2), (4.13a) and (4.13b) respectively.
Hence, to show that F (t) is negative definite, it suffices to prove that
each block F(i,i)(t) is a negative definite matrix (i = 1, . . . , N).
By construction k˙ij(t) ≥ 0, being kij(0) > 0 (see (4.7)). Then, according
to (4.13b), the term
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
Ĉij(t) is negative semidefinite. Now to show
that blocks F(i,i)(t) are negative definite we have only to prove that
matrices A + Ci0(t) are negative definite for i = 1, . . . , N . Given the
definitions in (4.2) and in (4.13a), under the assumption that node 0 is
globally reachable in GN+1 we have:
A+ Ci0(t) =
 0 1 00 0 1
− 1T ρi0(t) − 1T βi0(t) − 1T (1 + γi0(t))
 (4.22)
and in so doing the statement is proven.
4.3 Stability Analysis
Before providing stability conditions, we introduce a model transforma-
tion based on the Leibniz-Newton formula (see Definition 4) [72], i.e.:
x˜(t− τ(t)) = x˜(t)− ∫ tt−τ(t) ˙˜x(s)ds , (4.23)
and, hence, we recast system (4.12) as:
˙˜x (t) = A0x˜ (t) +
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)x˜ (t)−
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)
∫ t
t−τl(t)
˙˜x(s)ds
+
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)x˜ (t)−
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)
∫ t
t−σp(t)
˙˜x(s)ds.
(4.24)
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Now, taking into account the definition of matrix F (t) as in (4.20), we
have:
˙˜x (t) = F (t)x˜ (t)−
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)
∫ t
t−τl(t)
˙˜x(s)ds−
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)
∫ t
t−σp(t)
˙˜x(s)ds .
(4.25)
Given the closed-loop delayed system in (4.25) the cooperative leader
tracking in the presence of multiple (or heterogeneous) time-varying V2V
delays is proved here under the common assumption that delays are
bounded [72, 63], i.e. σp(t) ∈ [0, σ?p], σ˙p(t) ∈ (0, dp] ∀t, ∀p and dp ≤ 1
and τl(t) ∈ [0, τ?l ], τ˙l(t) ∈ (0, dl] ∀t, ∀l and dl ≤ 1.
The stability criterion, used to ensure leader synchronization, is expressed
as an LMI criterion that allows to compute the maximum admissible
delays margin by exploiting a Lyapunov-Krasovskii approach according
to the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. Consider the closed loop system under the action of the
adaptive control law (4.5) as in (4.25). Assume delays σp(t) (p = 1, ...,m)
and τl(t) (l = 1, ..., q) to be bounded and node 0 to be globally reachable in
GN+1. Given an upper bound of time-delay functions τ? = max
l,p
{τ?l , σ?p} >
0, if there exist the following positive-definite matrices P,Ql, Qp, R ∈
R3N×3N and a positive scalar η such that the following LMIs hold:
η
qτ?
2
R−Ql(1− dl) < 0, (4.26a)
η
mτ?
2
R−Qp(1− dp) < 0, (4.26b)
F>(t)P + PF (t) + (q +m)τ?M(t) + 1
η
q∑
l=1
Ql +
1
η
m∑
p=1
Qp < 0 (4.26c)
being
M(t) =
[
q∑
l=1
PCl(t)R
−1C>l (t)P +
m∑
p=1
P Ĉp(t)R−1Ĉ>p (t)P +R
]
,
(4.27)
then the cooperative delayed vehicular network achieves leader synchro-
nization, i.e.
lim
t→∞ x˜(t) = 0; (4.28)
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and the adaptive gains converge to a constant value vector, say k?ij ∈ R3,
as
lim
t→∞ kij(t) = k
?
ij . (4.29)
Proof. To prove the stability, we consider the following Krasovskii func-
tional:
V (x˜(t)) = V1(x˜(t)) + V2(x˜(t)) + V3(x˜(t)) + V4(x˜(t), κij(t)) (4.30)
being
V1(x˜(t)) = ηx˜
>(t)Px˜(t) (4.31a)
V2(x˜(t)) =
q∑
l=1
∫ t
t−τl(t)
x˜>(s)Qlx˜(s)ds (4.31b)
V3(x˜(t)) =
m∑
p=1
∫ t
t−σp(t)
x˜>(s)Qpx˜(s)ds (4.31c)
V4(x˜(t), κij(t)) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=0
1
2
[
k?ij − kij(t)
]> [
k?ij − kij(t)
]
(4.31d)
where Ql, Qp and P ∈ R3N×3N are constant symmetric and positive
defined matrices to be determined and η is a positive scalar.
Furthermore, according to the Lyapunov-Krasovskii approach in Theo-
rem 4, we define the following positive continuous non-decreasing func-
tions:
α(x˜(t)) = x˜>(t)Px˜(t) (4.32)
and
β(x˜(t− τ?)) = ηx˜>(t)Px˜(t) +
q∑
l=1
∫ t
t−τ? x˜
>(s)Qlx˜(s)ds+
m∑
p=1
∫ t
t−τ? x˜
>(s)Qpx˜(s)ds
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=0
1
2(k
?
ij − kij(t))>(k?ij − kij(t))
(4.33)
where τ? = max
l,p
{τ?l , σ?p} is such that:
α(x˜(t)) ≤ V (x˜(t)) ≤ β(x˜(t− τ?)). (4.34)
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Now, differentiating V1(x˜(t)) in Eq. (4.31a) along the trajectories of the
system in (4.25), we have:
V˙1(x˜(t)) = ηx˜
>(t)
(
F>(t)P + PF (t)
)
x˜(t)
−2ηx˜>(t)P
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)
∫ t
t−τl(t)
˙˜x(s)ds
−2ηx˜>(t)P
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)
∫ t
t−σp(t)
˙˜x(s)ds.
(4.35)
According to Lemma 3, for any matrix positive definite R it holds
−2x>(t)PC ∫ tt−h x(s)ds ≤ h¯x>(t)PCR−1C>Px(t)
+
∫ t
t−h x
>(s)Rx(s)ds
(4.36)
being h¯ maximum value assumed by a time delay. Under the assumption
of delays boundedness [63], inequality (4.36) can be applied to (4.35),
thus yielding:
V˙1(x˜(t)) ≤ ηx˜>(t)
(
F>(t)P + PF (t)
)
x˜(t)
+η
q∑
l=1
τ?l x˜
>(t)PCl(t)R−1C>l (t)Px˜(t)
+η
∫ t
t−τl(t)
˙˜x
>
(s)R ˙˜x(s)ds
+η
m∑
p=1
σ?px˜
>(t)P Ĉp(t)R−1Ĉ>p (t)Px˜(t)
+η
∫ t
t−τl(t)
˙˜x
>
(s)R ˙˜x(s)ds.
(4.37)
Applying now the Jensen inequality for the integral terms (see Lemma 2),
inequality (4.37) can be easily re-written after some algebraic manipula-
tions as:
V˙1(x˜(t)) ≤ ηx˜>(t)
(
F>(t)P + PF (t) +
q∑
l=1
τ?l PCl(t)R
−1C>l (t)P+
m∑
p=1
σ?pP Ĉp(t)R−1Ĉ>p (t)P +
q∑
l=1
τ?l
2 R+
m∑
p=1
σ?p
2 R
)
x˜(t)+
η
q∑
l=1
τ?l
2
(
x˜>(t− τl(t))Rx˜>(t− τl(t))
)
+η
m∑
p=1
σ?p
2
(
x˜>(t− σp(t))Rx˜>(t− σp(t))
)
.
(4.38)
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Consider now the maximum delay bound for all the different time-delay
functions associated to the each single link, i.e. τ? = max
l,p
{τ?l , σ?p}. Since
q∑
l=1
τ?l ≤ qτ? and
m∑
p=1
σ?p ≤ mτ?, inequality (4.38) can be finally be recast
in a more compact form as:
V˙1(x˜(t)) ≤ ηx˜>(t)
(
F>(t)P + PF (t) + (q +m)τ?M(t)) x˜(t)
+η qτ
?
2
q∑
l=1
(
x˜>(t− τl(t))Rx˜>(t− τl(t))
)
+ηmτ
?
2
m∑
p=1
(
x˜>(t− σp(t))Rx˜>(t− σp(t))
)
.
(4.39)
being
M(t) =
q∑
l=1
PCl(t)R
−1C>l (t)P +
m∑
p=1
P Ĉp(t)R−1Ĉ>p (t)P +R. (4.40)
From (4.31b), by differentiating V2(x˜(t)) along the trajectories of the
system in (4.25), we have:
V˙2(x˜(t)) =
q∑
l=1
x˜>(t)Qlx˜(t)−
q∑
l=1
x˜>(t− τl(t))Qlx˜(t− τl(t)) (1− τ˙l(t)) ,
(4.41)
and then, assuming that all delays are bounded, it holds:
V˙2(x˜(t)) ≤
q∑
l=1
x˜>(t)Qlx˜(t)−
q∑
l=1
x˜>(t− τl(t))Ql (1− dl) x˜(t− τl(t)).
(4.42)
Analogously, following the above steps in the case of V3(x˜(t)) in (4.31c)
we get
V˙3(x˜(t)) ≤
m∑
p=1
x˜>(t)Qpx˜(t)−
m∑
p=1
x˜>(t− σp(t))Qp (1− dp) x˜(t− σp(t)),
(4.43)
while differentiating V4(κij(t)) in (4.31d) along the trajectories of the
system it holds
V˙4(kij(t)) = −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=0
[
k?ij − kij(t)
]>
k˙ij(t). (4.44)
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By summing (4.39),(4.42),(4.43) and (4.44), after some algebraic manip-
ulations we have:
V˙ (·) ≤ ηx˜>(t) (F>(t)P + PF (t) + (q +m)τ?M(t)
+ 1η
∑q
l=1Ql +
1
η
∑m
p=1Qp
)
x˜(t)
+
q∑
l=1
x˜>(t− τl(t))
(
η qτ
?
2 R−Ql (1− dl)
)
x˜>(t− τl(t))
+
m∑
p=1
x˜>(t− σp(t))
(
ηmτ
?
2 R−Qp (1− dp)
)
x˜>(t− σp(t))
−
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=0
[
k?ij − kij(t)
]>
k˙ij(t).
(4.45)
Define now the following augmented state vector
ξ(t) = [x˜(t− τ1(t)), · · · , x˜(t− τq(t)), x˜(t− σ1(t)), · · · , x˜(t− σm(t))]>
(4.46)
and denote
H(t) = F>(t)P + PF (t) + (q +m)τ?M(t) + 1η
q∑
l=1
Ql +
1
η
m∑
p=1
Qp.
(4.47)
Inequality (4.45) can be now rewritten in a more compact form as:
V˙ (x˜(t), kij(t)) ≤ ηx˜>(t)H(t)x˜(t) + ξ>(t)Θξ(t)
−
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=0
[
k?ij − kij(t)
]>
k˙ij(t)
(4.48)
where Θ ∈ Rυ×υ (υ = 3N(q+m)) is the following diagonal block matrix:
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Θ =

θ1,1 0
3N×3N · · · · · · · · · · · · 03N×3N
03N×3N θ2,2 03N×3N · · · · · · · · ·
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . · · · · · · ...
...
. . . 03N×3N θq,q 03N×3N
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . θq+1,q+1
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . 03N×3N
03N×3N · · · · · · · · · · · · 03N×3N θq+m,q+m

(4.49)
whose diagonal blocks are given as follows:
θ3N×3Nh,h =
{
η qτ
?
2 R−Ql(1− dl) for h = l = 1, . . . , q;
ηmτ
?
2 R−Qp(1− dp) for h = q + p, p = 1, . . . ,m.
(4.50)
Inequality (4.48) can be finally recast as:
V˙ (x˜(t)) ≤ Φ1(ξ(t)) + Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t)) + Φ3(x˜(t), kij(t)), (4.51)
being
Φ1(ξ(t)) = ξ
>(t)Θξ(t); (4.52a)
Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t)) = ηx˜
>(t)H(t)x˜(t); (4.52b)
Φ3(x˜(t), kij(t)) = −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=0
(k?ij − kij(t))>(k˙ij(t)). (4.52c)
Hence, if (4.26a), (4.26b) and (4.26c) are satisfied, then Φ1(ξ(t)) in
(4.52a) and Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t)) in (4.52b) are negative definite. Therefore
from (4.51), to have V˙ (t) < 0 it suffices to show that Φ3(x˜(t), kij(t)) is
non positive. Obviously, if each kij(t) is upper bounded, given that by
construction k˙ij(t) ≥ 0 then there exists a value of each arbitrary vector
k?ij that guarantees asymptotic stability of the system (4.25).
Otherwise, in what follows we show that if kij(t) were unbounded, we
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would get a contradiction. Both Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t)) and Φ3(x˜(t), kij(t))
are quadratic function of the synchronization errors x˜(t). Moreover,
Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t)) is a quadratic function of the various kij(t) while
Φ3(x˜(t), kij(t)) is a linear function of these various gains. Hence, if
kij(t) diverged, both Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t)) and Φ3(x˜(t), kij(t)) would also di-
verge. Thus, it is possible to find a suitable value of the constant η
in (4.52b) so that |Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t))| ≥ |Φ3(x˜(t), kij(t))| ∀ x˜(t) and kij(t).
Since Φ2(x˜(t), kij(t)) is negative definite from the hypothesis, we have
that V˙ (t) < 0 ∀ x˜(t) and kij(t) against the assumption that kij(t) di-
verged. Hence kij(t) are upper bounded and being kij(t) monotone
increasing, it follows limt→∞ kij(t) = cij < +∞. Choosing cij = k?ij , we
have that V˙ (t) < 0 and thus condition (2.23) of Theorem 4 is satisfied. In
addiction, choosing α(s) as in (4.32), it follows that lims→∞ α(s) = +∞,
and hence system (4.25) is globally uniformly asymptotically stable and
synchronization is proved.
Finally, since kij(t) are upper bounded, we can compute the matrices
defined in (4.20) and (4.40) for kij(t) = k
?
ij and we indicate them as
F ? and C?, respectively. Then the delay margin can be estimated from
(4.26c) as
τ? =
‖F ?>P + PF ? + 1η
(∑q
l=1Ql +
∑m
p=1Qp
)
‖
‖(q +m)C?‖ . (4.53)
Remark 1. Note that the LMI in (4.26c) ∀t ≥ 0 admits solution under
the assumptions of Lemma 4. Indeed, when F(t) is negative definite
Eq. (2.15) holds. Furthermore it can be numerically verified by using, for
example, the interior-point method [112, 27] implemented in the Yalmip ©
Toolbox.
4.4 Numerical Analysis
4.4.1 Network and Traffic Scenario
To validate the theoretical results, the proposed adaptive approach has
been implemented in PLEXE [172], a high-fidelity simulator that allows
the platoon investigation by coupling realistic vehicle dynamics (such
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Figure 4.1: Keyframe of the simulation scenario. The vehicles
platoon moves on a reserved lane (the right-most lane). Initial
conditions are reported in Table 4.2.
as engine and brake limitations, air drag, friction, etc....) with realistic
wireless network simulations. Indeed, PLEXE exploits, in an integrated
simulation environment, the network simulator OMNeT++/MiXiM, the
road traffic simulator SUMO and detailed vehicle dynamic models. OM-
NET++/MiXiM is used to simulate V2V communication based on the
IEEE 802.11p standard, while the extended version of SUMO, that in-
cludes realistic car models, can simulate the vehicle dynamics under
the action of the collaborative strategy. We remark that, in agreement
with our theoretical framework we have configured the PLEXE simulator
so that our collaborative algorithm only exploits neighbor information
coming from V2V communications. Moreover, in this simulation envi-
ronment, the different communication delays values are not parameters
to be set during simulations (e.g., as well as they result from a random
distribution) since their realistic presence, originated by the actual con-
ditions of the communication channel, is accurately emulated by PLEXE
[170]. To show the effectiveness of the proposed strategy for cooperative
tracking, here we consider a 10 [km], 3 lanes, stretch of freeway. Here an
automated platoon of 7 vehicles plus a leader travels in a reserved lane
(the right-most lane) and each vehicle, driven by its on-board control, has
no possibility to overtake the vehicle ahead (Fig. 4.1 shows a keyframe
of the simulation scenario).
The traking performances have been evaluated considering two repre-
sentative leader maneuvers, namely: (i) a trapezoidal speed profile (see
Fig. 4.2a); (ii) a realistic driving profile used to test the performance
of connected vehicles during the Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge
(GCDC) [106] (see Fig. 4.2b).
Note that the trapezoidal profiles are usually used to mimic the effect
of traffic jam, when a sudden deceleration is required due to the presence
of a forward obstacle (e.g. a vehicle not belonging to platoon or not
 76
4 Adaptive synchronization-based control protocol for cooperative driving
of autonomous vehicles with multiple communication delays
60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
10
20
30
40
50
v 0
(t
)
time [s]
(a)
100 120 140 160 180 200
0
10
20
30
40
50
v 0
(t
)
time [s]
(b)
Figure 4.2: Leader maneuvers: (a) Trapezoidal speed profile;
(b) Realistic driving profile.
connected) then followed by an acceleration for the repositioning of the
platoon to the target velocity as soon as it is possible [59]. Furthermore,
to disclose the flexibility of the approach with respect to information
flows, the investigation is conducted for different exemplar communi-
cation topologies used in the platoon literature [59] and depicted in
Fig. 3.5:
1. Predecessor-Follower (P-F): each vehicle can exchange information
only with its preceding vehicle;
2. Leader-Predecessor-Follower (L-P-F): each vehicle can communi-
cate with its preceding vehicle and the leading vehicle;
3. Bidirectional-Leader-Follower (B-L-F): each vehicle can exchange
information with its preceding vehicle, its follower vehicle and the
leading vehicle;
4. All-to-All (Broadcast, BR): each vehicle exchange information with
all the other vehicles in platoon.
The parameters for both network and traffic simulation are reported
in Tab. 4.1 and Tab. 4.2. Note that the value of the theoretical delay
margin computed as in (4.53) and reported in Tab. 4.2, τ? = 0.21 [s],
is within the average end-to-end communication delay, typical of IEEE
802.11p vehicular networks, which is of the order of hundredths of a
second (i.e., 10−2 [s]) [6].
To further evaluate the safety in all the different driving and com-
munication scenarios, we have also quantitatively analyzed the possible
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Table 4.1: NETWORK SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Communication system model setting
Communication protocol IEEE802.11p
Channel data rate 6 [Mbps]
Beacon frequency 10 [Hz]
Beacon size 200 [bytes]
Bernoullian channel
PER p 0.6
Gilbert-Elliott channel
PER p (GOOD) 0.3
PER p (BAD) 0.7
state duration exp(0.5 [s−1]) (E[X] = 2 [s])
Table 4.2: TRAFFIC SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Freeway length 10 [km]
Lanes 3 (two-way)
Platoon size 8 cars
Platooning car max acceleration 3.5 [ms-2]
Drivetrain constant T 0.5 [s]
Platooning car mass 1460 [kg]
Platooning car length li 4 [m]
Initial position [r0(0), · · · , r7(0)]> [40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160, 180]>[m]
Initial speed [v0(0), · · · , v7(0)]> [27, 25, 22, 26, 25, 24, 28, 21]> [ms-1]
Initial acceleration ai(0) 0 [ms
-2] ∀i = 0, 1, · · · , 7
Control gains ζij,1 ζij,1 = 0.01
Control gains ζij,2 ζij,2 = 10
Control gains ζij,3 ζij,3 = 0.1
Initial condition ρij(0) ρ10(0) = 5.9, ρ10(0) = 2.35
ρi,i−1(0) = 0.6 (i = 1, · · · , N)
Initial condition βij(0) β10(0) = 6.8, βi0(0) = 0.68
βi,i−1(0) = 0.68 (i = 1, · · · , N)
Initial condition γij(0) γ10(0) = 0.68, γi0(0) = 0.68
γi,i−1(0) = 0.68 (i = 1, · · · , N)
Spacing policy dij 15 [m]
Theoretical delay margin τ? 0.21 [s]
emergence of critical driving situations for all the maneuvers under in-
vestigation by exploiting a non-dimensional warning index (or collision
index CI) that is well known in the automotive literature [138]. This
index represents the occurrence of a possible physical collision in the
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current driving situation and it is defined for each vehicle i (i = 1, · · · , 7)
as follows:
CIi =
ci − dbr,i
dw,i − dbr,i , (4.54)
where ci is the actual spacing between vehicle i and vehicle i− 1; dw,i
and dbr,i are the braking-critical and warning-critical distances between
vehicle i and vehicle i− 1, respectively. (See [138] for the definition of all
these quantities and for details on how they can be computed according
to a given trajectory.) From (4.54) it follows that, if the actual distance
ci exceeds dw,i and dbr,i, then the warning index CIi assumes a positive
value and indicates that the current driving situation is in a safe region.
If ci is below dbr,i, then the warning index assumes a negative value
denoting a dangerous driving situation. Therefore, the distance of the
index from zero can be interpreted as a safety margin.
Finally, the robustness with respect to packet losses/hard delay has been
also evaluated by implementing the well-known Bernoulli and Gilbert-
Elliot channel models [169]. In particular, we first use a Bernoullian
channel with independent random losses Packet Error Rates (PERs), and
then we employ a Gilbert-Elliott channel driven by a two-state Markov
chain.
4.4.2 Tracking performance for L-P-F topology
Firstly we start considering, as a preliminary analysis, the transient
performance of the platoon during the special case of platoon creation.
As depicted in Fig. 4.3, moving from different initial conditions among
vehicles, the platoon is then engaged at t = 50 [s] when vehicles start to
move with the constant velocity imposed by the leading vehicle with a
formation that preserves the spacing policy requirements. Note that all
vehicles converge toward the desired mutual positions (see Fig. 4.3a) and
reach the required constant speed (Fig. 4.3b). Moreover, all CIi indexes
remain strictly positive confirming that the driving situation is always
safe (see Fig. 4.4).
Finally, we remark that, according to the theoretical derivation (see
Theorem 5), when synchronization errors converge toward zero, adaptive
gains converge toward suitable constant values with bounded dynamics
(see Fig. 4.5).
Once the platoon is formed, we test the ability of the adaptive control
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Figure 4.3: Platoon creation under L-P-F topology. Time
history of the relative errors (i = 1, . . . 7): (a) Time history of the
position error computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0; (b) Time history of
the speed error computed as vi(t)− v0; (c) Time history of the
acceleration error computed as ai(t)− a0(t).
Figure 4.4: Platoon creation under L-P-F topology. Analysis
of the warning index CIi (∀i = 1, · · · , 7).
strategy in tracking the leading vehicle for the speed profile detailed
in Fig. 4.2a. Specifically, at t = 100 [s], the leader decelerates from
100 [km h−1] to 18 [km h−1] with a constant deceleration of 1.5 [m s−2];
then, at t = 160 [s], it accelerates with a constant acceleration of
3.5 [m s−2] till it reaches again the target velocity of 100 [km h−1].
Results in Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 confirm the theoretical analysis and show
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Figure 4.5: Platoon creation under L-P-F topology. Adaptive
gains convergence (i = 1, . . . , 7; j = 0, . . . , 7): (a) Time history of
the adaptive gains ρij(t); (b) Time history of the adaptive gains
βij(t); (c) Time history of the adaptive gains γij(t).
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Figure 4.6: Tracking performance for the trapezoidal speed
profile in Fig. 4.2a under L-P-F topology: (a) Time history of the
vehicles speed vi(t) (i = 0, . . . 7); (b) Time history of the vehicles
acceleration ai(t) (i = 0, . . . 7).
how vehicles safely track the leader while preserving at the same time
the required mutual positions (see Fig. 4.7a). As expected, velocities
and accelerations profiles in Fig. 4.6 disclose that the fast tracking
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Figure 4.7: Tracking performance for the trapezoidal speed
profile in Fig. 4.2a under L-P-F topology. Time histories of
the relative errors (i = 1, . . . 7): (a) Position error computed as
ri(t)− r0(t)− di0; (b) Speed error computed as vi(t)− v0(t); (c)
Acceleration error computed as ai(t)− a0(t).
of the leader motion is achieved with a smooth behavior, while some
sudden changes naturally arise in the errors profiles corresponding to
transient variations in the reference velocity signal (see Fig. 4.7 and
Fig. 4.2a). Note that, in order to guarantee the tracking performance,
the adaptive action counteracts the synchronization errors, originated
by the acceleration/deceleration of the leader, by slightly increasing the
gains values (gains variations of the order of hundredths) as depicted in
Fig. 4.8. Moreover, adaptive gains are always bounded during the entire
maneuver. Finally, we point out that the analysis of the warning index,
omitted here for the sake of brevity, reveals a safe driving situation.
The performance of the adaptive strategy have been also tested here for
the realistic speed profile defined in [106]. Namely, platoon is cruising
at 100 [km h−1] when the leading vehicle accelerates to 115 [km h−1]
and then it brakes to 100 [km h−1]. This sequence is then repeated two
times. After that, at 150 [s], the leader accelerates to 120 [km h−1],
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Figure 4.8: Tracking performance for the trapezoidal speed pro-
file in Fig. 4.2a under L-P-F topology. Adaptive gains convergence
(i = 1, . . . , 7; j = 0, . . . , 7): (a) Time history of the adaptive gains
ρij(t); (b) Time history of the adaptive gains βij(t); (c) Time
history of the adaptive gains γij(t).
and, finally, an harsher braking is applied for approaching 85 [km h−1]
(see Fig. 4.2b). Also in this case, the time history of the relative errors
reported in Fig. 4.9 reveals a good cooperative tracking behavior, since
each vehicle tracks the reference speed (see Fig. 4.9b) and acceleration
(see Fig. 4.9c), while maintaining the rigid formation requirements (see
Fig. 4.9a). Again sudden changes in the errors profiles refer to transients
associated to variations in the reference signal to be tracked (see Fig. 4.2b).
Furthermore, as for the previous trapezoidal maneuver, the time history
of velocities and accelerations for all vehicles confirms the effectiveness
of the adaptive control in tracking the leader according to the errors
evolution; the CI indexes are always strictly positive during the entire
maneuver; the adaptive gains turn to be bounded. Hence, the similar
results have been omitted here for the sake of brevity.
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Figure 4.9: Tracking performance for the realistic driving
profile in Fig. 4.2b under L-P-F topology. Time history of the
relative errors (i = 1, . . . , 7): (a) Time history of the position
error computed as ri(t) − r0(t) − di0; (b) Time history of the
speed error computed as vi(t) − v0(t); (c) Time history of the
acceleration error computed as ai(t)− a0(t).
4.4.3 Alternative communication topologies
Good tracking performances have also been verified for alternative com-
munication topologies. Results show that, for all topologies under inves-
tigation, the adaptive protocol is able to effectively achieve the synchro-
nization with the leader motion, preserving at the same time the desired
spacing policy within the formation. As an illustrative example, we
report in Fig. 4.10 the speed profiles obtained for B-L-F (see Fig. 4.10a),
BR (see Fig. 4.10b) and P-F (see Fig. 4.10c) for the trapezoidal leader
maneuver depicted in Fig. 4.2a. As expected, appreciable elongations
are detectable only in the case of the P-F topology depicted in Fig. 4.10c.
Indeed, they are consequence of the lack of a direct communication link
with the leader that introduces hard oscillations during transients as
disclosed in the recent technical literature [212]. Similar results (depicted
in Fig. 4.11) can be obtained for the realistic speed profiles in Fig. 4.2b.
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Figure 4.10: Alternative topologies. Tracking performance for
the trapezoidal speed profile in Fig. 4.2a. Time history of vehicles
speed, vi(t) (i = 0, . . . 7): (a) B-L-F; (b) BR; (c) P-F.
We remark that, for all topologies under investigation, all gains are
bounded for both the maneuvers and warning indexes always confirm
the safety of the driving conditions in all the different cases. The very
similar results have been hence omitted here for the sake of brevity.
4.4.4 Hard Braking maneuver for different communica-
tion topologies
To further disclose security issues, we consider here the occurrence of an
hard braking (emergency) maneuver as an additional evaluation scenario.
Specifically, results in Fig. 4.12 show how the platoon reacts in the case
of a braking maneuver performed by the leader from 100 [km h−1] to a
full stop, for each communication topology under investigation. Also in
this case, the platoon correctly tracks the leader velocity during braking,
till it rests, while possible collisions are avoided. To better unveil this
latter aspect, we report in Fig. 4.13 the analysis of the warning index
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Figure 4.11: Alternative topologies. Tracking performance for
the realistic driving profile in Fig. 4.2b. Time history of vehicles
speed, vi(t) (i = 0, . . . 7): (a) B-L-F; (b) BR; (c) P-F.
during the entire emergency maneuver for the exemplar case of the L-P-F
communication topology. We point out that for all the other topologies
under investigation results are very similar and, hence, they are omitted
here for the sake of brevity.
4.4.5 Robustness with respect to lossy channels
Here we test the robustness of the adaptive strategy in the presence of
information packet losses. We recall that, in case of packet loss, the
algorithm uses the last available information, which means transmission
delay actually jumps, to a large value, then returns to a smaller value
when the next valid message is received. Thus the resilience to message
loss, also implies the robustness to hard delay conditions.
To this aim, we consider the Bernoulli and Gilbert-Elliott channel models,
whose features are reported in Tab. 4.1.
Concerning the Bernoullian channel, results in Fig. 4.14 (related to exem-
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Figure 4.12: Tracking performance for a hard braking maneu-
ver. Time history of vehicles speed, vi(t) (i = 0, . . . 7): (a) L-P-F;
(b) B-L-F; (c) BR; (d) P-F.
Figure 4.13: Hard braking maneuver under L-P-F topology.
Analysis of the warning index CIi (∀i = 1, · · · , 7).
plar case of the realistic speed profile in Fig. 4.2b with L-P-F topology)
show that, due to the adaptive approach that provides robustness w.r.t.
uncertainties, the strategy is able to impose the reference behaviour up to
PER equals to 60%. Very small position errors can be appreciated despite
the hard communication impairment (Fig. 4.14). Note that boundedness
of the adaptive gains is still preserved (results omitted for the sake of
brevity).
Similar performances are obtained in the case of the Gilbert-Elliot chan-
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nel model driven by a two-state Markov chain. Each state represents the
current channel status, which can be either in good or in bad conditions
(from 30% to 70% of packets lost). Results in Fig. 4.15 show that the
platoon cooperatively synchronizes also in this setup and confirm the
high resilience to packet losses and delays provided by adaptation (with
a similar bounded behavior of the adaptive gains). Sudden changes in
the position error signal (see Fig. 4.15a) are due to the occurrence of
bad conditions in terms of packets lost, according to the Gilbert-Elliott
transmission channel model.
We remark that similar performances can be even achieved for the other
communication topologies and hence they have not been reported here
for the sake of brevity.
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Figure 4.14: Bernoulli transmission channel. Tracking perfor-
mance for the realistic driving profile in Fig. 4.2b under L-P-F
topology: (a) Time history of the position error computed as
ri(t) − r0(t) − di0 (i = 1, . . . 7); (b) Time history of the speed
vi(t) (i = 1, . . . 7); (c) Time history of the acceleration ai(t)
(i = 1, . . . 7).
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Figure 4.15: Gilbert-Elliott transmission channel. Tracking
performance for the realistic driving profile in Fig. 4.2b under
L-P-F topology: (a) Time history of the position error computed
as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0 (i = 1, . . . 7); (b) Time history of the speed
vi(t) (i = 1, . . . 7); (c) Time history of the acceleration ai(t)
(i = 1, . . . 7).
4.4.6 A Brief Comparison with an up-to-date distributed
control
To better disclose the control performance, here we carry out a comparison
between our distributed adaptive approach and a collaborative approach
that leverages the idea of consensus [170]. Note that consensus has been
recently indicated in the technical literature on interconnected vehicles as
a particularly suitable tool for maintaining platoon while counteracting
communication impairments (e.g., see [46] and references therein). The
comparative analysis reported here has been carried out by considering,
as an exemplar case, the leader maneuver depicted in Fig. 4.2b under a
classical L-P-F communication topology.
Comparing the results in Fig. 4.16 with the ones depicted in Fig. 4.9, it
is easy to note that, despite the good accomplishment of the consensus-
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bases control, the adaptive approach achieves better performance and
smaller errors. Indeed, the position error (see Fig. 4.16a) is at most equal
to 5 [m] and the speed error (see Fig. 4.16b) is at most 1.2 [m s−1] for the
consensus-based algorithm, while smaller error values, less than 1.8 [m]
for positions and less than 0.8 [m s−1] for the speed, can be obtained in
the case of gains adaptation (see Fig. 4.9a and Fig. 4.9b, respectively).
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Figure 4.16: Consensus-based controller tracking performance
for the realistic driving profile in Fig. 4.2b under L-P-F topology.
Time history of the relative errors (i = 1, . . . 7): (a): time history
of the position error computed as ri(t) − r0(t) − di0; (b): time
history of the speed error computed as vi(t)− v0(t).
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The cooperative tracking problem for vehicles platoon in the presence of
multiple time-varying communication delays has been investigated.
The platooning problem is solved by treating it as the problem of cooper-
ative synchronization of LTI multi agents systems in a delayed dynamical
network.
By introducing the delays related to outdated information, we proved
with a Lyapunov-Krasovskii approach that the decentralized adaptive
strategy can be successfully used to globally synchronize the vehicular
networks to the leader dynamics.
The hi-fidelity analysis conducted with the PLEXE simulator confirmed
the theoretical derivation, the robustness to uncertainties and the good
responsiveness to sudden variations of the leader motion.
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CHAPTER 5
On the Robustness of the
distributed Adaptive
Synchronization Protocol
for Connected Autonomous
Vehicles with Multiple
Disturbances
This chapter studies the robustness property of the adaptive
synchronization-based control protocol, proposed in Chapter 4, for coop-
erative driving of autonomous vehicles platoons in the presence of both
multiple Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) time-varying communication delays
and external disturbances. The robust stability of the closed-loop delayed
network is proven via Lyapunov-Krasovskii theory. Delay-dependent lin-
ear matrix inequalities (LMIs) conditions are analytically derived for
ensuring both robust synchronization to the leader dynamics and dis-
turbances attenuation. An exemplar driving maneuver is considered for
evaluating the robustness of the performance achieved by vehicles platoon
and the numerical results confirm the effectiveness of the theoretical
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derivation.
5.1 Robustness Issues in Cooperative Driving
Systems
Practical challenges for the deployment of autonomous connected vehicles
are how to opportunely manage external disturbances acting along all the
vehicular chain and communication impairments introduced by the V2V
network, such as time-delays and packet losses [66]. To deal with the
robustness problem w.r.t. communication impairments, consensus-based
approaches have been widely investigated in [170, 97, 152] where the
heterogeneity in the time-varying communication delays is investigated,
though the theoretical analysis disregards leader tracking maneuvers.
More recently, the leader tracking problem in the presence of multiple
heterogeneous time-varying delays is addressed in [155], where an adap-
tive cooperative control protocol solves the issue by providing stability
conditions via a Lyapunov-Krasovkii approach.
Although robustness w.r.t. delays is crucial, another fundamental re-
quirement, however less addressed in the current platoon literature, is to
provide robustness w.r.t. external disturbances arising from different en-
vironmental factors. Along this line, distributed sliding mode control [77],
distributed finite-time approach [70], decentralized H∞ controllers [215]
are proposed under the ideal assumption of perfect communication. The
leader tracking problem when concurrently taking into account both
external disturbances and communication time-delay is instead recently
addressed in [66], where a distributed H∞ controller is designed for han-
dling autonomous vehicles platoons under the main restrictive assumption
of a homogeneous (or unique) and constant time-delay. However, in prac-
tice, communication is not perfect and, hence, each of the communication
links, connecting a pair of vehicles, is affected by a different variable
time-delay whose value depends on actual conditions, or possible impair-
ments, of the communication channel [30].
Because adaptive approaches provide robustness and self-adaptivity to
withstand time-varying disturbances, such as environmental factors or
time-varying conditions of the communication channel, it seems suit-
able to solve the cooperative robust leader tracking problem via the
distributed adaptive synchronization-based protocol presented in [155].
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The aim of this chapter is to analytically guarantee both robust stability
to uncertain external disturbances and multiple (or heterogeneous) time-
varying delays, which are both present in current on-the-road driving
conditions, while achieving at the same time the desired tracking per-
formance, i.e, so that all vehicles within the platoon synchronize to the
reference leading dynamics while preserving the required inter-vehicular
distance. Simultaneously considering the presence of time-varying distur-
bances and delays, novel sufficient robustness conditions are derived and
expressed as set of delay-dependent Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs).
Theoretical results are then confirmed via numerical simulations for an
exemplar driving maneuver.
5.2 Cooperative driving in uncertain driving
conditions
Consider a platoon of N autonomous vehicles plus a leader moving along
a single lane. The i-th generic vehicle behavior (∀i = 1, . . . , N) subject
to the external disturbance is described by the following third order
longitudinal model as [66, 70]:
x˙i = Axi +Bui(t; τij(t)) + Ewi(t), (5.1)
where xi(t) = [ri(t) vi(t) ai(t)]
> ∈ R3 represent the i-th vehicle state
vector (i = 1, · · · , N) (being ri [m] and vi [m/s] and ai [m/s2] the
i-th agent position (in meters), velocity (in meters per second) and
acceleration (in meters per second2), measured with respect to the road
reference frame); A ∈ R3×3, B ∈ R3×1 are as in Eq. (4.2) while E ∈ R3×1
has the following expression:
E =
[
0 0 1
]>
. (5.2)
ui(t; τij(t)) is the distributed input providing the desired acceleration
to be imposed to i − th vehicle within platoon. Note that, the dis-
tributed protocol ui(t; τij(t)) is on-board computed by handling both
local measurements and the network information that are affected by
time-varying delays depending on the specific communication link, i.e.
τij(t) (j = 0, · · · , N) i 6= j. Furthermore, wi(t) ∈ L2[0;∞) is the external
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disturbance arising from environmental factors, such as variations in
wind velocity and/or road slope.
The reference leading dynamics, not influenced by any followers and
not subject to external disturbances, are instead described by the au-
tonomous linear dynamical system as in Eq. (4.3).
To solve the cooperative leader tracking problem (see Eq. (4.4)) in
the presence of multiple disturbances wi(t) acting on each vehicles dy-
namics i (∀i = 1, . . . , N) and multiple communications delay τi,j(t)
(∀i = 1, . . . , N ; j = 0, 1, . . . , N, i 6= j), we consider the cooperative
distributed adaptive controller in Eq. (4.5) that updates its action based
on the errors among the state information shared among vehicles.
5.3 Robust Stability
In this section we analytically prove the robustness of the adaptive control
strategy (4.5). To this aim, we first derive the closed-loop dynamics of
vehicular platoon and, then, we provide our main result according to
Theorem 6 by leveraging Lyapunov-Krasovkii theory [72].
5.3.1 Closed-Loop Dynamics
Define the errors of the generic i-th and j-th vehicle with respect to leader
as in Eq. (4.8) and Eq. (4.9) respectively. By recasting ui(t, τij(t)) in
terms of the state errors as in Eq. (4.10), the dynamics of the closed-loop
error system for the generic i-th vehicle can be written as
e˙i(t) = Aei(t)−Bαi0κ>i0(t)ei(t− τi0(t)) + Ewi(t)
−B
N∑
j=1
αijκ
>
ij(t) [ei(t− τij(t))− ej(t− τij(t))] ,
(5.3)
where A-B and E are defined as in (4.2) and (5.2) respectively. Now,
naming
−Bαi0κ>i0(t) = Ci0(t) ∈ R3×3 −Bαijκ>ij(t) = Ĉij(t) ∈ R3×3, (5.4)
system (4.12) can be recast as (i = 1, . . . , N)
e˙i(t) = Aei(t) + Ewi(t) + Ci0(t)ei(t− τi0(t))+
N∑
j=1
Ĉij(t) [ei(t− τij(t))− ej(t− τij(t))] . (5.5)
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Delays τij(t) can be represented, with a more compact notation, as ele-
ments of the following delay set: σp(t) ∈ {τij(t) : i, j = 1, 2, ..., N, i 6= j)}
for p = 1, 2, ...,m with m ≤ N(N − 1). Analogously, delays τi0(t) are
elements of the set: τl(t) ∈ {τi0(t) : i = 1, 2, ..., N, } for l = 1, 2, ..., q with
q ≤ N [155]. Note that m and q are equal to their maximum value if
the underlying network topology GN+1 is a directed complete graph and
all time-delays are different.
Now, by defining the error state vector as x˜ (t) =[
e>1 (t), e>2 (t), · · · , e>N (t)
]> ∈ R3N and the external disturbances
vector as w˜ (t) =
[
w>1 (t), w>2 (t), · · · , w>N (t)
]> ∈ RN , the dynamics
of the delayed closed-loop vehicular network can be expressed as:
˙˜x (t) = A0x˜ (t) +
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)x˜ (t− τl (t)) +
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)x˜ (t− σp (t)) + E˜w˜(t)
(5.6)
where A0 ∈ R3N×3N and Cl(t) ∈ R3N×3N (l = 1, · · · , q) are defined as in
(4.16) and (4.17) respectively; matrices Ĉp(t) ∈ R3N×3N (p = 1, · · · ,m)
are block matrices such that each block is given as in (4.19). Moreover,
E˜ is the following diagonal block matrix:
E˜ =

E 03×1 · · · 03×1
03×1 E · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
...
03×1 · · · · · · E
 ∈ R3N×N , (5.7)
being E defined as in (5.2).
By introducing a model transformation with the Leibniz-Newton for-
mula [28] (see Definition 4), and by naming F (t) = A0 +
∑q
l=1Cl(t) +∑m
p=1 Ĉp(t) ∈ R3N×3N , the delayed closed-loop system (5.6) can be finally
recast as:
˙˜x (t) = F (t)x˜ (t)−
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)
∫ t
t−τl(t)
˙˜x(s)ds
−
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)
∫ t
t−σp(t)
˙˜x(s)ds + E˜w˜(t).
(5.8)
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5.3.2 Proof of Robust Stability
Here, we analytically prove the robust stability of the delayed closed-loop
vehicular network (5.8) considering the following disturbance rejection
index J for a prescribed scalar γ > 0:
J =
∫ t
0
x˜>(s)x˜(s)− γ2w˜>(s)w˜(s)ds. (5.9)
The aim is to find stability conditions that ensure both asymptotic
stability and robustness attenuation requirement guaranteeing that J <
0 [65, 192].
According to the delay system literature [72, 153] we assume here that
delays are bounded, i.e. σp(t) ∈ [0, σ?p], σ˙p(t) ∈ (0, dp] ∀t, ∀p and dp ≤ 1
and τl(t) ∈ [0, τ?l ], τ˙l(t) ∈ (0, dl] ∀t, ∀l and dl ≤ 1. Note that, this
assumption fits for the technological constraints of V2V communication,
where delays are bounded in practice [6].
Now, delay-dependent robust stability conditions can be expressed as
a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI) criterion according to the following
Theorem.
Theorem 6. Consider the delayed closed-loop vehicular network (5.8)
under the action of the distributed adaptive control protocol (4.5). Assume
delays τl(t) (l = 1, . . . , q) and σp(t) (p = 1, . . . ,m) to be bounded and
node 0 to be globally reachable in GN+1.
If there exist the following positive definite matrices P , Ql, Qp, Ml,
M˜p ∈ R3N×3N and a scalar γ > 0, such that the following LMIs hold:
F>(t)P + PF (t) +
q∑
l=1
Ql +
m∑
p=1
Qp +A
>
0 NA0 + I
3N×3N < 0 (5.10a)
C>l (t)NCl(t)−Ql(1− dl) < 0, (5.10b)
Ĉ>p (t)N Ĉp(t)−Qp(1− dp) < 0, (5.10c)
E˜>NE˜ − γ2IN×N < 0, (5.10d)
being N =
∑q
l=1 τ
?
l Ml +
∑m
p=1 σ
?
pM˜p, then the delayed vehicular network
(5.8) achieves synchronization as in (4.4) and it is also robust stable
w.r.t. external disturbances, i.e.
limt→∞ x˜(t) = 0 J(w˜) < 0. (5.11)
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Moreover, adaptive gains in (4.7) converge to a constant value κ?ij ∈
R3(∀i = 1, . . . , N j = 0, 1, . . . , N).
Proof. Consider the following Lyapunov-Krasovkii functional:
V (x˜(t)) = x˜>(t)Px˜(t) +
q∑
l=1
∫ t
t−τl(t) x˜
>(s)Qlx˜(s)ds
+
m∑
p=1
∫ t
t−σp(t) x˜
>(s)Qpx˜(s)ds
+
q∑
l=1
∫ 0
−τ?l
∫ t
t+θ
˙˜x(s)>Ml ˙˜x(s)dsdθ
+
m∑
p=1
∫ 0
−σ?p
∫ t
t+θ
˙˜x(s)>M˜p ˙˜x(s)dsdθ
(5.12)
where P , Ql, Qp, Ml and Mp ∈ R3N×3N are constant symmetric and
positive definite matrices to be determined.
Differentiating V (x˜(t)) along the trajectories of the closed-loop system
(5.8), given the bounds on delays, we have:
V˙ (x˜(t)) ≤ x˜>(t) (F>(t)P + PF (t)) x˜(t)
−2x˜>(t)P
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)
∫ t
t−τ?l
˙˜x(s)ds
−2x˜>(t)P
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)
∫ t
t−σ?p
˙˜x(s)ds+ 2x˜>(t)PE˜w˜(t)
+
q∑
l=1
x˜>(t)Qlx˜(t)−
q∑
l=1
x˜>(t− τl(t))Ql (1− dl) x˜(t− τl(t))
+
m∑
p=1
x˜>(t)Qpx˜(t)
−
m∑
p=1
x˜>(t− σp(t))Qp (1− dp) x˜(t− σp(t))
+ ˙˜x(t)
q∑
l=1
τ?l Ml
˙˜x(t)−
q∑
l=1
∫ t
t−τ?l
˙˜x>(s)Ml ˙˜x(s)ds
+ ˙˜x(t)
m∑
p=1
σ?pM˜p ˙˜x(t)−
m∑
p=1
∫ t
t−σ?p
˙˜x>(s)M˜p ˙˜x(s)ds.
(5.13)
Let N =
∑q
l=1 τ
?
l Ml +
∑m
p=1 σ
?
pM˜p and
ξ(t) =
[
x˜>(t), x˜>(t− τ1(t)), . . . , x˜>(t− τq(t)),
x˜>(t− σ1(t)), . . . , x˜>(t− σm(t)), w˜(t)
]> ∈ Rυ, (5.14)
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being υ = (1 +m+ q)3N +N .
Taking into account (5.14) and (5.6), after some algebraic manipulations,
inequality (5.13) can be rewritten as:
V˙ (x˜) ≤ ξ>(t)Φ(t)ξ>(t)− 2x˜>(t)P
q∑
l=1
Cl(t)
∫ t
t−τ?l
˙˜x(s)ds
−2x˜>(t)P
m∑
p=1
Ĉp(t)
∫ t
t−σ?p
˙˜x(s)ds−
q∑
l=1
∫ t
t−τ?l
˙˜x>(s)Ml ˙˜x(s)ds
−
m∑
p=1
∫ t
t−σ?p
˙˜x>(s)M˜p ˙˜x(s)ds,
(5.15)
being Φ(t) ∈ Rυ×υ the matrix defined Fig. 5.1 whose diagonal blocks,
ϕi,i(t) ∈ R3N×3N , are given as
ϕ(1,1)(t) = F
>(t)P + PF (t) +
q∑
l=1
Ql +
m∑
p=1
Qp +A
>
0 NA0,
ϕ(l+1,l+1)(t) = C
>
l (t)NCl(t)−Ql(1− dl),
ϕ(q+p+1,q+p+1)(t) = Ĉ>p (t)N Ĉp(t)−Qp(1− dp),
(5.16)
with l = 1, . . . , q; p = 1, . . . ,m.
Now, defining the following augmented vector as in [177]
Figure 5.1: Φ(t) ∈ Rυ×υ
ζ(t) =
[
ξ(t),
∫ t
t−τ?1
˙˜x>(s), . . . ,
∫ t
t−τ?q
˙˜x>(s),
∫ t
t−σ?1
˙˜x>(s), . . . ,∫ t
t−σ?m ,
˙˜x>(s)
]> ∈ Rν (5.17)
where ν = υ + (m+ q)3N , it is possible to recast inequality (5.15) in a
more compact form as:
V˙ (x˜) ≤ ζ>(t)Θ(t)ζ(t) (5.18)
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being Θ(t) ∈ Rν×ν the following diagonal block matrix:
Φ(t)
−2PC1(t) · · ·−2PCq(t)−2P Ĉ1(t) · · ·−2P Ĉm(t)
03N×3N · · · · · · · · · · · · 03N×3N
...
...
...
...
...
...
03N×3N · · · · · · · · · · · · 03N×3N
0(m+q)3N×(m+q)3N
−M1 03N×3N · · · · · · · · · 03N×3N
03N×3N
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . . −Mq . . .
...
...
... · · · . . . −M˜1 . . .
...
... · · · · · · . . . . . . 03N×3N
03N×3N · · · · · · · · · 03N×3N −M˜m

.
(5.19)
Given the attenuation index J as in (5.9), following [65, 192] robust
synchronization is guaranteed if
ζ>(t)Θ(t)ζ(t) + x˜>(t)x˜(t)− γ2w˜>(t)w˜(t) < 0, (5.20)
and, hence, if the LMIs in (5.10) hold. Now, following the approach in
[173], from the fulfillment of (5.20), by integrating equations (4.7), it is
possible to prove that all κij(t) tend to some constant values κ
?
ij . In so
doing the statement is proven.
Remark 2. The assumption of globally reachability of the leader guaran-
tees that the matrix F (t) is negative definite (see Lemma 4) and, hence,
that LMIs in (5.10) are feasible ∀t ≥ 0.
Remark 3. The LMIs in (5.10) can be numerically solved by using the
interior-point method [27] implemented in the Y almip© Toolbox.
5.4 Numerical Validation
In this section, the robustness of the distributed adaptive control strategy
(4.5) is disclosed by considering an exemplar platoon of five vehicles plus
a leader connected through an exemplar Leader-Predecessor-Follower (L-
P-F) [218] topology. Note that, although many different communication
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Figure 5.2: Leader tracking driving maneuver: a) time history
of the vehicle velocity vi(t) (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); b) time history of
the vehicle acceleration ai(t) (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
topologies may arise for platooning, according to the V2V paradigm, the
appraised L-P-F structure has been chosen as meaningful illustrative
case study since it is very common in the technical automotive liter-
ature (see [218] and references therein). The numerical analysis have
been performed by exploiting the MATLAB© platform where, for the
simulation scenario, communication delays have been emulated as a
time-varying functions whose maximum value, i.e. τ?l = σ
?
p = 0.1 [s],
is set above the typical value observed in practice for IEEE 802.11p
vehicular networks (which is of the order of few hundredths of a second,
i.e. 10−2 [s] [6]). Moreover, according to [70], we consider sinusoidal
disturbances with different amplitudes acting on each of the platoon
members, i.e., wi(t) = Ai sin(t), for t ≥ 20 [s]. Simulation parameters
are reported in Tab. 4.2. Results are related to an illustrative leader
tracking trapezoidal maneuver. Specifically, the leader, traveling with an
initial velocity of 22 [m/s], begins to accelerate at time t = 30 [s] with a
constant acceleration of 0.5 [m/s2] until it reaches a constant velocity
of 42 [m/s]. Then, at time t = 120 [s] it starts to decelerate with a
deceleration of −0.25 [m/s2] until it achieves a final constant velocity
equal to 22 [m/s]. According to the theoretical derivation in Section 5.3,
results, reported in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3, reveal the ability of the proposed
distributed controller in guaranteeing the required platooning formation
despite the external disturbances, acting on vehicle dynamics. and the
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Figure 5.3: Leader tracking driving maneuver: a) time history
of the position error r¯i(t), computed as ri(t) − r0(t) − di0 (i =
1, 2, 3, 4, 5); b) time history of the velocity error v¯i(t), computed
as vi(t)−v0(t) (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); c) time history of the acceleration
error a¯i(t), computed as ai(t) − a0(t) (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); d) time
history of the adaptive gains κij(t).
time-varying delays, affecting the V2V communication. Indeed, all vehi-
cles track the leader behavior (see Figs. 5.2a and 5.2b) while preserving
the desired inter-vehicular distance di,j (∀i = 1, . . . , 5,j = 0, 1, . . . , 5) (see
Fig. 5.3a). Note that, as depicted in Figs. 5.3a, 5.3b and 5.3c, all external
disturbances are strongly attenuated (more than 95%) and hence just
some very small bounded errors can be observed. Finally, we remark
that, coherently with the theoretical results (in Theorem 6), the adaptive
gains are always bounded and converge toward suitable constant values
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when synchronization errors converge to zero (see Fig. 5.3d).
5.5 Concluding Remarks
The robustness of a distributed adaptive cooperative synchronization-
based protocol for a platoon of connected vehicles in the presence of
multiple time-varying communication delays and external disturbances
has been investigated. The robust stability of the uncertain closed-loop
vehicular network has been proved through the Lyapunov-Krasovksii
approach, thus yielding to delay-dependent stability conditions expressed
as a set of feasible LMIs. Results disclose that the distributed adaptive
strategy can be successfully used to globally synchronize the vehicular
platoon to the leader dynamics, while attenuating external disturbances
acting on the vehicles platoon. Exemplary numerical simulations confirm
the effectiveness of the controller in guaranteeing the robust cooperative
tracking.
CHAPTER 6
Distributed Resilient
Control strategy for
autonomous connected
vehicles platoons in
presence of security
vulnerabilities
The Vehicular ad hoc Networks and the de facto vehicular networking
standard IEEE 802.11p communication protocol are key tools for the
deployment of platooning applications, since the cooperation among vehi-
cles is based on a reliable communication structure. However, vehicular
networks can suffer different security threats. Indeed, in collaborative
driving applications, the sudden appearance of a malicious attack can
mainly compromise: i) the correctness of data traffic flow on the vehicular
network by sending malicious messages that alter the platoon formation
and its coordinated motion; ii) the safety of platooning application by
altering vehicular network communication capability. In view of the fact
that cyber attacks can lead to dangerous implications for the security of
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autonomous driving systems, it is fundamental to consider their effects
on the behavior of the interconnected vehicles, and to try to limit them
from the control design stage.
To this aim, in this chapter we focus on some relevant types of mali-
cious threats that affect the platoon safety, i.e. application layer attacks
(Spoofing and Message Falsification) and network layer attacks (Denial
of Service and Burst Transmission), and we propose a novel collaborative
control strategy for enhancing the protection level of autonomous pla-
toons. The control protocol is designed and validated in both analytically
and numerically way, for the appraised malicious attack scenarios and
for different communication topology structures. The effectiveness of the
proposed strategy is shown by using PLEXE, a state of the art inter-
vehicular communications and mobility simulator that includes basic
building blocks for platooning. A detailed simulation analysis discloses
the robustness of the proposed approach and its capabilities in reacting
to the malicious attack effects.
6.1 Security Issues in Cooperative Driving Sys-
tems
Most studies on vehicles platooning focus their attention on the control
strategy design [158, 167, 155, 60] under the main assumption that the
communication structure is reliable. In this chapter, instead, we consider
an autonomous platoon of N vehicles traveling on a single lane and
sharing information through a non reliable V2V wireless communications,
in order to achieve cooperative driving. Indeed, similarly to other
open and dynamic networks, vehicular ad hoc networks are affected by
different security threats [103]. In these networks a cyber attack can
lead to dangerous implication for safety, privacy and, moreover, for the
public perception and consideration of vehicles platoon [79].
Countless studies on security issues in VANETs are presented in
[159, 26, 5, 141, 201, 121], where several tools, helpful in building a
secure vehicular network, have been exposed. One of the most proposed
solution consists in exploiting authentication/validation mechanism
for the messages exchanged among vehicles in order to remove from
communication network the adversary, disabling its communication
capability. In addiction, the works [94, 4, 134] present an accurate
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categorization of all the possible malicious attacks on VANETs and of
the eventual countermeasures allowing their prevention.
Although all these aforementioned works discuss the cyber attacks
implications and propose network layer countermeasures, none of them
considers the effects of malicious attacks on vehicular networks of
connected vehicles equipped with a longitudinal control. Only recently,
the security vulnerabilities problem on vehicles platooning has been
addressed in [75, 124, 11, 78, 23, 13, 40, 67, 44]. These works suggest
how important is, in control protocol design, to take into account the
eventual cyber attacks on vehicular platooning network in order to
improve its safety. Indeed, while security in sensing and communication
has been extensively investigated in the technical literature, security in
control has been recently indicated as a key ingredient that has to be
added for enhancing the protection level of the normal operation of a
physical process (e.g. see [75, 124]).
Motivated by this reason, we focus our attention on different situations
in which the correct communication among autonomous vehicles is
compromised and, based on this analysis, we propose a novel distributed
collaborative strategy that guarantees the platoon formation in
adversarial environment and that allows to promptly react to malicious
attacks. The proposed distributed control approach also leverages a
real-time voting technique to achieve the complete mitigation of some of
the most critical effects due to malicious attacks.
This does not imply that we aim to substitute other solutions for security,
such as the cryptographic ones [121] that work at the information level
to avoid that the content of the information can be somehow altered.
Our aim is to provide further countermeasures to detect, mitigate and,
if possible, counteract cyber threats that may alter driving decision at
control level so to help increasing the overall security of the ensemble of
the connected vehicles.
Moreover, besides cyber attacks we also consider that each communi-
cation link, that connects a pair of vehicles, is affected by a different
time-delay that accounts for actual conditions, or possible impairments,
of the communication channel.
The main contribution of this work is twofold. First, differently from lit-
erature, we propose a collaborative control strategy specifically designed
both to take into account cyber threats, as messages manipulation
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attacks and communication capability attacks and communication
impairments. The proposed approach is, hence, able to guarantee the
cooperative driving of the vehicles platoon in the presence of malicious
attack on the communication network as well as communication
time-delay by promptly counteracting them.
Second, the proposed collaborative strategy is implemented in PLEXE
[172], and we carry out a comprehensive experimental analysis with
eight cars in a realistic highway (10 km long) considering different cyber
attacks scenarios and different communication network topologies in
which the leading vehicle is globally reachable. The communication delay
in the control protocol, instead, is intrinsically modeled in Veins with a
realistic communications device (IEEE 802.11p card) implementation
[180]. The simulation analysis shows the main security vulnerabilities
effects on the platoon motion and illustrates the robustness of the
collaborative control strategy with respect to the most common malicious
attacks.
6.2 Cyber Attacks in Vehicular Network
The literature on cyber attacks to vehicular networks is both wide and
variegate. In this section, first we focus our attention on attacks to vehicu-
lar networks of interest for platooning, then we focus on countermeasures
for this application scenario.
6.2.1 Malicious Attacks to Vehicular Networks
Here, we provide an overview of the most relevant types of malicious
threats that may compromise the functionalities of cooperative driving
systems (e.g., see [11], [84, 56] and references therein). Indeed, with
respect to autonomous driving applications, a malicious node can affect:
i) the correct data traffic flow by sending malicious messages; ii) the
safety by altering vehicular network communication capability; iii) the
vehicle privacy by listening to legitimate messages. Before introducing
different cyber security scenarios, we first define the adversary typology
[160]. An adversary can be an insider, i.e. an authenticated member
of the network possessing a certified public key, or an outsider, i.e. a
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network intruder. If the adversary does not get benefit from the attack,
but it aims to harm the network members, it is said malicious, while it is
defined rational if it seeks personal benefit. Furthermore, the adversary
is defined active if it generates packet or signals, whereas it is defined
passive if it realizes an eavesdropping attack.
In our vehicular scenario, application layer attacks affect the correct
operating of the cooperative driving by altering the messages exchanged
among vehicles to reach and maintain a common motion. Specifically,
in a spoofing attack the adversary impersonates a vehicle, or more than
one vehicle, in the platoon taking the control of the vehicle itself or
injecting fraudulent information. Instead, in a message falsification
attack, an adversary starts listening the messages wirelessly sent on
networks and, after receiving each beacon, it tries to manipulate and
to falsify the content of messages in order to rebroadcast them. Value
changing of messages beacon field could have different effects depending
on the implementation of the vehicle control strategy. For example, an
alteration of the position beacon field leads to an increase or decrease of
the inter-vehicular distance and in the worst case to collision (collision
induction attack) [44]. Conversely, in replay attacks the adversary starts
listening the messages wirelessly sent on networks, but, after storing the
content of the message, it tries to retransmit the message at a later time.
The attack effect can be very dangerous, leading eventually to vehicle’s
collision. Furthermore, it can be used to confuse the authorities and to
hide the identification of the vehicles involved in an accident situation
[109]. Differently, if an internal adversary vehicle forges the identities of
multiple vehicles, the platoon is undergoing a Sybil attack. In this case,
the false identities create the illusion that there exist additional vehicles
along the road and this can be used to play any type of attack in the
system [148]. Public key cryptography is a tool commonly proposed for
dealing with these kind of attacks [4].
Considering now network layer attacks, in denial-of-service (DoS), an
adversary overloads and overwhelms the communication capacity of a
vehicle or of a group of vehicles by using vehicular botnets, in order to
make them unable to exchange the necessary information for cooperative
driving [67]. DoS attacks are considered very dangerous since they impact
on the control algorithm correctly running, causing instability of the
traffic flow and, in more severe cases, collisions. With respect to the
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wide DoS category, note that during a burst attack the adversary tries to
manipulate the data traffic flow in order to disperse only some beacons
with a randomly loss rate distribution. In an eavesdropping attack,
instead, the adversary extracts valuable information about the vehicles
platoon and uses them for its own benefit. Furthermore, a platoon is said
to be under a radio jamming attack when a deliberate communication
disruption among platoon’s members over small or wide geographic
areas is implemented by using different techniques, such as one-channel
jamming or several channels jamming. Malware attacks can also cause
serious disruptions in normal VANETs operations. These attacks are
normally executed by malicious insiders, rather than outsiders, whenever
on board units (OBU) of vehicles and road side units (RSUs) perform
software updates. The effect is an increase of transmission latency, which
can be alleviated by using a centralized administration system[148].
Instead, during a black hole attack, a malicious vehicle declares having
the shortest path to get the data and then it routes and redirects them.
The adversary is hence able to intercept the data packet or retain it. When
the forged route is successfully established, it depends on the malicious
vehicle whether to drop or forward the packet [84]. Existing solutions to
this attack consider designing protocols having more than one route to
the destination, which imposes processing overload to the network [56].
As well as black hole, a wormhole is a severe attack. In this case two or
more malicious vehicles create a tunnel to transmit data packets from
one end of the network toward a malicious vehicle at the other end. By
this way, these packets are broadcasted on the network and the malicious
vehicles take the control of such a short network connection or link,
hence threatening the security of transmitting data packets. To prevent
wormhole attacks, packet leash is one of the most well known approaches
(e.g. see [4] and references therein for more details). Another dangerous
attack, referred in technical literature as byzantine [7], compromises
either a single vehicle or a group of vehicles by creating routing loops
and then directing data packets via non optimal paths, thus leading to
degradation or disruption of the routing services [7]. To counteract this
attack, the Robust Source Routing (RSR) protocol has been introduced,
whose features allow delivering packets to their respective destinations
even in Byzantine attack-like adversarial conditions [39]. Finally, a
stealthy attack includes both side- and covert-channel exploitation (by
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observing the traffic load in the physical level or hiding data flows within
the regular messages) and passive traffic analysis (to learn from the
network topology and/or deduce vehicles activity patterns, lifestyle and
routes) [7].
Malicious attacks can also occur at system level. These are due to the
tampering of vehicles hardware or software, that can be done both by
a malicious insider at manufacturing level, and by an outsider in an
unattended vehicle (for instance by replacing or altering certain vehicle
sensors). In all these cases, if the on-board hardware/software is tampered
with, or it is faulty, the input information to the system turn out to
be not accurate, even if the communication channel is secure and an
up-to-date architecture is implemented on the VANET. This lack of
accuracy seriously affects the operation of the high-level protocols and,
hence, the risk of tampering should be not neglected. To cope with this
kind of attacks, the most popular solution presented in the technical
literature is to use tamper-proof sensors [56]. Among the system level
attacks, illusion attacks are particularly dangerous since the adversary
purposefully deceives the sensors on his car in order to produce wrong
sensor readings. This causes incorrect traffic warning messages that are
broadcasted to neighbors. Hence, leveraging information from a cheating
sensor, an attacker, who is an insider, can alter perceived position, speed,
and direction of the other vehicles, thus inducing mishaps [84].
It is worth mentioning here that for the special case of electric vehicles,
there exist specific security vulnerabilities, such as fraud and energy
theft. To solve these problems, different solutions, devoted to improve
the security of the Open Charge Point Protocol, have been proposed in
the very recent technical literature (see [7] and references therein).
In this work, we consider self-contained vehicles equipped with internal
combustion engines [11] and focus our attention on spoofing and message
falsification, for the class of attacks at application layer, and on Denial of
Service and Burst Transmission, for the class of attacks at network layer.
As for the spoofing attack, we assume there is an internal opponent
(i.e. a vehicle traveling inside the platoon) that imposes a constant
offset at its current acceleration value from a given time instant. It then
returns erroneous information to other vehicles within its communication
range for disturbing their motion. For a message falsification attack,
an internal opponent, who manipulates and falsifies the content of the
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beacons to be sent to its neighbors, is considered. Specifically, it adds a
constant offset value to its current position value such as to compromise
the safe inter-vehicle distance. Furthermore, with respect to Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks, we consider one external network intruder or
one internal adversary that periodically overloads and overwhelms the
communication capacity of one specific vehicle within the platoon. For
the burst transmission attack (a particular type of DoS) it is instead
assumed that one external network intruder, or one internal adversary,
tries to manipulate the data traffic flow in order to disperse some beacons
with a randomly loss rate. More details about the analyzed attacks are
in Section 6.5.2.
6.2.2 Malicious Attack Countermeasures in Platooning
Applications
Here, we discuss the main countermeasures for detecting and mitigating
the malicious attacks presented above, in order to make the platooning
application safer.
Cryptographic control method is one of the most useful tools [79, 159,
26, 5, 141, 201, 85, 121], especially if the opponent is an outsider. In-
deed, the control system provides several services as authentication, data
integrity and non repudiation [134], hence preventing vehicle imperson-
ation or messages alteration. However when the adversary is an insider
attacker, it possesses a valid recognition certificate. Thus the only use
of cryptographic system control is not enough to solve cyber threats
[222]. Moreover nonce technique [79], consisting in the use of an arbitrary
number that may only be used once in the beacon message, can be useful
in preventing the replay attacks.
Other effective solutions include reputation- and trust-based systems
[204, 49, 52, 47]. Reputation is a widely used index for constructing
the credibility of a vehicle within the network and Bayesian reputa-
tion functions are commonly used to calculate these reputation values.
Leveraging reputation-based approaches, vehicles with a low confidence
level are isolated from the others and they are eventually deprived from
receiving any service [47]. Most of the approaches rely on the monitoring
of neighboring vehicles, in order to evaluate their trustiness, or on a
reputation management system (e.g. see [49] and references therein for
further details). Also, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have shown
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their efficiency in detecting with a high accuracy both internal and
external attacks by using special agent-nodes that monitor both the
behavior of target vehicles and the network traffic response. An alarm is
triggered any time when a malicious behavior is detected [171]. Broadly
intrusion detection techniques can be classified into the following cate-
gories [110]: signature-based detection methods, in which the intrusion
detection system monitors the packets and matches them with existing
signatures (e.g. see [137]); anomaly-based detection tools in which the
system activities are monitored and, hence, declared as malicious or
anomalous on the basis of some predefined rules rather than signatures
(e.g. see [3, 171]); hybrid detection approaches in which the detection of
malicious activities leverages either signature-based or anomaly-based
methods (e.g. see [149]). Finally, note that, with the aim of improving
detection performance, the IDSs are often endowed with computational
intelligence. To this aim, neural networks, fuzzy rules, soft computing
and machine leaning techniques are the most widely exploited tools in
the field (e.g. see [175] and references therein).
With respect to the specific platoon application, the control strategy de-
sign plays an important role in providing further robustness and security
and, hence, in enhancing the protection level of the normal operation
of the autonomous driving process. Indeed, although the information
security field has developed both advanced technologies and tools for
preventing and reacting to attacks, embedding security in control design
can be crucial, since an opponent, attacking the cyber infrastructure,
can interfere the normal operation of physical process [75, 124].
A possible solution in this direction would consist in implementing a
control algorithm allowing the detection of malfunctions and/or anoma-
lies. Comparing the expected behavior of the vehicles platoon with the
actually observed one, each vehicle would be able to detect a malicious
information and to react adequately. This kind of approach has been
for example considered in [44], where a model-based detection scheme
is presented: each vehicle exploits wireless communication to model the
expected behavior of its preceding vehicle; if the expected and actual
behavior differ, the monitoring vehicle downgrades to non cooperative
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), exploiting only radar measurement.
Collaborative-decision technique, such as voting, could be also useful in
detection and mitigation of malicious attacks. Note that, although the
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idea of voting for detecting the malicious behavior has been proposed for
years and several solution has been proposed to counteract the malicious
attacks at network level [161, 202, 2, 71], no one exploits the technique
at control level. Voting or fusion techniques can be effective tools for en-
hancing control security in platooning application. Indeed, by leveraging
information redundancy (that is high especially in all-to-all or deeply
connected configurations) it is possible to help the detection of some
malicious behaviors [11, 151]. Furthermore in [13] another mitigation
technique, embedded on-board vehicles platoon, is proposed: when a
vehicle receives a message, before accepting the information, it checks
the identification of the vehicle and the consistence of the message to
avoid the acceptance of malicious information.
In [78] an example of wireless jamming attack is described. In this
work the authors highlight how a correct control strategy design for the
vehicles platoon, embedded with an estimator of the lost information,
is able to mitigate the malicious effect of jamming. Finally, another
mitigation technique is presented in [23], where a fuzzy algorithm for
attack detection is proposed.
Hence, from literature overview, it is clear that the control strategy
design plays an important role in robustness and security issues. Within
this scenario, this chapter tackles and solves the platoon control problem
in the presence of malicious attacks as a second order consensus problem,
accounting for time varying communication delays and vehicles dynamics.
Based on the effects of malicious attacks such as messages manipulation
and communication capabilities impairments, we design a novel robust
control strategy mixed to a voting technique for cooperative driving in
an adversarial environment. The proposed control algorithm significantly
enhances the state of art. Differently from [11], in which platoon instabil-
ity arises for the presence of security vulnerabilities, the proposed robust
strategy guarantees the platoon stability also in the presence of adver-
saries. Differently from [44], the mitigation technique implemented in
this paper is able to react to malicious attacks without downgrading the
cooperative strategy to the non cooperative ACC one. Finally, different
from [78], we do not necessitate of an estimate of lost information since
we design the strategy taking into account the eventual cyber attack on
the vehicle communication capabilities. Furthermore we point out that
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the control strategy overcomes the limitation of the V2V communica-
tion structure that is not restricted to the Predecessor-Follower one as
assumed in [11, 44].
6.3 Collaborative Strategy for Platooning and
Countermeasure for Malicious Behaviors
Our aim is to regulate the speed and the relative distance of each vehicle
with respect to the neighboring vehicles in its communication range and
to the leading vehicle, respectively [185, 38] in the presence of adversaries.
The platoon is composed of N vehicles traveling on a single lane plus the
additional leading vehicle acting as a reference for the ensemble. The
adversary or the vehicle controlled by the adversary is part of the vehicles
platoon and thus it is able to send valid V2V messages [124].
Since vehicles are moving within a non-ideal wireless communication
environment, information can be received by each vehicle with different
(often defined as multiple or heterogeneous) time-varying delays, whose
current value is not random, but depends on the actual network conditions
[30, 218]. Hence, in practice, communication impairments are unavoidable
and therefore the control input, that is computed on the basis of outdated
information, turns out to be affected by time-varying delays [164].
To model the generic i-th vehicle dynamics (i = 1, . . . , N) we exploit the
second-order longitudinal model in (3.3), i.e.
r˙i(t) = vi(t)
v˙i(t) =
1
Mi
ui(t),
(6.1)
where ri [m] and vi [m/s] are the i-th vehicle absolute position (with
respect to a given reference framework) and speed; Mi [kg] is the i-th
vehicle mass and the propelling force ui denotes the control input to be
appropriately chosen to achieve the control goal.
Similarly, the leader vehicle dynamics are
r˙0(t) = v0
v˙0 = 0
(6.2)
being r0 and v0 the leader state variables.
Given (6.1) and (6.2), the problem of maintaining a desired inter-vehicle
 114
6 Distributed Resilient Control strategy for autonomous connected vehicles
platoons in presence of security vulnerabilities
spacing policy and a common constant speed (as imposed by the leader)
can be rewritten as the following second-order consensus problem
ri(t)→ 1∆i
{∑N
j=0 αij · (rj(t) + sij)
}
vi(t)→ v0,
(6.3)
where sij is the desired distance between vehicles i and j; αij (for i =
1,...,N and j = 0,...,N) models the platoon communication topology
emerging from the presence/absence of a communication link between
vehicles i and j; ∆i is the degree of vehicle i, i.e. the number of vehicles
establishing a communication link with vehicle i.
According to [41], the desired spacing sij can be expressed as sij =
hijv0 +s
st
ij , where hij is the headway time and s
st
ij is the distance between
the vehicles i-th and j-th at standstill. Furthermore we remark that αij
are the non negative elements of the adjacency matrix associated to the
platoon topology directed graph GN+1.
The platoon goal in (6.3) is here achieved by using a distributed strategy
that explicitly counteracts the presence of communication impairments,
such as time-varying delays (e.g. due to packet losses, that affect each
communication link at a given time instant t) and that embeds a local
detection of compromised communication information, that are hence
discarded for the trust computation of the control protocol. To this
aim, each vehicle in the platoon checks, at each time step, for anomalies
in the data wirelessly received from the members of the group with a
collaborative decision-making technique (voting techinque) that enables
vehicles to collectively shield themselves against a misbehaving vehicle.
Note that, monitoring solutions, with the aim of excluding in a real-time
mode a faulty node for preserving quality in wireless sensor networks,
often leverage a generic neighborhood voting with a decentralized ap-
proach and adopt in practice a comparison with some threshold value
that is usually related to the distance from an average desired behavior
(see [142, 33] and references therein). In the specific case of a platoon
application, we implement a similar approach by computing the average
distance between vehicles in nominal conditions. This average value
is locally computed by each vehicle at the engagement of the platoon
during the initialization step of the voting algorithm.
The control input to each vehicle, on board computed on the basis of
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trusted information obtained by the voting procedure, is hence chosen
as
ui(t) = −b [vi(t)− v0]− 1∆i
∑N
j=0
j 6∈M
kijαij [dij(t)− τij(t)v0], (6.4)
where dij(t) = ri(t)−rj(t−τij(t))−sij is the actual inter-vehicle distance
between vehicle i and vehicle j on-board computed from transmitted
data according to the required spacing policy; kij and b are control gains
to be opportunely tuned to regulate the mutual behavior among neighbor
vehicles; τij(t) is the time-varying communication delays affecting the
i-th vehicle when information are transmitted from its neighbor j. The
delays τij(t) are bounded [167, 25, 101, 102] and detectable through the
time stamp embedded in transmitted information [167, 32]. Moreover
M = {m1,m2, · · · ,mρ} (with ρ ≤ N) is the set of detected malicious
vehicles, or nodes.
In order to update the set of malicious node M, each vehicle i of the
platoon, during traveling, collects all information, sent by all the other
vehicles in its communication range and shared via V2V. We further
remark that we consider that the vehicles platoon is formed and it is
traveling at its steady-state with a prescribed spacing policy and with a
constant velocity.
Data are locally exploited for constructing, according to the control
protocol in (6.4), a ’belief’ about the average distance under the ideal
assumption that all information are correct (e.g. M = ∅) and defined as
d¯i(t) =
1
∆i
N∑
j=0
αij [ri(t)− rj(t− τij(t))− sij − τij(t)v0] . (6.5)
This average value d¯i(t) is compared with the actual inter-vehicular
distance between vehicle i and vehicle j (∀j = 1, · · · , N , j 6= i) defined
as
γij(t) = [dij(t)− τij(t)v0] . (6.6)
If there is a significant discrepancy in the belief, i.e. if, for a certain vehicle
this difference is grater than a threshold δ, it might be an indicator of a
security compromise in the communication channel and hence information
coming from the malicious vehicle are not exploited for the longitudinal
control of vehicle i and the set M, that enumerates the malicious nodes,
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Algorithm 1: Safe distributed control strategy pseudo-code for
the i-th vehicle
Data: v0, rj(t) and τij(t) (∀ j = 0, 1, · · · , N)
Result: The control effort ui(t)
Declarations
dij(t) = ri(t)− rj(t− τij(t))− sij ;
d¯i(t) =
1
∆i
N∑
j=0
aij [dij(t)− τij(t)v0] ;
γij(t) = [dij(t)− τij(t)v0] .
Initialization (platoon engaged)
M = ∅;
ρ = 1;
δ = 0.5;
∆i =
N∑
j=0
aij ;
sij = hijv0(0) + s
st
ij .
for j = 1 to N do
if i,j(t) = ‖d¯i(t)− γij(t)‖ > δ then
Detection of malicious vehicle j:
mρ = j;
ρ = ρ+ 1;
Updating of the set of detected malicious vehicles:
M =M∪ {mρ}
end
ui(t) = −b [vi(t)− v0]− 1
∆i
N∑
j=0
j 6∈M
kijαijγij(t);
end
is updated accordingly. The procedure is repeated for all vehicles within
the platoon at each time step.
A schematic overview of the functioning of the safe distributed control
strategy is reported in Algorithm 1. Note that, as usual, the information
received by the leading vehicle, i.e. the reference behavior for platoon, is
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not falsified (for example assuming the usage of cryptographic security
procedures in terms of digital signatures [124]) while all information
transmitted by the other vehicles within the platoon can be compromised.
We finally remark that the proposed approach is flexible since it fits
different communication topologies in which the leading vehicle is globally
reachable (see Figure 3.5 for different examples). Alternative attempts
are instead designed with respect to a pre-fixed communication structure,
e.g. predecessor-follower as in [11].
6.4 Stability Analysis
6.4.1 Vehicular Network Dynamics
To derive the platoon dynamics under the action of the collaborative
strategy in (6.4), and then prove its convergence, we first define the
position and speed errors with respect to the reference signal r0(t) , v0
(i = 1, . . . , N) as
r¯i(t) = ri(t)− r0(t)− hi0v0 − ssti0
v¯i(t) = vi(t)− v0. (6.7)
Re-writing the control action ui(t) (see (6.4)) in terms of the state error
(see (6.7)), expressing hij and the standstill distance s
st
ij with respect
to the leading vehicle (namely hij = hi0 − hj0 and sstij = ssti0 − sstj0), the
closed-loop dynamics can be rewritten ∀i = 1, . . . , N as
˙¯ri = v¯i
Mi ˙¯vi = −bv¯i − 1∆i (ki0αi0 +
∑N
j=1 kijαij)r¯i(t)
+ 1∆i
∑N
j=1 kijαij r¯j(t− τij(t)).
(6.8)
To describe the platoon dynamics in the presence of cyber threats
and time-varying delays, associated to the different links, in a more
compact form, we define the position and the speed errors vec-
tors as r¯ (t) =
[
r¯>1 (t) · · · r¯>i (t) · · · r¯>N (t)
]> ∈ RN , v¯ (t) =[
v¯>1 (t) · · · v¯>i (t) · · · v¯>N (t)
]> ∈ RN , and the error state vector as
x¯ (t) =
[
r¯> (t) v¯> (t)
]> ∈ R2N . Furthermore, delays τij(t) can be
represented as elements of the following delay set: τp(t) ∈ {τij(t) : i, j =
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1, 2, ..., N, i 6= j} for p = 1, 2, ...,m with m ≤ N(N − 1). Note that m
is equal to its maximum value if the underlying network topology is a
directed complete graph and all time-delays are different.
According to the above definition, the closed-loop platoon dynamics can
be represented as the following set of functional differential equations:
˙¯x(t) = A0x¯(t) +
∑m
p=1Ap (x¯(t− τp(t))) , (6.9)
where
A0 =
[
0N×N IN×N
−MK˜ −MB˜
]
∈ R2N×2N , (6.10)
Ap =
[
0N×N 0N×N
MK˜p 0N×N
]
∈ R2N×2N , (6.11)
being
M = diag
{ 1
M1
, · · · , 1
MN
}
∈ RN×N ; (6.12)
B˜ = diag
{
b, · · · , b
}
∈ RN×N ; (6.13)
K˜ = diag
{
k˜11, · · · , k˜NN
}
∈ RN×N , with k˜ii = 1∆i
∑N
j=0 kijαij ;
(6.14)
and K˜p = [k˜pij ] is the matrix defined as:
k˜pij =

αijkij
∆i
, j 6= i, τp(·) = τij(·) ,
0, j 6= i , τp(·) 6= τij(·) ,
0, j = i .
(6.15)
6.4.2 Proof of Convergence
In this section we analytically prove the convergence of the proposed
approach. The stability analysis is based on the recast of the closed-loop
dynamics as a set of functional differential equations for which it is
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possible to find a quadratic Lyapunov-Krasovskii function [73, 62].
From Leibniz-Newton (see Definition 4) it is known that [184]
x¯(t− τp(t)) = x¯(t)−
∫ 0
−τp(t) ˙¯x(t+ s)ds . (6.16)
Hence substituting (6.9) in (6.16) we have:
x¯(t− τp(t)) = x¯(t)−
∑m
q=0Aq
∫ 0
−τp(t) x¯(t+ s− τq(t+ s))ds , (6.17)
where matrices A0, A1, . . . , Am are defined in (6.10), (6.11) and τ0(t+
s) = 0. Using the above transformation, the time-delayed model (6.9)
can be transformed into
˙¯x(t) = A0x¯(t) +
∑m
p=1Apx¯(t)+
−∑mp=1∑mq=0ApAq ∫ 0−τp(t) x¯(t+ s− τq(t+ s))ds . (6.18)
From the definition in (6.10) and in (6.11), it follows that ApAq = 0
when p = 1, . . . ,m and q = 1, . . . ,m. Hence the system defined in (6.9)
can be written as
˙¯x(t) = Fx¯(t)−∑mp=1Cp ∫ 0−τp(t) x¯(t+ s)ds, (6.19)
where
Cp = ApA0 =
[
0N×N 0N×N
0N×N MK˜p
]
, (6.20)
and
F = A0 +
m∑
p=1
Ap =
[
0N×N IN×N
−MK̂ −MB˜
]
, (6.21)
with
K̂ = −
m∑
p=1
K˜p + K˜. (6.22)
Furthermore the following lemmas hold:
Lemma 5. [167] Supposing ki =
ki0αi0
∆i
≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . , N), the matrix
K̂ in (6.22) is positive stable (see definition in [55]) if and only if node
0 is globally reachable in GN+1.
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According to Lemma 5 the following matrix
K̂M = MK̂ (6.23)
is also positive stable since M > 0 (Equation 6.12).
Lemma 6. [167] Let F be the matrix defined in (6.21). F is Hurwitz
stable if and only if K̂M (6.23) in Lemma 5 is positive stable and
b > max
i
{ |Im(µi)|√
Re(µi)
Mi
}
(6.24)
being µi the i-th eigenvalue of K̂M (i = 1, . . . , N).
Stability in the presence of the heterogeneous time-varying delays can
be now guaranteed under the classical constraints on bounded delay
functions [73], i.e τp(t) ∈ [0; τ?p ], τ˙p(t) ∈ [0, dp] ∀t, ∀p and dp ≤ 1,
according to the following LMI-based criterion that can be easily verified
by using, for example, the interior-point method [27] implemented in the
Yalmip © Toolbox [128].
Theorem 7. Consider the vehicular network in (6.9) under the assump-
tions of Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. Also assume all delays τp(t) (p =
1, . . . ,m) to be bounded. If there exist constant, symmetric and positive
definite matrices P ∈ R2N×2N and Sp ∈ R2N×2N (p = 1, . . . ,m) such
that it holds 
τ?
2 P − S1(1− d1) < 0
...
τ?
2 P − Sm(1− dm) < 0 ,
(6.25)
then the closed loop system (6.9) is asymptotically stable, i.e.
lim
t→∞x(t) = 0 (6.26)
for
τ? = max
p
{τ?p } <
‖Q−∑mp=1 Sp‖
‖∑mp=1 PCpP−1C>p P>+P2 ‖ . (6.27)
Proof. Consider the following Lyapunov-Krasovskii function for system
in (6.19):
V (x¯(t)) = x¯>(t)Px¯(t) +
∑m
p=1
∫ t
t−τp(t) x¯
>(s)Spx¯(s)ds, (6.28)
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where P = P> > 0 ∈ R2N×2N and Sp > 0 ∈ R2N×2N (p = 1, . . . ,m)
are appropriately chosen. According to the hypothesis of Lyapunov-
Krasovskii theorem [73], we define the following positive continuous
non-decreasing functions
u(x¯(t)) = x¯>(t)Px¯(t)
v(x¯(t− τ?)) = x¯>(t)Px¯(t) +
m∑
p=1
t∫
t−τ?
x¯>(s)Spx¯(s) ds,
(6.29)
with τ? = max
p
{τ?p } such that
u(x¯(t)) ≤ V (x¯(t)) ≤ v(x¯(t− τ?)). (6.30)
Now differentiating the functional in (6.28) along the trajectories of the
system (6.19) it follows
V˙ (x¯(t)) = x¯>(t)
(
PF + F>P +
∑m
p=1 Sp
)
x¯(t)
−2x¯(t)P∑mp=1Cp 0∫
−τp(t)
x¯>(t+ s) ds
−∑mp=1 x¯>(t− τp(t))Spx¯(t− τp(t))(1− τ˙p) .
(6.31)
By selecting the control gains kij , b according to Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and
by considering the global reachability for the leading vehicle, it follows
that the matrix F in (6.21) is Hurwitz stable (see definition in [55]). Thus,
according to the Lyapunov theory (see [104]) we have PF + F>P = −Q
with Q > 0 ∈ R2N×2N .
Furthermore, by exploiting Lemma 3 in which we set a = −x¯>(t)PCp,
c = x¯(t+s), Ξ = P−1 and integrating both side of the inequality, equation
(6.31) becomes
V˙ (x¯(t)) ≤ −x¯>(t)Qx¯(t) + x¯>(t)∑mp=1 Spx¯(t)
+
∑m
p=1
[
τp(t)x¯
>(t)PCpP−1C>p P>x¯(t) +
0∫
−τp(t)
x¯>(t+ s) ds
]
−∑mp=1 x¯>(t− τp(t))Spx¯(t− τp(t))(1− τ˙p) .
(6.32)
Now, applying Jensen Inequality (see Lemma 2) to the integral terms
and exploiting the bound on the delay function [63], inequality (6.32)
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can be recast as
V˙ (x¯(t)) ≤ −x¯>(t)Qx¯(t) + x¯>(t)∑mp=1 Spx¯(t)
+
∑m
p=1
[
τ?x¯>(t)PCpP−1C>p P>x¯(t)
+ τ
?
2
(
x¯>(t)Px¯(t) + x¯>(t− τp(t))Px¯(t− τp(t))
)]
−∑mp=1 x¯>(t− τp(t))Spx¯(t− τp(t))(1− dp) .
(6.33)
Now, by defining an augmented state error vector ζ(t) =
[x¯(t), x¯(t− τ1(t)), · · · , x¯(t− τm(t))] ∈ Rρ, with ρ = (m + 1)2N , it
is possible to re-write (6.33) in a more compact form as
V˙ (x¯(t)) ≤ ζ>(t)Θζ(t) , (6.34)
where Θ ∈ Rρ×ρ is the following diagonal blocks matrix:
Θ =

θ1,1 02N×2N · · · · · · 02N×2N
02N×2N θ2,2 02N×2N
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . 02N×2N θm,m 02N×2N
02N×2N · · · · · · 02N×2N θm+1,m+1

, (6.35)
with
θ1,1 = −Q+
∑m
p=1 Sp +
∑m
p=1
τ?
2
[
2PCpP
−1C>p P> + P
]
,
θ2,2 =
τ?
2 P − S1(1− d1),
...
θm+1,m+1 =
τ?
2 P − Sm(1− dm).
(6.36)
Now, from (6.34) stability can be proved by showing V˙ (x¯(t)) ≤ 0. Given
(6.35), to this aim we have to show that each diagonal blocks has to be
negative definite, i.e.
−Q+
m∑
p=1
Sp +
m∑
p=1
τ?
2
[
2PCpP
−1C>p P
> + P
]
< 0 (6.37)
and 
τ?
2 P − S1(1− d1) < 0
...
τ?
2 P − Sm(1− dm) < 0 .
(6.38)
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Since dp < 1 ∀p, from the hypothesis of the theorem in (6.25) it follows
that the LMI problem in (6.37) and (6.38) can be solved by selecting
the delay bound τ? as (6.27). Furthermore, given the choice made for
u(x¯(t)) in (6.29), the closed-loop vehicular network in (6.9) is also globally
asymptotically stable according to Lyapunov-Krasovskii theorem [73].
This completes the proof.
Remark 4. We remark that Algorithm 1 is embedded into the control
protocol and hence it has to be meant as an integral part of it. In so doing,
its correctness proof is provided through the above analytical derivation
where the convergence of the whole control protocol is proven by using a
Lyapunov-Krasovskii approach.
6.5 Numerical Analysis
6.5.1 Network and Traffic Scenario
To show the effectiveness of the proposed strategy for cooperative driv-
ing in the presence of malicious attacks (detailed in the following Sec-
tion 6.5.2), here we consider a 10 [km] freeway where an automated
platoon of seven vehicles plus the leader, connected via the IEEE 802.11p
communication protocol, travels along a single lane. To validate the
theoretical results the collaborative strategy presented in section 6.3 is
implemented in PLEXE[172].
The exemplar analysis has been carried out for two representative driving
maneuvers, namely: (i) maintaining tight formation - starting from differ-
ent initial conditions, the platoon has to reach and maintain the reference
behavior as imposed by the leader, that moves with a constant velocity,
while it achieves at the same time the desired spacing policy [167]; (ii)
leader tracking - all followers have to correctly track the time-varying
leader speed.
Furthermore, with the aim of disclosing the flexibility of the approach
with respect to information flows, the investigation is conducted for the
different communication topologies depicted in Fig. 3.5, that are the most
frequently used for platoon applications [59]. Table 7.1 and Table 8.1
summarize all relevant parameters for both network and traffic simulation.
Note that the value of the theoretical delay margin computed as in (6.27)
and reported in Table 8.1, τ? = 0.18 [s], is within the average end-to-end
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Table 6.1: NETWORK SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Realistic channel
Path loss model Free space (α = 2.0)
Fading model Nakagami-m (m = 3)
PHY/MAC model IEEE 802.11p/1609.4 single channel (CCH)
Frequency 5.89 [GHz]
Bitrate 6 [Mbits-1] (QPSK R = 1
2
)
Access category AC VI
MSDU size 200 [B(byte)]
Transmit power 20 [dBm]
Beacon frequency 10 [Hz]
Table 6.2: TRAFFIC SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Freeway length 10 [km]
Lanes 4 (two-way)
Cars speed 100 [Kmh-1]
Platoon size 8 cars
Platooning car max acceleration 3.5 [ms-2]
Platooning car mass 1460 [Kg]
Platooning car length li 4 [m]
Headway time hij 0.8 [s]
Control gains kij k10 = 460, ki0 = 80 (i = 1, · · · , N)
ki,i−1 = 860, kij = 0 otherwise
Control gains b b = 1800
Distance at standstill sstij 15 [m]
Theoretical delay margin τ? 0.18 [s]
Freeway fill-up time 500 [s]
Network warm-up time 10 [s]
Data recording time 50 [s]
communication delay, typical of IEEE 802.11p vehicular networks, which
is of the order of hundredths of a second (i.e. 10−2[s]) [6]. This confirms
a certain margin of stability robustness in practical working conditions.
We remark that if the estimated theoretical bound was under the average
value exhibited by the communication channel, robust stability could not
be analytically guaranteed in all the network working conditions.
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6.5.2 Description of the Attacks
In what follows we describe and consider the typical attacks that have
been indicated as the main causes of vulnerability in cooperative driving
applications, according to the very recent literature in the field of V2V
connected vehicles (e.g. see [11]), i.e. Spoofing, Message Falsification,
Denial of Service (DoS) and Burst Transmission.
6.5.2.1 Spoofing
In this kind of attack, an adversary impersonates a vehicle in the stream
with the intention of injecting fraudulent information into a specific
vehicle or of taking the control of the vehicle itself [24]. This kind of
attack compromises the platoon maintenance and, in the worst case, it
may cause collisions.
In our scenario we assume that an internal adversary (cryptography
security procedures in terms of digital signatures are implemented to
prevent external attacks [134]) takes the control of the third vehicle and
imposes a constant offset to its current acceleration value, namely equal
to 3.5 [ms−2] from a given time instant t. This implies that the third
vehicle starts to improperly accelerate, then it incorrectly moves from
the prescribed velocity and, hence, it perturbs the motion of all the
vehicles within its communication range. The attack has to be mitigated
by algorithms able to discard the incorrect information.
6.5.2.2 Message Falsification
An adversary, internal or external to the platoon, starts listening to the
wireless messages exchanged among vehicles and, after receiving each
beacon, it falsifies the content of messages. Finally, it rebroadcasts the
malicious messages [44]. Countermeasures to this kind of attack rely on
efficient detection algorithms, such as the voting technique presented in
this paper, to construct a more well formed belief, which can then be
checked against the vehicle belief. As well as spoofing, note that here we
consider an insider malicious attacker since, if the adversary is external
to the platoon, then cryptography security procedures would guarantee
the prevention of the attack.
Specifically, in our exemplar analysis the adversary is the fourth vehicle
of the fleet and it manipulates the position field of the beacon to be
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sent by adding, at a specific time instant t, a value of +5 [m] to its
current position value. The incorrect information are then rebroadcast
to the other vehicles. Note that, since passengers security is one of the
most important issue for the platooning application diffusion, this kind
of attack is very dangerous because it compromises the inter-vehicular
distance and, in the worst case, it causes a collision.
6.5.2.3 Denial of Service
This attack aims to compromise the communication capability of a
specific vehicle, or of a group of vehicles within the platoon, by making
them unable to properly collaborate.
Specifically, here we consider that the third vehicle is under the DoS
attack and it gets only the 70% of the exchanged information among
vehicles within the platoon from a given time instant t. This lack of
information downgrades the ability to correctly collaborate during driving
and, thus, the attached vehicle may even collide with its predecessor.
Possible countermeasures are based on the explicit compensation of the
communication impairments. Note that the effects of a DoS attack are
usually mitigated by technical solutions that act on the communication
layer, such as channel switching, technology switching, frequency hopping,
or multiple radio transceivers [11], [23, 85]. Hence, in our simulation
scenario we suppose that the duration of each DoS attack is limited to a
specific time interval, after which it is rejected. The DoS attack is then
repeated again and again in a periodic fashion every 25 seconds (with
a DoS time duration of 20 [s] and with a percentage loss rate equal to
30%).
6.5.2.4 Burst Transmission
The burst transmission is a particular network attack that induces packet
losses with a random loss rate. An internal or external adversary, at
a specific time instant t, manipulates the data traffic flow in order to
disperse some of the packets exchanged among vehicles. In particular
here we consider a loss rate that randomly varies between 40% and 60%.
The effect of this kind of attack can be disastrous, bringing vehicles
platoon to collision. Note that both the DoS and the Burst Transmis-
sion require that the collaborative algorithms, robust with respect to
6.5 Numerical Analysis  127
0 50 100 150
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
p
o
si
ti
o
n
er
ro
r
[m
]
time [s]
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
(a)
0 50 100 150
-10
-5
0
5
10
sp
ee
d
er
ro
r
[m
/
s]
time [s]
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
(b)
0 50 100 150
-4
-2
0
2
4
co
n
tr
o
l
eff
o
rt
[m
/
s2
]
time [s]
v0
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
(c)
Figure 6.1: Maintaining tight formation maneuver under L-P-F
topology: (a): time history of the position error computed as
ri(t)− r0(t)− di0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history of the speed
error computed as vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c): time history of
the control effort ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
networks delays due to packet losses, are implemented together with
cryptography solutions and authentication procedures for the access to
vehicular networks [85].
6.5.3 Simulation Results
6.5.3.1 Platoon Condition without Attacks
To better understand and evaluate the impact of malicious attacks and
the effectiveness of the collaborative strategy in counteracting mislead-
ing information, we show at first the ability of the approach in ideal
conditions, when no adversary is present. As depicted in Figure 6.1, all
vehicles, starting from distances different from the ones required by the
spacing policy, converge toward the desired positions and the leader speed
after about 60 seconds. This exemplar result refers to the classical L-P-F
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Figure 6.2: Effects of spoofing attack in nominal conditions (the
malicious attack begins at time t = 70 [s] as highlighted by the
vertical gray dash line). Maintaining tight formation maneuver
under L-P-F topology: (a): time history of the position error
computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history
of the speed error computed as vi(t) − v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c):
time history of the control effort ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
communication topology. Similar results can be achieved for alternative
information flows, but they are omitted here for the sake of brevity.
6.5.3.2 Platoon Condition with Attacks
In what follows we present results with respect to the different attacks
described in Section 6.5.2.
Spoofing Let consider the case of maintaining tight formation under
a L-P-F communication topology. At t = 70 [s], an internal adversary
takes the control of the third vehicle and injects fraudulent information
by setting its acceleration to the maximum value (see details in Sec-
tion 6.5.2.1). To quantitatively investigate the effect of this spoofing
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Figure 6.3: Spoofing attack (the malicious attack begins at
time t = 70 [s] as highlighted by the vertical gray dash line).
Maintaining tight formation maneuver under L-P-F topology: (a):
time history of the position error computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0
(∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history of the speed error computed as
vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c): time history of the control effort
ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
attack and to better disclose the ability of the collaborative strategy in
counteracting its presence, we start presenting the platoon behavior in
the case when the voting algorithm (Algorithm 1) is inactive and, hence,
vehicles trust all information (M = ∅ in (6.4) ∀i). Results in Figure 6.2
show how the spoofing strongly affects the correct inter-vehicular spacing
policy (position error of vehicles 3− 4− 5− 6− 7 does not converge to
zero as highlighted in Figure 6.2a) while, after a brief transient of 30 [s],
the strategy is able to recover the velocity requirements (see Figure 6.2b
and Figure 6.2c). The same dynamic behavior arises for P-F, B-L-F, and
BR network topologies and hence it is omitted.
When enabling voting within the control protocol (i.e. Algorithm 1 is on),
vehicles 4− 5− 6− 7 are instead able to discard the information falsified
from vehicle 3 as shown in Figure 6.3 and, hence, they always satisfy the
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spacing policy requirements (position errors go to zero, see Figure 6.3a).
As expected, only for the third vehicle the effect of malicious is mitigated,
but it is not completely rejected, since it is exposed to a direct attack
on its acceleration signal. Nevertheless, collision avoidance is always
ensured. The algorithm reacts to the cyber threat between 0.019 [s] and
0.021] [s]. It reacts much faster than a human driver since the average
human reaction time has been estimated to be approximately equal to
0.4 [s] (e.g. see [206] and references therein for a technical discussion on
the topic).
Similar good performance has been also noted for B-L-F and BR network
topologies and results are hence omitted. A special remark has to be
done for P-F topology. Here, due to the lack of information redundancy
resulting from the very simple topology, the voting technique only work-
ing on V2V transmitted data can not be used. It is worth noticing, the
technique could be instead easily implemented to mitigate the falsification
effect if each vehicle i in the platoon is also equipped with additional
on-board sensors (such as radar, lidar) that measure the state variable of
the predecessor i−1. In this special case, the voting algorithm could fuse
sensor data together with wireless-transmitted information. However the
use of proximity sensors, mixed to wirelessly transmitted information, is
beyond this work.
To further test the robustness of our approach and to reveal its limits, we
consider a worst case in which all vehicles are subjected to the previously
described spoofing attack on acceleration signal. Results refer to the ex-
emplar case of the BR topology in absence of the voting-based detection
algorithm, and show that the platoon crashes after 20 [s] from the begin-
ning of the attack (see Figure 6.4). Conversely, the malicious effects can
be effectively mitigated when the voting technique is exploited. Indeed,
all vehicles are now able to avoid collisions, as shown in Figure 6.5a,
and to track the leader velocity profile (see results in Figure 6.5b and
Figure 6.5c). Note that this example has been reported with the aim to
show the good performance of the proposed approach since in the real
implementation of vehicles platooning, the management system owns a
low level strategy for managing collisions which avoids their occurrence
[10, 168].
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Figure 6.4: Effects of spoofing attack in nominal conditions
(the malicious attack begins at time t = 70 [s], as highlighted
by the vertical gray dash line). Maintaining tight formation
maneuver under BR topology: (a): time history of the position
error computed as ri(t) − r0(t) − di0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time
history of the speed error computed as vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7);
(c): time history of the control effort ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7). The
symbol ′∗′ indicates the time instant when vehicles collide.
Message Falsification Here we consider that, at t = 70 [s], the forth
vehicle of the platoon falsifies the position field of the messages to be sent
as detailed in Section 6.5.2.2. All the other vehicles accept the falsified
information and then exploit them for the actuation of the longitudinal
control. Consider again at first that the voting algorithm is not enabled,
i.e. M = ∅ in (6.4) ∀i. Results in Figure 6.6 show, in the case of L-P-F
topology, that position errors of vehicles 5 − 6 − 7 do not converge to
zero and hence the correct tight formation is not guaranteed. Note that,
as expected, a position falsification mainly influences the inter-vehicular
distance (effects on speed and acceleration errors are negligible as shown
in Figure 6.6b and in Figure 6.6c). Similar results have been observed
for the B-F-L and BR topologies under investigations and hence they
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Figure 6.5: Spoofing attack (the malicious attack begins at
time t = 70 [s], as highlighted by the vertical gray dash line).
Maintaining tight formation maneuver under BR topology: (a):
time history of the position error computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0
(∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history of the speed error computed as
vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c): time history of the control effort
ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
are omitted here for the sake of brevity. The impact of this attack is
instead more strong for the P-F topology since in this configuration each
vehicle receives only data from the preceding vehicle and, hence, it can
not merge alternative information to create its belief. However results
are similar to Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.7 shows the results obtained in the same scenario, but with the
remarkable difference of exploiting voting as a countermeasure to detect
malicious behavior. Note that, differently from the previous results,
now vehicle 5 is able to discard the falsified message, sent by the 4-th
vehicle, and exploits only the information sent by the leading vehicle
for cooperative driving. As a consequence, vehicles 6− 7 do not receive
misleading information and the tight formation goal is still preserved.
Finally we remark that the algorithm reacts to the message falsification
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Figure 6.6: Effects of message falsification attack in nominal
conditions (the malicious attack begins at t = 70 [s] as highlighted
by the vertical gray dash line). Maintaining tight formation
maneuver under L-P-F topology: (a): time history of the position
error computed as ri(t) − r0(t) − di0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time
history of the speed error computed as vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7);
(c): time history of the control effort ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
attack between 0.019 [s] and 0.021 [s].
Similar good performance has been also observed for the B-L-F and BR
topologies and results are hence omitted. As well as for spoofing attacks
in P-F topology, the effects of message falsification could be limited by
exploiting local sensor measurement in the voting technique. However
this possibility is beyond this work.
Denial of Service Consider the DoS attack described in Sec-
tion 6.5.2.3. The attack on the third vehicle starts at t = 2 [s] for
the L-P-F platoon topology.
As already mentioned, for this case of network attacks, the aim of the
control protocol is not to discard false information by voting, but to
compensate the lack of information due to communication impairments
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Figure 6.7: Message falsification attack (the malicious attack
begins at t = 70 [s] as highlighted by the vertical gray dash line).
Maintaining tight formation maneuver under L-P-F topology: (a):
time history of the position error computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0
(∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history of the speed error computed as
vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c): time history of the control effort
ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
(packet losses). To this aim our strategy in (6.4) exploits the current
delay information, τij(t), that are detected from timestamps embedded
into the GPS signal. When a message is lost, the algorithm uses the last
available information, thus τij(t) actually jumps to a large value, then
returns to a smaller value when the next valid message is received.
Results in Figure 6.8 confirm the robustness of the approach and show
that the maintenance of tight formation is guaranteed after a transient
of 60 seconds, despite a loss rate of 30% for the third vehicle. Only the
transient performance is slightly deteriorated during platoon formation
maneuver. Similar good results have been obtained for the other com-
munication topologies under investigation (and thus they are not shown
for the sake of brevity).
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Figure 6.8: DoS attack (the malicious attack begins at t = 2 [s]
with a time duration of 20 [s] and it is then repeated in a periodic
fashion every 25 [s] as highlighted by the vertical gray dash lines).
Maintaining tight formation maneuver under L-P-F topology: (a):
time history of the position error computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0
(∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history of the speed error computed as
vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c): time history of the control effort
ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
Burst Transmission In this network attack, described in Sec-
tion 6.5.2.4, an adversary, external/internal to the platoon, manipulates
the data traveling on wireless networks (at time instant t = 3 [s]) with the
intent of dispersing some of the information necessary for collaborative
driving. Also in this case, results for the L-P-F topology in Figure 6.9
confirm the algorithm effectiveness of the proposed control strategy when
each vehicle within the platoon receives a percentage of the messages
exchanged that randomly varies between 40% and 60%.
Although the transient performance is deteriorated with respect to the
ideal case without any attack in Figure 6.1, the approach is still able
to reach the reference behavior given by the leading vehicle (see Fig-
ure 6.9b) and to maintain the desired inter-vehicular spacing policy (see
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Figure 6.9: Burst attack (the malicious attack begins at time
t = 3 [s] as highlighted by the vertical gray dash line). Main-
taining tight formation maneuver under L-P-F topology: (a):
time history of the position error computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0
(∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history of the speed error computed as
vi(t)− v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c): time history of the control effort
ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
Figure 6.9a).
These robustness features with respect to burst attacks have been also
observed for the other communication topologies under investigation
(not shown for the sake of brevity). It is worth to note here that the
Burst Transmission scenario also fits for situations that are not related
to malicious attacks, as when an involuntary communication impairment
happens (e.g. passing under a tunnel).
Finally, we analyze the particular case of the radio jamming attack on
the overall communication network. In our scenario the adversary, at
t = 1 [s], deliberately disrupts the communication among vehicles. We
suppose that the time duration of the radio jamming is limited to a
specific time interval, i.e. 5 [s], after which the communication is re-
established. The radio jamming attack is then repeated again and again
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Figure 6.10: Radio Jamming attack (the malicious attack
begins at time t = 1 [s] with a time duration of 5 [s] and it is then
repeated in periodic fashion every 20 [s] as highlighted by the
vertical gray dash lines). Maintaining tight formation maneuver
under L-P-F topology: (a): time history of the position error
computed as ri(t)− r0(t)− di0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (b): time history
of the speed error computed as vi(t) − v0 (∀i = 1, · · · , 7); (c):
time history of the control effort ai(t) (∀i = 0, · · · , 7).
in a periodic fashion every 20 [s]. Furthermore, we suppose that, during
the communication re-establishment, the network is subjected to a Burst
attack with a loss rate equal to 80 %. Results in Figure 6.10 disclose the
robustness of the proposed control strategy in bearing the total disruption
of communication for 5 [s] and in counteracting the losses of information
due to the burst attack. In fact, although the performance are strongly
deteriorated with respect to the nominal condition, the tight formation
of the platoon is guaranteed after 150 [s]. Note that the time duration
of the communication disruption, equal to 5 [s], represents a threshold
after which a collision could occur. However, since the maximum value
of human reaction time is ≈ 0.4 [s] [206], the found threshold allows
human driver to get the command of the vehicle before an eventual
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collision happens. Moreover, note that connected vehicles are usually
equipped with additional collision avoidance systems that also include
human-driver warnings (e.g. see [12] and reference therein) and, hence,
at any time the driver can take the control of the vehicle in which he/she
is.
6.5.3.3 Leader Velocity Tracking Performance
Here, we further test the ability of the proposed strategy to counteract a
malicious attack in the case when the leading vehicle performs a longitudi-
nal maneuver. It accelerates according to the following trapezoidal speed
profile: from 0 [kmh−1] to 100 [kmh−1] with a constant acceleration of
1.5 [ms−2]. Then it decelerates to 18 [kmh−1], at t = 120 [s], with a
constant deceleration of −1.5 [ms−2]. The analysis is conducted for all
the malicious scenarios presented in Section 6.5.2 and for all topologies
under investigation. Here we show results achieved only in the case of
L-P-F topology, since similar performance has been obtained for all the
others.
Results in Figure 6.11 show that all vehicles within the platoon are
able to follow the leading dynamics and to correctly track the required
velocity profile in the presence of each of the malicious attacks under
investigation.
6.5.3.4 A Discussion with Respect to Literature
Here we discuss the performance of our collaborative approach with
respect the one proposed in [10] and then analyzed with respect to secu-
rity attacks [11]. In [10] CACC (Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control)
vehicles use a one-vehicle look-ahead communication scheme where each
vehicle is listening to beacon messages sent wirelessly from its immediate
preceding vehicle (the communication topology is fixed). The vehicles
then utilize the speed, position, acceleration, and all the other information
embedded in these beacon messages, as well as on-board radar measure-
ments for platooning. In particular, the preceding acceleration vehicle is
obtained using wireless communication, while speed and inter-vehicular
distance by using radar measurement (that are hence not affected by
unavoidable communication delays).
The robustness with respect to security attacks is investigated by using
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Figure 6.11: Leader tracking maneuver under L-P-F topology.
Time history of vehicles speed, vi(t) (∀i = 0, . . . , 7): (a): spoofing
attack; (b): message falsification attack; (c): DoS attack; (d):
burst attack. The vertical gray dash lines indicate the time instant
when a malicious attacks begins.
the VENTOS platform. The main results achieved in [11] can be summa-
rized as: i) a manipulation of the acceleration field of beacon messages
leads to string instability of the stream since no security features are
implemented in vehicles; ii) when a radio jamming occurs, the only
solution for its mitigation is the downgrading of the control strategy to
non cooperative ACC approach.
Our approach enhances the cooperative driving problem in the pres-
ence of malicious attacks in several different ways. First, we consider
only wireless information about position and speed of the vehicles for
cooperative driving achievement and we model explicitly, in analytical
way, the V2V communication time-delay. Indeed, in practice, vehicles
share information through dedicated wireless communication networks.
Hence, time-delays in data acquisition and transmission are unavoidable
[164]. Furthermore, communication time-delays can not be assumed as
uniform (homogeneous) and constant, but they have to be considered
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as time-varying functions depending from the specific communication
link under investigation [30] (multiple, or heterogeneous, time-varying
delays).
Second, our strategy overcomes the limitation of V2V communication
structure in [11], restricted only to P-F.
Third, differently from [11], we have considered in our analysis four
attacks, explaining their effects, proposing and then implementing so-
lutions for their mitigation. Indeed, we proposed a novel, secure and
robust, distributed strategy that embeds a collaborative decision-making
technique, able to promptly counteract the cyber attacks. Using the
PLEXE platform we performed a meticulous analysis on the effectiveness
of the proposed strategy for different leader driving maneuvers and for
different communication topologies. Comparing the results in [11] with
those presented in Section 6.5.3.2 and Section 6.5.3.3, we can observe
the robustness of our approach to the malicious attacks: the stability of
the stream is still preserved, hence guaranteeing the cooperative driving
in the presence of cyber threats.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the problem of cooperative driving for vehicles platoon in
the presence of security vulnerabilities in vehicular networks is addressed.
To avoid dangerous implication for safety it is fundamental, first to
identify the effects deriving from a malicious attack and then to consider
them in the control strategy design. Based on the study of messages
alteration and communication impairment attacks, we proposed and
validated a novel, robust, consensus-based control strategy mixed to
a voting technique. We have analytically proven the stability of the
decentralized control in the presence of time-varying communication
delays and cyber threats by exploiting the Lyapunov-Krasovskii approach.
The hi-fidelity analysis, conducted with the PLEXE simulator, confirmed
the theoretical derivation, the robustness to vulnerabilities and the good
responsiveness in reacting to the malicious attack. Finally, the strategy
has been qualitatively compared with a classic CACC approach, well
known in literature. The comparison has highlighted the superiority of
our approach and the enhancement with respect to the state of art.
CHAPTER 7
Cooperative Driving at
Traffic Junction
In this chapter, we focus on cooperative driving of autonomous vehicles
approaching a traffic junction. The cooperative crossing application is
addressed by recasting the intersection geometry as a virtual platoon
and solved by leveraging a distributed finite-time controller that exploits
outdated information, shared via the new brand 5G communication
network, to proper compute its action. The stability of the closed-loop
is an on-going work and hence not reported here. Numerical simulations
disclose the effectiveness of the control approach in guaranteeing the
cooperative crossing of autonomous vehicles at traffic junction without
collisions.
7.1 Cooperative crossing of autonomous
vehicles as virtual platoon problem
Urban traffic intersection accounts for a significant part of traffic acci-
dents and their appropriate management is a challenge for transportation
system research, due to its potential to increase road safety while decreas-
ing traffic congestion [145]. To face this issue, intelligent traffic lights,
that dynamically adapt the traffic signals to the actual traffic condition,
have been proposed in the technical transportation literature (see [95] and
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references therein). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these approaches
strongly relies on correct human reactions and hence, nowadays, the
percentage of accidents at intersections are still very high [178].
On the other hand, self-driving cars, connected through wireless commu-
nication technologies, have been recently proposed as a promising solution
to enhance the road safety and to improve the traffic efficiency [43]. In
this context, leveraging Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) paradigm (based
on the protocol IEEE 802.11p), or the newly mobile communication net-
works 5G, the connection among vehicles and/or roadside infrastructures
enables a global environmental perception, easily including the presence
of other road users both within and beyond the line of sight [114].
Real-time information exchange empowers the cooperation among au-
tonomous vehicles that hence can explicitly coordinate their mutual
actions in order to avoid collisions or optimize the overall on-the-road
performance [34]. Among the cooperative autonomous driving tech-
niques, the handling of vehicular platoons has been recognized as a
suitable solution for traffic congestion avoidance in the very next future
[96, 66, 155, 170]. It follows that these cooperative abilities can be also
exploited for dealing with the safe management of groups of autonomous
vehicles negotiating a traffic junction without the intervention of any
traffic light.
In the wide technical literature on connected autonomous vehicles, the
different techniques for the safe intersection crossing have been mainly cat-
egorized as centralized and decentralized (see [165] and references therein).
In centralized approaches, an Intersection Coordination Unit (ICU) acts
as a supervisor that globally coordinates all vehicles tasks in order to
minimize the risk of collisions and/or the travel time [221, 195, 99, 157].
However, when considering an intersection involving a large number of
autonomous vehicles, this centralized control architecture may result
unsuitable because of both its limitation to gather and process a large
amount of information and the difficulty arising from solving in real-time
the consequent large-scale optimization problem [214].
Differently, decentralized approaches, where each vehicle determines its
dynamic behavior on the basis of only information received by neighbors,
implement at single vehicle level decision making algorithms allowing to
negotiate the access to the traffic intersection. Once the crossing time or
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order is scheduled, a control strategy locally provides the required acceler-
ation/deceleration profile that each vehicle has to track. Optimal control
approaches, tailored for the specific geometry of a given road intersection,
are usually exploited for accounting the hard safety constraints necessary
to avoid collisions, as for example in [208, 93, 43, 126, 209]. Note that
these optimization approaches are usually proven only through numerical
simulations since their real-time deployment may require some heuristic
approximations to deal with the combinatorial complexity of the search
algorithm.
In order to provide flexibility with respect to the intersection geometry,
very recent approaches for control design leverage coordinate transforma-
tion to recast the crossing problem as the control of a virtual longitudinal
platoon that opportunely arranges the vehicles that may be in differ-
ent lanes of the junction and may have different directional intentions.
Specifically, this recast has been proposed in the seminal work [188]
and recently exploited in [132], where a just simulation study shows the
performance of a classical longitudinal (virtual platooning) controller
based on a linear CACC strategy which is essentially an inter-vehicle
distance control algorithm that ensures the string stability, i.e. ensures
that once at steady-state, the inter-vehicular distances are kept constant.
However, for safety reasons, a fundamental problem is to guarantee, from
the very beginning of control design, that the desired virtual formation
is effectively reached before vehicles enter the Conflicting Area (CA), i.e.
the intersection core area where collisions could occur (see Fig. 7.1 and
the definitions in the following Sec. 7.2).
To face this issue, this chapter propose a completely distributed nonlinear
finite-time control strategy for cooperative vehicles negotiating an inter-
section. Collisions are, hence, prevented due to the achievement of the
desired virtual formation in a finite time T before the first vehicle accesses
the CA. Moreover, the control protocol guarantees desired inter-vehicle
distances among virtual platoon members such that real vehicles access
the CA in a mutually exclusive fashion, while the simultaneous achieve-
ment of a common platoon velocity ensures that the desired formation
will be preserved once reached.
The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated in numerical way.
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Figure 7.1: A possible traffic junction scenario (µ = 4). Ve-
hicles cooperate for autonomously and exclusively crossing the
Conflicting Area (CA). Once inside the Cooperative Zone (CZ),
the vehicle i chooses one of the possible trajectories ti,pq starting
from the road p where they are initially located.
7.2 System Modeling and Problem Formulation
Consider a scenario where N vehicles are autonomously driving along µ
different two-lane roads leading into a traffic junction, regulated neither
by traffic lights or ordinary traffic rules, as depicted in Fig. 7.1. The
central polygonal zone (highlighted in gray), is the Conflicting Area (CA)
which represents the intersection core area where collisions could occur,
while the larger circular zone with radius rcz is referred as Cooperation
Zone (CZ).
We assume that each self-driving vehicle i (∀i = 1, · · · , N) is able to
measure its own position and speed exploiting onboard sensors and
hence to act accordingly on its acceleration/braking control systems for
following, also thanks to onboard steering, its own trajectory ti,qg linking
the road q, where the vehicle is initially located, with the road g, where
the vehicle is heading to.
Moreover, we assume that each vehicle i approaching the traffic junction
is modelled by the second-order longitudinal dynamics in (3.3), i.e.
p˙i(t) = vi(t) (7.1)
v˙i(t) =
1
mi
ui(t), (7.2)
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Figure 7.2: Autonomous vehicles approaching the traffic junc-
tion as a virtual platoon problem w.r.t. the position from the
centre of the chosen trajectory pi(t). a) Computation of the
pi(t). b) Virtual platoon recast and choice of the desired distance
according to Algorithm 2.
being pi(t) the position of each vehicle i, expressed as its distance from
the center of its trajectory ti,qg (as shown in Fig. 7.2), vi(t) its velocity
and mi its mass.
In addition, vehicles within CZ are assumed to be connected via the brand
new 5G mobile communication network in order to share information
about their own trajectory and their local state. The communication
topology in the CZ can be hence described by a directed connected graph
GN even though not completely connected.
The final aim is to regulate the motion of each vehicle so that the
autonomous connected vehicles, cooperating through exchanging infor-
mation in the CZ, cross the CA with a mutually exclusive mode in order
to avoid side and rear-end collisions [196], i.e. at most one vehicle must
drive without stopping within the CA at any time instant. Note that, the
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traffic flow may arrive quite continuously at a road intersection. However,
for a specific time interval, we only need to consider a restricted group
of N vehicles that are moving to the junction [113]. Under this consid-
eration, as shown in Fig. 7.1, vehicles inside the CZ will be considered
as the group that currently takes part in cooperative crossing, whereas
vehicles outside the CZ will be postponed to the next negotiating.
7.2.1 Problem Formulation as a Virtual Platoon
In order to solve the coordination problem described above, in what
follows we formulate it as a virtual longitudinal platoon control problem.
The core idea is to re-organize and control all vehicles driving within the
CZ as a virtual platoon, ordered on the basis of the distance pi(t) of each
vehicle from the center of its trajectory, ti,qg ∀i = 1, · · · , N (as shown in
Fig. 7.2). Details on the coordinate transformations and mathematical
manipulations that allow to map the vehicle coordinate vector ri(t),
provided by the GPS receiver, into the position pi(t) along the trajectory
and the relative positions pij(t) between vehicles i and j (i, j = 1, · · · , N
with i 6= j) are reported in [132].
The vehicles ordering into the platoon w.r.t. pi(t) clearly corresponds
to a crossing order, so that the closest vehicle crosses first. Both side
and rear-end collision avoidance is achieved by ensuring the desired
spacing policy within the virtual formation, i.e. vehicles have to reach
and maintain pre-fixed inter-vehicular gaps as they drive with a common
velocity. Specifically, the desired inter-vehicle distances imposed among
virtual platoon members, say p?ij (∀(i, j)), have to be selected so to ensure
that real vehicles access exclusively the CA, while the achievement of a
common velocity guarantees that the desired formation will be preserved
once reached. It is important to highlight that collisions are prevented
by the achievement of the desired formation in a finite time T before the
first vehicle enters into the CA.
The Virtual Platoon control objective that recasts the problem of self-
driving cars negotiating their way through the intersection can be now
summarized as follows. Given the virtual platoon, obtained by organizing
the N vehicles within the CZ in ascending order of distances from the
center of their trajectories pi(t) (∀i = 1, · · · , N), find a distributed
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cooperative control protocol ui(t) such that ∀(i, j) the achievement of
the following desired formation is guaranteed in a finite-time T :
|pi − pj | → p?ij , (7.3)
|vi − vj | → 0, (7.4)
being p?ij the desired inter-vehicular gaps (calculated according to Algo-
rithm 2).
7.2.2 Procedure details
The implementation of the proposed methodology consists of two steps:
an initialization phase, performed one-time at the entrance of the CZ,
and a cyclic routine.
During the initialization phase, vehicles have to perform the following
tasks: (a) agreeing on a common order into the virtual platoon on the
basis of the exchanged messages; (b) calculating the desired relative
distances p?ij that ensure the exclusive access into CA.
During the cyclic routine, instead, the following tasks have to be
executed by each vehicle i: (c) locally measuring its position and
velocity and then computing the position along its trajectory pi(t);
(d) receiving/sending local state information from/toward vehicles
connected via the 5G network and calculating the relative distances w.r.t
each vehicle j in the neighboring set (see Fig. 7.2b); (e) actuating the
acceleration control input ui(t) according to a virtual platoon protocol.
Note that, the desired inter-vehicle distances (task (b)) have to be
selected so that the platoon formation guarantees when a vehicle leaves
the CA, the next one is just ready to enter (see figure Fig. 7.2). For this
purpose, Algorithm 2 provides the values p?ij according to vehicle length
Li (i = 1, · · · , N) and vehicle trajectory ti,qg at the intersection geometry.
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Algorithm 2: Computing the desired inter-vehicles gap for the
vehicle i
Let ξi = li,qg be the length of the trajectory followed by the the
i-th vehicle when it crosses the intersection from road q to road g.
Define di,i−1 = Li2 +
Li−1
2 , being Li the length of the i-th vehicle
if i > j then
p?ij =
∑j
i=i+1[di,i−1 + ξi−1]
if ;
then
i < j
p?ij =
∑i
i=j+1[di,i−1 + ξi−1]
7.3 Distributed Finite Time Control Protocol
for Self-driving Vehicles at Intersection
In order to solve the problem of the cooperative driving at traffic junction,
we propose the following distributed nonlinear control law:
ui(t) = −
N∑
j=1
aijsig(pi(t− τij(t))− pj(t− τij(t))− p?ij)
2α
1+α
−
N∑
j=1
aijsig(vi(t− τij(t))− vj(t− τij(t)))α,
(7.5)
where α ∈ (0; 1) and sig(x) is defined as [129, 22]:
sig(x)α = sign(x)|x|α, (7.6)
being x ∈ R and sign(·) is the signum function. Moreover, aij models
the topology of the underlying connected communication graph GN , i.e.
the presence/absence of a communication link between the i-th and
j-th vehicle; τij(t) models the unavoidable communication time delay
affecting information shared among vehicle i and vehicle j via the 5G
communication link (i, j) (∀i = 1, · · · , N ∀j = 1, · · · , N, i 6= j). Hence,
communication time-delays are assumed to heterogeneous, i.e. different
for each communicating link (i, j), and time-varying functions whose
actual value, at a given time instant, depends on the current availability
of the communication link [116].
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Control gain α 0.1
Vehicle length Li [m] 4 (∀i = 1, . . . , 4)
Length of the trajectory ξi [m] 16 (∀i = 1, . . . , 4)
Position initial condition [m]
[p1(0), p2(0), p3(0), p4(0)]
> [−212,−222,−232,−242]>
Velocities initial condition [m/s]
[v1(0), v2(0), v3(0), v4(0)]
> [11, 9, 11, 9]>
Table 7.1: SIMULATION PARAMETERS
7.4 Numerical Validation
Consider, as an exemplary case of study, N = 4 autonomous vehicles
driving along 6 different two-lane roads approaching a traffic junction,
as depicted in Fig. 7.1. When vehicles enter into the CZ (characterized
by a radius rCZ = 250 [m]) they exchange information with all the other
vehicles within the area (all-to-all communication topology). On the
basis of these information, the finite-time distributed control protocol
(7.5), with α = 0.1, properly acts in order to guarantee the safe crossing
with the desired inter-vehicle spacing p?ij (∀i, j = 1, · · · , N with i 6= j),
computed according to Algorithm 2.
The numerical analysis has been performed by exploiting the MATLAB©
platform where, for the simulation scenario, communication delays have
been emulated as a random time-varying functions whose maximum value
is τ?ij = 0.05 [s] according to the experimental analysis conducted on the
5G communication delay in [18]. Simulation parameters are reported in
Tab. 7.1.
The time histories of vehicles positions, velocities and accelerations are
reported in Fig. 7.3a, Fig. 7.3b and Fig. 7.3c respectively, while the
position errors with respect to the desired inter-vehicle distances and
velocities errors are shown in Fig. 7.3d and Fig. 7.3e, respectively.
Results in Fig. 7.3a and Fig. 7.3d clearly endorse the effectiveness of the
finite-time proposed control strategy in ensuring that the desired inter-
vehicle spacing p?ij ∀(i, j) is achieved and maintained. This implies that,
for any time, no more than one vehicle is into the CA, whose boundaries
are indicated with the dashed-dotted horizontal lines; indeed, only when
one vehicle has exited the CA, the next one is just ready to enter the
intersection, as highlighted by the vertical solid lines. Moreover, once
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Figure 7.3: Four autonomous vehicles negotiating a six roads
intersection (i = 1, . . . , 4). a) Time history of vehicles positions
(boundaries of the CA: dash-dots horizontal lines). b) Time history
of vehicle velocity. c) Time history of vehicles accelerations. d)
Time history of position errors computed as pi(t) − pj(t) − p?ij ,
(i, j = 1, . . . , 4 i 6= j). e) Time history of the speed errors
computed as vi(t)− vj(t), (i, j = 1, . . . , 4 i 6= j). Vertical lines in
figures b), c) d) and e) indicate the time instant at the witch each
vehicle enters and exits the CA. Note that the different colors
refer the different vehicles (some vertical line are not visible since
they are overlapped)
the desired formation is obtained, the control protocol leads vehicles to
the velocity consensus v? = 10 [m/s], as depicted in Fig. 7.3b, Fig. 7.3e
and Fig. 7.3c. As required, the convergence is guaranteed before the first
vehicle accesses the CA, hence ensuring the absence of collisions. Indeed
the cooperative crossing problem 7.3 is solved in a finite time T of about
17 [s] (chosen the control gain as α = 0.1). Fig. 7.4 shows the inner
relationship between the control parameter α and the corresponding
convergence time T w.r.t to the appraised initial conditions for vehicles
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position and velocities in Tab. 7.1. Note that, according to [129], the
shortest convergence time occurs when α is approaching to 0 and this
confirms that the control parameter α can be properly tuned so to
ensure the desired convergence rate. Finally, we highlight that readers
may refer to the next Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion about
the effectiveness of the proposed control strategy in real on-the-road
scenarios.
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Figure 7.4: Settling time T [s] v.s. control gain α ∈ (0; 1).
7.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter a distributed control algorithm solving the problem
of coordinating autonomous vehicles at traffic intersections over 5G
communication networks has been proposed. By re-arranging all vehicles
within the cooperative zone at the intersection, the coordination problem
has been first recast as a virtual platoon control problem and then solved
by a distributed nonlinear control strategy, guaranteeing convergence to a
safe configuration in finite-time. The closed-loop stability is an on-going
work and hence not reported here. Numerical results have revealed the
ability of the vehicles to negotiate the traffic intersection so to cross it
without collisions.
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CHAPTER 8
Experimental validation of
Cooperative Driving
Strategies
In this Chapter we present the experimental validation campaign that we
carried out, in collaboration with Professor Paolo Falcone of Chalmers
University of Technology (Gothenburg, Sweden) and the Research Depart-
ment of Ericsson (Gothenburg, Sweden), to test the cooperative driving
control strategy proposed in Chapter 7. Experiments were performed
at AstaZero test track (near Gothenburg, Sweden) by exploiting three
heterogeneous vehicles, properly equipped with specific communication
and control hardware: Volvo Car XC90 ; Volvo Car S90 ; Volvo Truck
FH16. Experimental results confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed
approach in guaranteeing, in real on-the-road scenarios, the safe crossing
of autonomous connected vehicles at traffic junctions.
8.1 Experimental setup
The experimental trial involves three heterogenous vehicles, i.e. Volvo
Car XC90, Volvo Car S90 and Volvo Truck FH16, that exchange infor-
mation via a 5G communication network, kindly provided by Ericsson.
Since vehicles have been provided by Chalmers university of Technology
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and by Ericsson, each vehicle is proper equipped with different commu-
nication/control hardware devices and software components. Vehicles
are hence heterogeneous in their masses, on-board systems and driving
mode.
The Volvo Car XC90 and the Volvo Truck FH16 have been kindly loaned
by the Revere Laboratory of Chalmers University of Technology. They
are equipped with the open-source driving system OpenDLV [20, 21, 19].
On the other hand, Volvo Car S90 has been provided by Ericsson and it
is endowed with an ADB Pedal Robot [1] to drive the vehicles motion by
acting on steering and throttle/brake pedals. In turn, the robot can be
controlled through a proprietary interface that interfaces with Matlab
Realtime. In the following we detail for each vehicle under investigation
the vehicle architectures focusing both on hardware devices and software
components.
8.1.1 Volvo Car XC90
Here we analyze the hardware and software components of the Volvo
Car XC90 belonging to the Revere Laboratory at Chalmers and depicted
in Fig. 8.1. The sensing and control subsystems, on this car, are entirely
managed and supervised by OpenDLV. In particular, on-board sensors
and actuators are connected, through a Local Area Netowrk (LAN), local
to the car, with a main computer and exchange data through an UDP
(a) (b)
Figure 8.1: Test Car Volvo XC90: a) front perspective; b) back
perspective.
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(a) (b)
Figure 8.2: Test Car Volvo XC90 a) Test Car Volvo XC90 -
External Instrumentation b) Test Car Volvo XC90 - Internal
Instrumentation
Multicast session. The following sensors and actuators, already installed
and configured on the car, are used to carry out the experiments:
• Applanix GNSS: GNSS/INSS unit providing car position data in
GPS coordinates. This sensor is combined with a Radio modem
to gain RTK corrections on the field achieving a precision up to
centimeters in data position [194].
• Inertial Movement Unit (IMU): On-board unit that is used to assess
the current vehicle acceleration.
• 5G Telit Modem: 5th generation modem to establish a radio com-
munication with the 5G Ericsson Proof of Concept network.
• 5G Antennas: 5th generation antennas to receive information com-
ing from the 5G Ericsson Proof of Concept network.
• CAN Interface: Interface to the vehicle CAN to receive information
related to the current speed and send to the vehicle ECU the
computed control signals.
• Time-Synch: Time Synchronize used to align the clock among
multiple devices.
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Figure 8.3: Software architecture executed on OpenDLV.
• Golden PC: Main computer running the OpenDLV software under
a GNU/Linux based operating system (ArchLinux) to handle au-
tonomous driving sensing and actuating software. This computer
computes the control input on the basis of on-board and network
information.
This hardware configuration is showed in Figure 8.2a and 8.2b. The
software architecture, executed on OpenDLV, is instead depicted in
Fig. 8.3. Here, the blue boxes represent measurements and communica-
tion interfaces, while the yellow box implements the cooperative driving
control strategy. The green one, instead, is the vehicle interface to the
powertrain. This architecture is hierarchical, i.e. it is composed by an
upper and a lower level controller. The upper level (designed in this
thesis), leveraging data received from neighbors and local information,
determines the desired acceleration that has to be imposed for achieving
the required formation, while the Actuation Interface on OpenDLV passes
the appropriate commands to the powertrain, so that the lower level
control can command the throttle and/or brake system of each vehicle
for the actuation of the reference acceleration profile.
8.1.2 Volvo Truck FH16
Here we analyze the hardware and software components of the Volvo
Truck FH16, belonging to the Revere Laboratory at Chalmers and
depicted in Fig. 8.4. The autonomous driving on-board system on this
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vehicle is quite similar to the one of the XC90. Infact, the sensing and
control subsystems on the truck are entirely managed and supervised by
OpenDLV. In particular on-board sensors and actuators are connected,
through a Local Area Netowrk (LAN), local to the vehicle, with a main
computer and exchange data through an UDP Multicast session. The
following sensors and actuators, already installed and configured on the
truck, are used to carry out the experiments:
• Oxford OXTS GNSS: GNSS/INSS unit providing position data
GPS coordinates. This sensor is combined with a Radio modem
to gain RTK corrections on the field achieving a precision up to
centimeters for data position [194].
• Inertial Movement Unit (IMU): On-board unit that is used to assess
the current vehicle acceleration.
• 5G Telit Modem: 5th generation modem to establish a radio com-
munication with the 5G Ericsson Proof of Concept network.
• 5G Antennas: 5th generation antennas to receive information com-
ing from the 5G Ericsson Proof of Concept network.
• CAN Interface: Interface to the Volvo Truck CAN to receive infor-
mation related to the current speed and send the control signal.
• Time-Synch: Time Synchronize used to align the clock among
multiple devices.
• Golden PC: Main computer running the OpenDLV software under
a GNU/Linux based operating system (ArchLinux) to handle au-
tonomous driving sensing and actuating software. This computer
computes the control input on the basis of on-board and network
information.
This hardware configuration is showed in Figure 8.5.
The software architecture, executed on OpenDLV, is instead depicted
in Fig. 8.3. This architecture is hierarchical, i.e. it is composed by an
upper and a lower level controller. The upper level (designed in this
thesis), leveraging data received from neighbors and local information,
determines the desired acceleration that has to be imposed for achieving
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Figure 8.4: Volvo Truck FH16
Figure 8.5: Test Truck Volvo FH16 - Instrumentation
the required formation, while the Actuation Interface on OpenDLV passes
the appropriate commands to the powertrain, so that the lower level
control can command the throttle and/or brake system of each vehicle
for the actuation of the reference acceleration profile.
8.1.3 Volvo Car S90
Here we analyze the hardware and software components of the Volvo
Car S90, provided by Ericsson and depicted in Fig. 8.6
The vehicle exploits an ADB Pedal Robot (see Fig. 8.7) to actuate the
designed cooperative driving control strategy which is proper computed
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Figure 8.6: Volvo Car S90
Figure 8.7: Volvo Car S90: ADB Pedal Robot
via the dSpace Micro Autobox (MBAX)[54]. MBAX is a real-time plat-
form that is interconnected with the vehicle and the on-board equipment
through the Controlled Area Network (CAN) and the Local Area Net-
work (LAN), respectively and programmed through the Matlab Realtime
(Matlab RT) Toolbox. The control strategy is indeed implemented via
Matlab RT Toolbox and the related code is then uploaded on the MBAX
which elaborates the control output on the basis of network and local
information. The computed control strategy is then sent to the pedal
robot via the LAN. The following sensors and actuators are used to carry
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Figure 8.8: Test Car Volvo S90 Instrumentation
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Figure 8.9: Software architecture executed on dSpace MicroAutobox.
out the experiments:
• ADB Pedal Robot: This powerful robot acts both as sensor and
actuators. It has a direct connection with the vehicle GNSS unit,
IMU and CAN. Therefore it can communicate to the dSpace MBAX
the current state of the car. Furthermore it has the ability of
actuate the vehicle acceleration and the braking system (through
mechanical actuators on pedals) according to the designed and
implemented cooperative driving control strategy.
• 5G Telit Modem: 5th generation modem to establish a radio com-
munication with the 5G Ericsson Proof of Concept network.
• 5G Antennas: 5th generation antennas to receive information com-
ing from the 5G Ericsson Proof of Concept network.
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• Communication Box: It is a Raspberry PI opportunely programmed
to receive data from the 5G network and converts them in a readable
format for the dSpace MBAX.
• Router: It creates the internal ethernet LAN interconnecting all
onboard components.
This hardware configuration is showed in Fig. 8.8 while the software
architecture, executed on MBAX, is showm in Fig. 8.9. Here, the blue
boxes represent measurements and communication interfaces, while the
yellow box implements the cooperative driving control strategy. The
green one, instead, is the vehicle interface to the powertrain. This
architecture is hierarchical, i.e. it is composed by an upper and a lower
level controller. The upper level (designed in this thesis), leveraging data
received from neighbors and local information, determines the desired
acceleration that has to be imposed for achieving the required formation,
while the Actuation Interface provided by the ABD pedal robot passes
the appropriate commands to the powertrain, so that the lower level
control can command the throttle and/or brake system of each vehicle
for the actuation of the reference acceleration profile.
8.2 Experimental Driving Scenario
Experimental test has been carried out at AstaZero test track (near
Gothenburg, Sweden) 1 in the City Area 2. The City area consist of 4
blocks and cover a number of different sub-areas such as:
• town centers with varying street widths and lanes, bus stops, pave-
ments, street lighting and building backdrops;
• a road system with different kinds of test environments such as
roundabouts, T-junction, return-loop and lab-area. Connections
to the Rural road occur in two places.
The City area is based on a relatively flat surface and with dummy blocks
that resemble buildings both to the eye and to technical aids such as
radar as depicted in Fig. 8.10. One block contains space for control room
1http://www.astazero.com
2http://www.astazero.com/the-test-site/test-environments/city-area/
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and warehouse for dummies. The map of the City Area is reported in
Fig. 8.11
Figure 8.10: The City Area at AstaZero
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Figure 8.11: Map of the City Area at AstaZero
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Herein, the Cooperative Zone (CZ) (marked with a blue circle) is the
whole city area since we are considering that vehicles exchange informa-
tion via 5G network. The Conflicting Area (CA) (marked with a red
circle) is the T-junction part of the city. For the experimental tests,
vehicles are positioned as in Fig. 8.11 and they access the CZ with a
common initial velocity and relative positions that would lead to collision
without any control action.
The experimental trail involves two representative cooperative driving
scenarios, namely: i) Three autonomous vehicles scenario; ii) Two au-
tonomous vehicles with one human-driven vehicle scenario. In scenario i
we consider that the three vehicle are fully automated and, on the basis of
the shared information, they proper act on their motion according to the
control strategy in Chapter 7. In scenario ii we consider the Volvo Car
XC90 and Volvo Car S90 to be fully automated while the Volvo Truck
16 to be human-driven with capability to send information about its
position and speed. Parameters values, characterizing the experimental
scenarios, are summarized in Tab. 8.1. Finally we highlight that the
Control parameters
Control gain α 0.1
Vehicle length Li [m] L1 = 7.8 L2 = L3 = 4.6
Length of the trajectory ξi [m] 10 (i = 1, 2, 3)
Three autonomous vehicles
experimental scenario
Position error initial condition [m]
[e12(0), e13(0)]
> [−7.7,−10.3]>
Velocities initial condition [m/s]
[v1(0), v2(0), v3(0)]
> [13, 13, 13]>
Two autonomous vehicles
with one human-driven vehicle scenario
Position error initial condition [m]
[e12(0), e13(0)]
> [−7.7,−10.3]>
Velocities initial condition [m/s]
[v1(0), v2(0), v3(0)]
> [13, 13, 13]>
Table 8.1: EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIOS PARAMETERS.
measured 5G communication delay is equal to 11ms with a standard
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deviation of 0.02.
8.3 Experimental Results
The obtained experimental results, depicted in Fig. 8.12, confirm the
effectiveness of the proposed control strategy in guaranteeing the safe
crossing at intersection and its resiliency to communication time-delay.
Indeed, each vehicle cross the CA with a mutually exclusive mode in
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 8.12: Experimental Test-05-th June 2018
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Figure 8.13: Three autonomous vehicles scenario experimental
results: a) time history of vehicles positions (boundaries of the CA:
dash-dots horizontal lines); b) time history of vehicles velocities;
c) time history of vehicles accelerations; d): 2nd vehicle position
w.r.t. 1st and 3rd vehicle positions.
order to avoid side and rear-end collisions, i.e. at most one vehicle drive
without stopping within the CA at any time instant. See the full video of
the experiments at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rmjJkIlFMJ4.
Now we disclose in detail the experimental results obtained in the two
appraised cooperative driving scenarios.
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Figure 8.14: Three autonomous vehicles scenario experimental
results: a) time history of position errors computed as eij = pi(t)−
pj(t) − p?ij (i, j = 1, . . . , 3 j 6= i); b): time history of the speed
errors computed as vij(t) = vi(t)− vj(t) (i, j = 1, . . . , 3 j 6= i).
8.3.1 Three autonomous vehicles scenario
Results in Fig. 8.13 and Fig. 8.14 confirm the effectiveness of the con-
trol strategy in ensuring the safe crossing of three self-driving vehicles
that reach in a proper finite time the desired inter-vehicle spacing (see
Fig. 8.13a and Fig. 8.14a) with a common velocity (see Fig. 8.13b,
Fig. 8.14b and Fig. 8.13c) despite the presence of communication delays.
Indeed, as shown in Fig. 8.14a and Fig. 8.14b, where the time histories
of position and velocity errors are reported the desired control formation
is reached before that the first vehicle access the CA with a settling time
T of about 17 [s].
The good performance of the control algorithm is also confirmed by
results shown in Fig. 8.13d where the position of both the first and the
third vehicle, i.e. p1(t) and p3(t), are plotted against the position of
the second vehicle, i.e. p2(t). As it can be observed, both trajectories
tangentially touch the critical colliding area, indicated by the red square,
while the ideal trajectories (dashed-dotted line), that vehicles would
have followed if their initial velocities would have been held without
any correction, again uncover the occurrence of collisions without any
control. Note that, vertical lines in Fig. 8.13 b)-c) and in Fig. 8.14 a)-b)
indicate the time instant at the witch each vehicle enters and exits the
CA. Note that the different colors refer to the different vehicles (some of
the vertical lines are not visible since they are overlapped).
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Figure 8.15: Two autonomous vehicles with one human-driven
vehicle scenario. Experimental results: a) Time history of vehicles
positions (boundaries of the CA: dash-dots horizontal lines). b)
Time history of vehicles velocities. c) Time history of vehicles
accelerations.
8.3.2 Two autonomous vehicles with one human-driven
vehicle scenario
Results related to this road scenario are depicted in Fig. 8.15. Specifically,
the time histories of positions, velocities, and accelerations reported
respectively in Fig. 8.15a, Fig. 8.15b and Fig. 8.15c, confirm the
effectiveness of the proposed control strategy in guaranteeing the
exclusive vehicles access into the CA, whose boundaries are indicated
with dashed-dotted horizontal lines in Fig. 8.15a. Indeed, only when the
human-driven vehicle (the first to access the CA) has exited the CA, the
second vehicle is just ready to enter the intersection (as highlighted by
the vertical solid line). Finally, note that, according to the theoretical
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derivation, the desired inter-vehicle spacing is achieved before that the
first vehicle access the CA, hence ensuring collision avoidance at the
junction.
8.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have experimentally tested the distributed nonlinear
finite-time control algorithm in Chapter 7 that solves the problem of
coordinating autonomous vehicles at traffic intersections over 5G com-
munication networks. The experimental validation campaign has been
carried out at AstaZero test track (near Gothenburg, Sweden) by ex-
ploiting three heterogeneous vehicles, properly equipped with specific
communication and control hardware: Volvo Car XC90; Volvo Car S90;
Volvo Truck FH16.
We have provided details on the vehicles architectures focusing both on
hardware devices and software components. Then, we have described
the experimental driving scenario. Finally, we have disclosed the experi-
mental results. They have confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed
approach in guaranteeing, in real on-the-road scenarios, the safe crossing
of autonomous connected vehicles at traffic junctions.
CHAPTER 9
Conclusions
In this thesis the cooperative driving control problem of autonomous
connected vehicles has been addressed from networked control systems
perspective. We have focused our attention on two open control problem
both in cooperative driving application literature and in the general
context of networked control systems, namely:
1. designing distributed cooperative control algorithms that are re-
silient and robust to multiple time-varying communication delays
and packet losses;
2. designing resilient secure distributed control algorithms able to
counteract different security vulnerabilities when considering the
wireless communication network non-ideal.
To address the challenge 1, in this thesis we have proposed in Chapter 4
the novel adaptive distributed cooperative control so to ensuring the
cooperative driving despite the presence of communication delays
(assumed to be heterogeneous and time-varying) and also external
disturbances. The stability of the adaptive strategy and its robustness
w.r.t. uncertainties are analytically proven by exploiting the Lyapunov-
Krasovskii method and the stability criterion is expressed as an LMI
whose solution also provides the estimate of the delay margin that
guarantees stability. The effectiveness and robustness of the proposed
strategy is shown by using PLEXE simulator and Matlab/Simulink
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platform.
Again for addressing the challenge 1, we have also proposed in
Chapter 7 a nonlinear finite controller for the specific cooperative
driving application of autonomous vehicles approaching the traffic
junction. The nonlinear finite time controller has been chosen since in
this application a fundamental problem is to guarantee, besides the
robustness to communication impairments, that the desired virtual
formation is effectively reached before vehicles enter the Conflicting Area.
The stability analysis of the control strategy is an on-going work while
its effectiveness is validated in numerical and experimental way. Indeed
some on the road tests, involving three vehicles properly equipped for
autonomous driving, have been carried out at the AstaZero test track
near Gothenburg (Sweden). The related experimental results have
confirmed the effectiveness of the nonlinear streategy in guaranteeing
the safe crossing in real on-the-road scenarios.
For dealing with the challenge 2, we have proposed in Chapter 6 a
novel distributed collaborative strategy that guarantees the platoon
formation in adversarial environment and that allows to promptly react
to security vulnerabilities, such as messages manipulation attacks and
communication capability attacks. The proposed distributed control
approach also leverages a real-time voting technique to achieve the
complete mitigation of some of the most critical effects due to malicious
attacks. The stability of the strategy has been demonstrated by
exploiting the Lyapunov-Krasovskii theory and an extensive simulation
analysis discloses the effectiveness, the robustness and resiliency of the
proposed approach and its capabilities in reacting to the malicious
attack effects.
9.1 Future Works
Future works of this thesis could include:
• the stability analysis of the nonlinear finite-time controller proposed
in Chapter 7;
• the experimental validation of the cooperative driving control strate-
gies proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6;
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• theoretical robustness analysis of the adaptive distributed coopera-
tive control (proposed in Chapter 4) not only in presence of external
disturbances, but also in presence of parameters uncertainties on
vehicles dynamics;
• robustness analysis of the resilient control strategy (proposed in
Chapter 6) and of the finite-time nonlinear controller (proposed in
Chapter 7) in presence of both external disturbances and vehicle
dynamics parameters uncertainties.
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